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BACKGROUND: In recent years there has been emerging empirical support for the 
hypothesis that the mode of processing adopted in relation to trauma can impact 
upon outcomes in trauma-exposed individuals. Specifically “abstract” and 
“concrete” cognitive processing styles have been found to exert negative and 
positive outcomes respectively. However, at present the mechanisms by which 
these processing modes exert their effects on outcomes remains unclear. 
 
OBJECTIVES: By means of a systematic narrative review, we investigated the 
effects of “abstract” and “concrete” cognitive processing styles on outcomes in 
trauma-exposed individuals, and looked for evidence of the possible mechanisms 
by which these processing modes may be operating. 
 
METHODS: A systematic search was conducted using MEDLINE, EMBASE and 
PsycINFO databases. Studies were eligible for inclusion if they were published in a 
peer-reviewed journal, conducted on an adult population, included exposure to a 
trauma or an analogue trauma/stressor, as well as containing a manipulation or 
measurement of either “abstract” or “concrete” processing.  
 
RESULTS: 12 articles were included in the review, providing data from 14 studies. 
Eight studies were experimental in design, four were cross-sectional and two were 
longitudinal. Abstract processing was shown to lower mood, increase intrusions 
and levels of arousal. 
 
CONCLUSIONS: Abstract processing may be a cognitive avoidance strategy, which 
hinders the emotional processing of trauma, and thus perpetuates traumatic 
symptoms. Future studies should examine the effects of processing mode on 
appraisals of and memory for the trauma in order to shed further light on this 








1.1.  Processing mode theory 
Accumulating evidence suggests that the mode or style of processing that people 
adopt when repetitively thinking about negative events is one of the key factors 
that determines negative outcomes in emotional disorders, alongside valence of 
the thought content and the context in which it occurs (Watkins, 2008).  This 
theory evolved from studies showing repetitive negative thinking to be a key 
cognitive process in the onset and maintenance of a range of psychiatric disorders 
(Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004).  Studies 
investigating repetitive negative thinking in the form of worry in generalised 
anxiety disorder (GAD) and rumination in depression have provided the most 
empirical support for this hypothesis. More recently, research into rumination in 
trauma-exposed individuals with persistent PTSD has begun to emerge. In 
summary, the theory posits that the distinction between “abstract” and “concrete” 
cognitive processing can account for the functional and dysfunctional 
consequences of negative repetitive thought (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002; Watkins & 
Moulds, 2007).  
 
Various definitions of abstract and concrete processing have been proposed. In 
relation to GAD, abstract thought processes are defined as being “indistinct, cross-
situational, equivocal, unclear and aggregated”, whereas concrete thoughts are 
viewed as “distinct, situationally specific, unequivocal, clear and singular”(Stöber & 
Borkovec, 2002). The social cognitive literature makes a distinction between 
higher-level and lower-level construals of information processing, (Trope & 
Liberman, 2003; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), which have been adopted into 
processing mode definitions of repetitive negative thinking in depression. 
Abstract-evaluative thinking in the form of rumination has been characterised by 
high-level construals, which contain general, decontextualised mental 
representations that convey the essential gist and meaning of events and actions. 
They tend to consist of ‘why?’ and ‘what-if?’ questions that have no obvious 
solution, and are focused on the causes, meanings and implications of events. In 
contrast, concrete-evaluative thinking is characterised by low-level, specific, 
contextualised mental representations that convey the incidental details of events 
and actions. They tend to consist of ‘how’ questions that are focused on the direct 
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experience (including emotions) and the means to the desired ends, e.g. steps 
needed to achieve an overall goal (Watkins, 2008). 
 
1.2.  What are the mechanisms by which processing mode influences 
outcomes in depression/GAD? 
The way in which abstract and concrete processes influence outcomes in 
psychological disorders has been a matter of theoretical investigation in recent 
years. Watkins’ (2008) comprehensive review of constructive and unconstructive 
repetitive thinking provides some insight into the potential mechanisms by which 
processing modes may be operating, as do experimental studies that have 
manipulated processing modes in non-clinical populations. As previously 
mentioned, the majority of the experimental literature thus far has been concerned 
with rumination processes in depression, with a few significant studies on worry 
in GAD. Therefore the key mechanisms by which processing modes are 
hypothesised to be operating have been based on these disorders to date. In 
reviewing the literature on worry and rumination in depression and GAD, there 
appear to be four competing hypotheses about how processing mode may exert its 
negative effects in these disorders. A summary of the extant hypotheses is 
provided below. 
 
1.2.1. Problem solving 
One mechanism by which processing mode may exert negative effects is by 
influencing the efficacy of problem solving. Watkins (2008) argued that concrete 
processing may provide ‘more elaborated and contextual detail about the specific 
means, alternatives and actions by which to best proceed when faced with difficult, 
novel or complex situations.’ Consistent with this hypothesis, there has been 
evidence to suggest that when individuals with depression focus concretely on 
their symptoms, there are improvements in their social problem solving abilities 
relative to an abstract symptom focus (Watkins & Moulds, 2005). In addition, there 
is also evidence to suggest that when depressed individuals focus on concrete 
questions that are intended to increase their awareness of mental processes 
involved in problem solving, (e.g. “How am I deciding on a way to solve this 
problem?”) there are significant improvements in their problem solving abilities 
relative to questions focused on the cause of problems (e.g. “What’s the reason 
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behind all this?”) (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). In this way, the abstract nature of 
rumination, with its focus on “why” questions without obvious answers, may 
prevent the individual from finding a suitable solution to their problem.  
 
1.2.2. Self-regulation  
Processing mode linked to rumination may also exert its negative effects through 
self-regulation. Self-regulation is defined as the on-going pursuit of personal goals 
and evaluation of one’s own progress towards these goals (Carver & Scheier, 
1990). Leary et al. (2006) argue that abstract construals about the evaluative or 
interpersonal implications of one’s behaviour (e.g. thoughts about the implications 
of failing to carry out a desired behaviour) interrupt the smooth performance of 
behaviours, whereas more concrete construals (e.g. thoughts that focus on how to 
carry out the behaviour) benefit self-regulation by focusing attention on the 
immediate demands of the present situation, reducing anxiety and using up fewer 
self-regulatory resources.  Support for this hypothesis comes from studies that 
show high levels of actual-ideal discrepancy and a tendency to ruminate in 
response to stress and failure results in greater depressive symptoms (Papadakis, 
Prince, Jones, & Strauman, 2006).   
 
1.2.3. Degree of generalisation  
Processing mode may also exert effects by influencing the degree of generalisation 
in response to emotional events. In depressive rumination, abstract thoughts are 
seen to produce mental representations that generalize across situations and that 
fail to incorporate specific contextual details. Watkins (2008) argued that abstract 
construals could facilitate negative overgeneralisations where a single failure is 
explained in terms of a global personal inadequacy (e.g. “I am useless”) rather than 
in terms of situation-specific difficulties. In contrast, concrete construals are 
hypothesised to be more adaptive by reducing negative overgeneralisations. 
Support for this hypothesis has come from studies that have shown recalling 
specific, contextualised autobiographical memories reduces the negative impact of 
a stressful task in contrast to the recall of general, decontextualised memories 
(Williams, Eelen, Raes, & Hermans, 2006), as well as studies with depressed 
individuals where adopting a concrete-experiential self-focus (defined as focusing 
on the direct experience of one's thoughts, feelings and sensations in the present 
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moment) has been found to be protective against the development of negative 
global self-judgements (Rimes & Watkins, 2005).  
 
1.2.4. Emotional reactivity 
Following on from the generalisation hypothesis, the pathway by which processing 
mode may influence the extent of generalization may be via emotional reactivity. 
Emotional reactivity is conceptualized as the change in quality and intensity of 
affect in response to an emotionally evocative event, such as change in 
despondency following a failure. In depressive rumination, abstract processing 
involves predominantly high-level construals about self and mood, and when a 
negative event occurs, people with this mind-set are more likely to produce 
negative overgeneralisations (“I always mess up”) when focusing on self, problems 
and feelings. Such overgeneralisations are likely to exacerbate emotional reactivity 
to subsequent negative events (Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988). Evidence supporting 
this hypothesis comes from experimental studies where people high in trait 
rumination were trained to adopt either abstract or concrete construals and then 
exposed to a failure. Only abstract processing was found to be related to lower 
levels of positive affect (Moberly & Watkins, 2006) and therefore, processing mode 
was said to have moderated the effect of trait rumination on emotional reactivity. 
A direct effect of processing mode on emotional reactivity has also been shown 
when Watkins, Moberly and Moulds (2008) trained non-clinical participants in 
concrete processing and found that this reduced subsequent emotional reactivity 
to a failure relative to abstract processing.  
 
1.2.5. Emotional processing 
With regards to the literature on worry, research has shown that worrisome 
thoughts in GAD tend to be predominantly abstract in form, and that abstractness 
of thinking is related to diagnoses of GAD (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002; Stöber, 
Tepperwien, & Staak, 2000). To make sense of this, Stöber proposed a “reduced 
concreteness” theory of excessive worry (Stöber, 1998). He argued that worry is 
primarily a verbal process, consisting of abstract thoughts (i.e. reduced concrete 
thoughts), which function to reduce aversive imagery (Borkovec, Ray, & Stober, 
1998). He suggested that the dominant role of abstract verbal thoughts and the 
subsequent avoidance of concrete aversive imagery is what keeps worry going.  
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This is because confrontation of the meaning of the aversive material is needed for 
successful emotional processing of said material. Successful emotional processing 
involves activating the emotional memory linked to the imagery, accessing the 
representations of the stressor, elaborating the stored material and encoding 
information in memory which is inconsistent with existing emotional structures 
(Foa & Kozak, 1986). Without concrete emotional imagery to facilitate emotional 
processing, negative emotional states and heightened physiological responses to 
fear cues are maintained (Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004). This has been shown 
in experimental research when deliberate worry following exposure to a stressful 
stimulus resulted in an increase in subsequent intrusive images about the stressor. 
The authors suggested that emotional processing of the images had been blocked 
due to the cognitively demanding and predominately verbal activity of worry 
(Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995). Taken together, this research suggests that one of 
the mechanisms by which abstract processing may have a dysfunctional effect 
could be through the blocking of emotional processing of negative material.  
 
1.3. Processing mode theory applied to PTSD 
Given the evidence in favour of repetitive negative thinking as a transdiagnostic 
process (Ehring & Watkins, 2008), it is of no surprise that modes of cognitive 
processing are being explored transdiagnostically. One emerging area of research 
is the exploration of the processing mode theory in relation to trauma exposure 
(Ehring, Frank, & Ehlers, 2008). There is early research evidence to suggest that 
abstract-evaluative repetitive thinking about trauma and its consequences is 
responsible for symptom maintenance in PTSD (Michael, Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers, 
2007). However, since this is a novel research area, little is known about the 
mechanisms by which abstract thinking exerts its negative effects in relation to 
traumatic experiences. It may be the case that abstract and concrete processing 
influence outcomes in PTSD via some of the same mechanisms identified in 
depressive rumination and worry (as summarised above), and yet, given the 
different cognitive models for depression, GAD and PTSD, it seems likely that there 
might be mechanisms specific to PTSD through which the abstract and concrete 




1.4. Study aims and objectives 
The present systematic review aimed to summarise the extant literature on 
processing mode theory as applied to trauma, and in doing so to answer the 
following questions: 
 
1) What effects do abstract and concrete cognitive processing styles have on 
outcomes in trauma-exposed individuals? 
 
2) What does the extant literature have to say about the mechanisms by which 




2.1. Study selection criteria 
Ehring, Kleim and Ehlers (2011) recently summarised the extant literature on 
what is known about general cognitive mechanisms in PTSD, and concluded that 
research studies in this area typically fall into one of two categories. The first 
category concerns studies of survivors of traumatic events where associations 
between PTSD and cognitive variables are assessed with questionnaires and/or 
information processing paradigms. The second group of studies concerns healthy 
non-traumatized individuals who have been exposed to an analogue stressor and 
where cognitive variables have been experimentally manipulated to investigate 
their effects on analogue PTSD symptoms. As the present study was concerned 
with a specific type of cognitive mechanism in PTSD (namely abstract and concrete 
processing in relation to trauma), in light of the above, both types of study were 
included in the present review. The definition of “trauma-exposed” individuals was 
also kept wide enough to include analogue trauma exposed individuals. 
 
Studies were therefore included in the present review if: 
• They were conducted on an adult population (as cognitive processes are 
still developing in child/adolescent populations and are therefore arguably 
not comparable to adult cognitive processes) 
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• The population had been exposed to a trauma or an analogue 
trauma/stressor (as defined by the authors, but stressors akin to those 
found in the PTSD population) 
• There was a manipulation or measurement of either “abstract” or 
“concrete” processing in keeping with Watkins’ (2008) processing mode 
theory of repetitive thinking or Stöber’s (1998) theory of reduced 
concreteness. 
• The paper was published in a peer-reviewed journal 
 
Studies were excluded from the present review if: 
• The sample included individuals under 18 
• The population had not been exposed to trauma 
• The population had been exposed to a stressor relating to a disorder other 
than PTSD (e.g. depression, GAD, worry or social phobia) 
• There was no manipulation or measurement of either “abstract” or 
“concrete” processing 
• The manipulation or measurement of “abstract” or “concrete” processing 
was unrelated to Watkins’ (2008) processing mode theory of repetitive 
thinking or Stöber’s (1998) theory of reduced concreteness. 
• The paper was a review paper, an unpublished manuscript, or conference 
proceeding 
 
2.2. Information sources 
The following databases were searched for relevant studies in March 2015: 
EMBASE (via Ovid, 1980 to 2015 week 12, 23/03/15); MEDLINE (via Ovid, 1946 to 
March week 3 2015, 23/03/15); and PsycINFO (via Ovid, 1806 to March week 3 
2015, 23/03/15). The databases were selected based on the size and nature of 
their collections. In addition, further studies were identified by examining the 
reference lists of all relevant articles, hand searching the Journal of Behavior 
Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry for relevant publications in the last few years 
given it’s focus on experimental tests of psychological approaches to 
psychopathology, as well as searching the publication lists of frequently cited 
authors on their research websites (e.g. departmental webpages, 
ResearchGate.net). 
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2.3. Search strategy 
The search strategy used search terms pertaining to abstract and concrete 
processing styles and combined these with PTSD MESH and keyword search term 
variants (depending on the topic namings found in each database). The search was 
not limited by type of study or language. An example of the full list of search terms 
used to search the Ovid databases is provided in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.  A full list of the search terms used to identify relevant literature in the 
Ovid databases (EMBASE, MEDLINE & PsycINFO) 
 
2.4. Study selection 
Figure 2 shows a PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items of Systematic reviews and 
Meta-Analyses) flow diagram of the study selection process (Moher, Liberati, 
Tetzlaff, & Altman, 2009). Records identified from the search strategy were 
List 1. Abstract and concrete search terms (combined with OR) 
“abstract$ adj3 thought”, or “abstract$ adj3 thinking”, or “abstract$ adj3 
process$”, or “abstract adj evaluative”, or “repetitive adj thought$”, or 
“repetitive adj thinking”, or “recurrent adj thinking”, or “ruminative adj 
thinking”, or “unproductive adj thought$”, or “unproductive adj thinking”, or 
“reduced adj concreteness”, or “trauma adj related adj rumination”, or 
“trauma$ adj3 rumination”, or “PTSD adj3 rumination”, or “posttraumatic adj 
stress adj3 rumination”, or “cognitive adj process$ adj3 ptsd”, or “cognitive 
adj process$ style$”, or “processing adj3 trauma”, or “processing adj3 PTSD”, 
or “rumination/or rumination.mp”, or “concrete$ adj3 thought”, or “concrete$ 
adj3 thinking”, or “concrete adj process$”, or “concrete adj experiential”, or 
“constructive adj thought”, or “constructive adj thinking” or “construal adj 
level” or “level adj of adj processing” 
 
List 2. Trauma/PTSD search terms (combined with OR) 
“trauma$”, or “posttraumatic stress disorder/or posttraumatic stress 
disorder.mp”, or “PTSD/or PTSD.mp”, or “trauma adj exposed” or “analogue 
adj trauma”, or “stressful adj3 event” or “negative adj3 event”.  
 
Lists 1 & 2 (combined with AND) 
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checked for duplicates, and any duplicate records were removed from the search. 
The titles and abstracts of the remaining records were screened for potential 
eligibility against the study inclusion/exclusion criteria. Records were not 
considered for full-text screening and were excluded from the search if there was 
sufficient information in the abstract to indicate that the record was unrelated to 
the research question or did not meet inclusion criteria.  If there was insufficient 
information from the abstract in order for the researcher to make an informed 
decision about eligibility, the full-text of the paper was accessed and screened. At 
the full-text screening stage, both the first author and a blind independent rater 
assessed all 26 potentially relevant papers for inclusion. Any disagreement on 
ambiguous texts was resolved through discussion. Cohen’s Kappa was calculated 
as a measure of agreement between the raters, and was found to be 0.85, which 
represents almost perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). 
 
2.5. Data extraction and synthesis 
Data was extracted from reports using an extraction instrument that was created 
for the purposes of the present review. The following variables were extracted and 
are summarised by type of study in Tables 1 and 2: Author and publication year, 
country, total number of participants included in the study, percentage female, 
population, study methodology, experimental conditions, primary outcomes of 
interest (including measurement tools used), main effects of condition on 
outcomes or main finding, and conclusions about abstract/concrete processing 
mechanisms cited in the studies. As this is an emerging area of research, the 
present systematic review adopted a narrative data synthesis approach, and thus 
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3.1. Summary of study characteristics 
Tables 1 & 2 summarise the papers included in the review (see pgs. 40-45). In 
total, 12 papers were included in the review, with data from 14 studies (two 
papers reported two studies within one paper). Papers were published between 
2007 and 2014. Six studies came from labs or clinics based in the UK, four from the 
Netherlands, one from the USA, one from Belgium, one from Switzerland and one 
from Italy. All identified papers were written in English. Eight studies were 
experimental in design, four were cross-sectional and two were longitudinal. 
Sample sizes ranged from 51 to 212. Percentages of female participants ranged 
from 33% to 100%. 
 
Five of the studies recruited traumatized samples, three of which were cross-
sectional (Birrer & Michael, 2007; Ehring, Frank, & Ehlers, 2008; Michael, Halligan, 
Clark, & Ehlers, 2007) and two of which were longitudinal in design (Ehring et al., 
2008; Michael et al., 2007). Nine studies recruited non-traumatised participants, 
eight of which were experimental in design (Ball & Brewin, 2012; Ehring, Fuchs, & 
Kläsener, 2009; Ehring, Szeimies, & Schaffrick, 2009; Goldwin, Behar, & Sibrava, 
2013; Santa Maria, Reichert, & Hummel, 2012; Schaich, Watkins, & Ehring, 2013; 
Vrielynck, Philippot, & Rime, 2010; Zetsche, Ehring, & Ehlers, 2009), and one of 
which was cross-sectional (Bassanini, Caselli, Fiore, Ruggiero, Sassaroli, & Watkins 
2014)1. 
 
All cross-sectional studies and longitudinal studies used self-report questionnaires 
to gather information about abstract and concrete processing from participants, 
with two of the studies supplementing questionnaires with in-depth interviews 
(Birrer & Michael, 2011; Ehring et al., 2008). The analogue traumas used in the 
experimental studies assumed one of two categories: those using the trauma film 
paradigm and those using participants’ real-life distressing experiences. Four of 
the eight studies (Ball & Brewin, 2012; Ehring, et al., 2009b; Schaich et al., 2013; 
                                                     
1
 There was limited information in Bassanini et al. (2014) to assess whether the “negative everyday scenarios” 
used in the study were appropriate analogue trauma stressors relevant to our research question. However, we 
included this paper in the present review based on the example item of ‘car accident’ given in the paper, which 
is in keeping with the analogue trauma stimuli used in other included studies. 
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Zetsche et al., 2009) used a trauma film paradigm (Holmes & Bourne, 2008) to 
induce analogue trauma symptoms and to test the effect of abstract or concrete 
processing on these symptoms. The other four studies used participants’ own 
distressing life experiences to the same effect (Ehring, et al., 2009a; Goldwin et al., 
2013; Santa Maria et al., 2012; Vrielynck, et al., 2010b). Table 3 provides a 
summary of the types of analogue trauma stressor used in these experiential 
studies to provoke analogue PTSD symptoms, as well as specific details of 
abstract/concrete manipulations or measurements used (see pgs. 46-47). 
 
For the studies using trauma films, three out of four studies used films depicting 
the aftermath of real-life RTAs (Ball & Brewin, 2012; Ehring et al., 2009b; Zetsche 
et al., 2009), and one study used a scene from a particularly distressing motion 
picture (Schaich et al., 2013). The studies using films of RTAs all used films based 
on an original compilation by Steil (1997), as these have been shown to reliably 
induce intrusive memories in earlier studies (e.g. Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers, 2002; 
Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004). However, Zetsche et al. (2009) updated some 
of the German materials to make them more relevant to the UK population. Schaich 
et al. (2013) used a clip from the film “Irreversible” (showing the raping and 
beating of a woman) which has been used reliably as an analogue stressor in 
previous studies (Verwoerd, de Jong, & Wessel, 2008; Verwoerd, Wessel, de Jong, & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2009) and has also been found to be the most effective motion 
picture for eliciting stress responses relative to other traumatic films (Weidmann, 
Conradi, Gröger, Fehm, & Fydrich, 2009). 
 
The studies that used participants’ own experiences as analogue stressors were 
more diverse in their methodology. For example, Ehring et al. (2009) asked 
participants to identify ‘distressing, but non-traumatic life events’ which they had 
to be ‘moderately distressed’ about at the time of the study (indicated by a rating 
of at least 2 on a 0-5 scale). The variety of responses included ‘relationship 
difficulties or breakup, serious illness of a loved one, death of a loved one, serious 
family problems and serious problems at university’. However, Santa-Maria et al. 
(2012) required the ‘distressing life event’ to have happened in the last five years, 
with distress at the time of the event scoring at least 7 out of 10, and 5 out of 10 at 
the time of the study. The reported negative events fell into similar categories of 
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‘death of a loved one, relationship breakup, illness of a loved one, traffic accident, 
having been a victim of a crime, and other events.’ Vrielynck et al. (2010b) also 
required participants to have experienced a life event within the last five years, but 
one which they felt they had not recovered from and some of the features of which 
they had not previously disclosed. The resultant traumas were: ‘death of a relative, 
relationship break up, professional difficulties, sexual abuse, physical abuse, moral 
abuse, abortion, vehicle accidents, illness of a relative and other’. The least 
stringent criteria came from Goldwin et al. (2013), who instructed participants to 
call to mind a past traumatic event about which they currently think with ‘at least 
some frequency’. The resultant topics were: ‘injury/accident, victimization, death, 
negative interpersonal relationship, illness, suicide, and unspecified/vague-trauma 
related topic’.  
 
3.2. Quality of the reviewed studies 
Due to the different methodologies of the reviewed studies, it was not possible to 
use a single quality assessment checklist to assess the methodological quality of all 
the studies. As such, the quality of the experimental, longitudinal and cross-
sectional studies was addressed narratively, in line with guidance from Khan, 
Kunz, Kleijnen and Antes (2011). 
 
3.2.1. Quality of experimental studies 
According to Khan et al. (2011) there are four key biases that can impact upon the 
quality of experimental studies, namely: “selection bias”, “performance bias”, 
“measurement bias” and “attrition bias”.  
 
Selection bias refers to the systematic differences between comparison groups in 
responsiveness to experimental manipulation. To assess whether selection bias 
had been accounted for in the studies reviewed, we examined whether 
participants had been randomly allocated to their experimental groups, and the 
extent to which the randomisation process had been described. Seven of the 
experimental studies contained information about random assignment to groups, 
and one study allocated participants to groups according to their responses on 
standardised trait questionnaires (Goldwin et al., 2013). Five of the studies 
randomly allocated participants to groups, but stratified their assignment by 
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gender (Ball & Brewin, 2012; Ehring et al., 2009a; Ehring et al., 2009b; Santa Maria 
et al., 2012; Zetsche et al., 2009). None of the studies provided details of how the 
random assignment was done, however this is typically more pertinent for clinical 
randomised controlled trials. Randomisation checks were statistically analysed in 
the seven studies that used randomisation, and any significant differences that 
emerged between groups were controlled for in the main analyses. Overall, the 
selection bias was deemed adequately controlled for in the experimental studies 
reviewed. 
 
Performance bias refers to the systematic differences in the manipulation provided 
to the study subjects other than the interventions being evaluated. Although this 
item is more relevant to clinical interventions and typically refers to the blinding of 
participants to allocated conditions, we were interested in the standardization of 
the experimental protocols between comparison groups. All of the experimental 
studies made attempts to control for performance bias. For example, studies made 
sure that all participants were given the same instructions (bar processing mode 
specific instructions)(Ball & Brewin, 2012) and that manipulations lasted the same 
length of time (Ehring et al., 2009a; Ehring et al., 2009b; Goldwin et al., 2013; Santa 
Maria et al., 2012; Schaich et al., 2013; Vrielynck et al., 2010b; Zetsche et al., 2009). 
Specifically, Ehring et al. (2009a) made sure that their distraction condition 
demanded a similar amount of concentration and verbal activity as the rumination 
tasks, and Goldwin et al. (2013) made sure that periods of depressive rumination 
and trauma recall were counterbalanced across groups. In summary, it was felt 
that performance bias was adequately controlled for in the experimental studies 
reviewed. 
 
Measurement bias refers to the systematic differences between groups in how 
outcomes are assessed in a study. Blinding of study subjects and outcome 
assessors typically protects against this. Although blinding of participants was not 
seen as relevant to the research in question, we were interested in assessing the 
subjectivity of the outcome measures, and any inter-rater methodology used. All 
studies used validated self-report outcome measures as their main study 
outcomes, with three studies measuring physiological arousal by more objective 
means (Ehring, et al. 2009a; Ehring et al., 2009b; Schaich et al., 2013). In terms of 
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inter-rater methodology, thought samples were rated for degree of concreteness in 
Goldwin et al. (2013) by three independent raters trained in Stöber’s coding 
system. These raters were blind to condition and to the purpose and hypotheses of 
the study. Intraclass correlation coefficients were computed, and showed good 
reliability.  Similarly, independent raters blind to condition were sought for 
manipulation checks in two of the studies, and intraclass correlation coefficients 
also computed (Schaich et al., 2013; Zetsche et al., 2009). It is possible that some of 
the studies could have done more to account for possible measurement bias, but 
on the whole, measurement bias was deemed adequately controlled for in the 
studies reviewed. 
 
Attrition bias refers to the systematic differences between study groups in 
withdrawals from the study. Descriptions of withdrawals were assessed in the 
studies reviewed. Four of the studies made no reference to drop-outs, suggesting 
there were none in their studies (Ehring et al., 2009b; Goldwin et al., 2013; Santa 
Maria et al., 2012; Zetsche et al., 2009). The other four studies made reference to 
specific numbers of participants who had to be excluded from analyses due to poor 
compliance with the test instructions or adherence to study protocols (Ball & 
Brewin, 2012; Ehring al., 2009a; Schaich et al., 2013; Vrielynck et al., 2010b) 
However, only  Vrielynck et al. (2010b) detailed from which experimental 
conditions their drop-outs were from and discussed the effect of drop outs on the 
study in their discussion. This was probably due to the fact that the number of 
dropouts in the other three studies did not significantly affect the study sample 
size. None of the studies conducted intention to treat analyses. In summary, 
attrition bias was seemingly only relevant to half the studies reviewed, and was 
considered to have been adequately addressed in the studies it was relevant for. 
 
3.2.2. Quality of the cross-sectional and longitudinal studies 
In terms of assessing selection bias in cross-sectional and longitudinal studies, we 
were interested in the methodology used to select cases for participation in the 
study. In both their cross-sectional and longitudinal studies, Ehring et al. (2008) 
assessed PTSD and depression amongst individuals who had experienced a road 
traffic accident using the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV (SCID; First, 
Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996). In addition, in their longitudinal study, they 
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conducted the Acute Stress Disorder Scale (ASDS; Bryant, Moulds, & Guthrie, 2000) 
as an interview and rated the presence or absence of the DSM-IV criteria for Acute 
Stress Disorder. They report high inter-rater reliabilities for the SCID and ASDS 
interviews. Similarly, Birrer et al. (2007) and Michael et al. (2007) assessed PTSD  
in both their cross-sectional and longitudinal studies with a modified version of 
the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997), 
which is reported to show good agreement with the SCID. However, neither of 
these studies used a structured diagnostic interview, which may have meant that 
their samples exhibited other psychopathology that may have influenced their 
results. Indeed Birrer at al. (2007) comment that as they used a self-selected 
sample, it may have been the case that people with severe symptoms were either 
over or under represented in their study. However, on the whole, as these studies 
used robust, standardized measures to select their samples, selection bias was 
considered adequately controlled for. The one exception may be Bassanini et al. 
(2014) who selected a non-clinical ‘convenience’ sample ‘from email contacts 
obtained through a previous study using an online data collection service’. There is 
little more detail on this sampling methodology, and it is therefore unclear 
whether the sample is representative of the non-clinical Italian population. 
 
Both Birrer at al. (2007) and Michael et al. (2007) point to potential sources of 
measurement bias in their studies. Birrer at al. (2007) note that the Intrusion 
Questionnaire they used to measure intrusion qualities is not yet a validated 
measure, and thus they were unable to report on its psychometric properties. 
Michael et al. (2007) did not use a precise definition of “rumination”, as they did 
not want to bias participant answers, but equally this could be seen as a source of 
imprecision. Indeed, Bassanini et al. (2014) wrote their paper in English, but 
presented one of their figures in Italian, so it is unclear to the English-speaking 
reader whether the particular conclusions the authors reach about these variables 
are justified by their results. Other the other hand, steps were taken by some 
studies to minimise measurement biases, with Ehring et al. (2008) using inter-
rater reliability on a random proportion of the concreteness ratings from 
participants’ rumination interviews, using raters who were blind to participants’ 
diagnostic status. In summary, measurement bias was considered largely well 
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controlled for in the longitudinal and cross-sectional studies, with some studies 
acknowledging potential sources of bias somewhat better than others. 
 
3.3. What can cross-sectional and longitudinal studies tell us about 
abstract and concrete processing in trauma-exposed individuals? 
The results from longitudinal studies are based on a total number of 220 
traumatised participants. The results from cross-sectional studies are based on a 
total number of 247 traumatised participants and 212 non-traumatised 
participants. Traumatised patients assessed in the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
studies were either individuals who had been injured in a road traffic accident as a 
driver, passenger, motorcyclist or cyclist whose injuries ranged from ‘minor’ to 
‘life-threatening’ (Ehring et al., 2008), individuals who had experienced a physical 
or sexual assault (Michael et al., 2007), or patients with PTSD or with depression 
and a history of a traumatic experience (Birrer & Michael, 2011). Non-traumatised 
participants were individuals from the Italian general population who were asked 
about their typical responses to “unexpected, negative, everyday situations” 
(Bassanini et al., 2014). 
 
In terms of what can be learnt about abstract and concrete processing from these 
populations, all studies confirmed the presence of abstract “why” and “what-if” 
type thoughts in relation to rumination about trauma, but few studies provided 
clear evidence of significant effects of this type of thinking on trauma-related 
outcomes.  
 
With regards to the presence of abstract “why” and “what-if” type thoughts, Birrer 
and Michael (2011) found no difference in the frequency of these thoughts 
between groups of patients with PTSD, depression and a history of trauma, and 
depressed patients without trauma. They also found that rumination in all of these 
populations consisted of a mixture of “why” & “what-if” type thoughts (e.g. 
thoughts about how unfair the experience is, about what they could have done 
differently before the trauma/negative event happened, about what they could say 
or do to the perpetrator and thoughts about the trauma/negative event having 
destroyed their life), thoughts related to the stress event (e.g. thoughts about how 
they felt whilst they were experiencing the trauma/negative life event, about their 
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thoughts at the time, about the long term consequences of the trauma and 
thoughts about the worst part of the trauma) as well as depressive thoughts 
(thoughts about how bad they are, how threatening the world is, how incompetent 
they are, their wrong decisions, their bad relationships with others and thoughts 
about never being able to trust anybody anymore).  
 
Bassanini et al. (2014) revealed that non-clinical individuals may have inherent 
preferences for “why” vs. “how” thinking in response to unexpected negative 
events. When the authors asked participants to justify their preference for “why” 
vs. “how” thinking, the group that typically adopted “how” responses cited reasons 
such as “it helps me not to think about painful things”, “I can’t stand wasting time 
on useless thoughts” and “it helps me to understand what to do actually”. The 
“why” group cited more dysfunctional reasons, such as “it helps me to understand 
why I failed”, and “this is who I am”. 
 
With regards to effects of abstract and concrete thinking on trauma-related 
outcomes, both Michael et al. (2007) and Ehring et al. (2008) found that 
rumination per se was significantly associated with PTSD severity at the time of 
interview and at 6 month follow-up in traumatised populations. In addition, 
Michael et al. (2007) found that occurrence of abstract “why” and “what-if” type 
questions (alongside other factors) explained a significant proportion of the 
variance in PTSD severity at interview and at 6 month follow-up. Bassanini et al. 
(2014) found that non-clinical individuals who typically use a “why” thinking style 
in response to negative unexpected situations were more likely to exhibit greater 
levels of depressed mood, even when controlling for depressed symptoms. These 
findings are important to note as they underlie theoretical assumptions and the 
link between rumination and trauma-related outcomes.  
 
However, Ehring et al. (2008) found no relationship between the level of 
concreteness of participants’ ruminations about their trauma and rumination or 
PTSD severity at the time of interview. Their longitudinal study provided some 
indirect support for the hypothesis that reduced concreteness is associated with 
the maintenance of PTSD following trauma (as rumination and reduced 
concreteness together predicted PTSD at 6 months better than rumination 
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frequency alone), and yet despite this, the authors note that the results are 
theoretically disappointing. As such, they ask for great caution to be taken in 
interpreting these results, and call for more research before firm conclusions 
regarding the role of reduced concreteness in trauma-related rumination are 
drawn. 
 
Ehring et al. (2008) explain their lack of correlation between self-reported 
rumination and level of concreteness in the Rumination Interview by suggesting 
that their methodology differed from studies of worry where this link has 
previously been found (Stöber et al., 2000). They also argue that the anticipation of 
future events (as in worry) may lend itself to a greater range of levels of 
concreteness than thoughts about past experiences that have already happened (as 
in rumination), as these are by definition more concrete than future events. They 
call for a more fine-grained investigation into the concreteness vs. abstractness of 
thinking about trauma-related concerns. 
 
3.4. What can cross-sectional and longitudinal studies say about the 
mechanisms by which abstract and concrete processing influence outcomes 
in trauma-exposed individuals? 
Given the paucity of available evidence on how abstract and concrete processing 
may affect outcomes for trauma-exposed individuals, it is unsurprising that the 
cross-sectional and longitudinal papers say little with respect to hypothesised 
mechanisms about how these processing modes operate. 
 
Birrer et al. (2011) talk to the theory of cognitive avoidance in relation to abstract 
“why” and “what-if” type thinking. They suggest that dwelling on negative issues 
related to the trauma and not thinking actively about the traumatic experience 
itself hinders emotional processing of trauma (Foa & Kozak, 1986).  
 
In relation to abstract “why” thinking and its influence on depressive mood state, 
Bassanini et al. (2014) hypothesise that this processing style probably leads to an 
increase in negative mood since it does not permit the availability of concrete 
solutions. This hypothesis is supported by the results of their study as concrete 
“how” thinking allowed individuals to generate solutions to unexpected situations 
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and these participants were less depressed as a result. Caution should be taken 
before extrapolating the results of this study to trauma-exposed populations, as it 
is unclear whether all the “negative unexpected situations” on which the 
processing modes were trialled classified as analogue-traumas in the strictest 
sense. Therefore the preferences made for “how” vs. “why” processing in this study 
may better reflect the usual cognitive responses of individuals to everyday 
negative problems rather than trauma-related situations per se, although the 
negative consequences of “why” thinking are still of interest to note.   
  
3.5. What can experimental studies tell us about abstract and concrete 
cognitive processing in analogue trauma-exposed individuals? 
The results from experimental analogue studies are based on a total number of 
580 non-traumatised participants, the majority of which were students. Some 
students were required to have particular characteristics akin to those found in a 
traumatised population. For example, Ball and Brewin (2012) pre-selected 
students who had a habitual tendency to ruminate, whereas Goldwin et al. (2013) 
used scores on rumination and posttraumatic stress disorder measures to 
compose experimental groups. Ehring et al. (2009), Santa Maria et al. (2012) and 
Vrielynck et al. (2010b) all required participants to have experienced an upsetting 
life event in the recent past and to still be showing some level of distress in relation 
to the event.  
 
In terms of what can be learnt about abstract and concrete processing from these 
studies, there seems to be a mixed picture with regards to the precise maladaptive 
nature of abstract processing on trauma-related outcomes. The main trauma-
related outcomes of typical interest across the studies were intrusive memories of 
the trauma (frequency, distress, vividness), negative mood and arousal. 
 
Intrusive memories were measured in six of the studies included in the review 
(Ball & Brewin, 2012; Ehring et al., 2009a; Ehring et al., 2009b; Santa Maria et al., 
2012; Schaich et al., 2013; Zetsche et al., 2009). The maladaptive nature of abstract 
thinking in relation to intrusive memories can be seen in Ball and Brewin (2012) 
whereby both abstract rumination about trauma film content and non-film content 
combined resulted in a higher total frequency of intrusions over seven days and a 
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greater number of days with intrusions when compared with a control group. In 
addition, Ehring et al. (2009a) found that abstract rumination in relation to a 
negative life event led to the maintenance in frequency and distress of intrusive 
memories in comparison to a distraction condition. In relation to concrete 
processing, the adaptive nature of concrete thinking is highlighted in Santa Maria 
et al. (2012) where the decrease in intrusive memories from 12hr to 36hr post 
writing about a negative life event was significantly larger in the group who wrote 
in a concrete-experiential way in comparison to the group who wrote in an 
abstract-evaluative way. The benefits of concrete processing can also be partially 
seen in Ehring et al. (2009b) where concrete thinking led to fewer intrusive 
memories of a trauma film than a distraction condition, although not significantly 
fewer than an abstract condition. Results from other studies were less supportive 
of the processing mode hypothesis in relation to intrusive memory outcomes. 
Schaich et al. (2013) failed to find a significant overall effect of processing mode 
condition on intrusive memories, although did find that concrete training 
moderated the effect of trait rumination on intrusive memories. Similarly, Zetsche 
et al. (2009) failed to find a significant effect of processing mode on intrusive 
memories, but did find an indirect effect, in that state rumination across all 
conditions was positively associated with the number of intrusive memories 
following the experimental manipulation. 
 
Negative mood was also recorded in the same six studies (Ball & Brewin, 2012; 
Ehring et al., 2009a; Ehring et al., 2009b; Santa Maria et al., 2012; Schaich et al., 
2013; Zetsche et al., 2009). In three of the studies, abstract rumination in relation 
to both trauma film stimuli and real life upsetting stimuli was found to lead to the 
maintenance of negative mood, in contrast to concrete rumination and distraction 
conditions where negative mood decreased (Ehring et al., 2009a; Ehring et al., 
2009b; Zetsche et al. 2009). However, when Santa Maria et al. (2012) asked 
participants to write about their negative experiences in either an abstract or 
concrete mode, no differences in recovery from negative mood were found. 
Similarly when participants were trained in an abstract or concrete processing 
mode prior to watching a trauma film, no significant effect of training condition on 
negative mood was found (Schaich et al., 2013). 
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Physiological arousal was reported in three of the studies (Ehring et al., 2009a; 
Ehring et al., 2009b; Schaich et al., 2013) with abstract thinking leading to the 
maintenance of increased heart rate over concrete thinking in one study (Ehring et 
al., 2009b), but no significant effect of abstract rumination in comparison to 
distraction on arousal in another (Ehring et al., 2009a). Interestingly Schaich et al. 
(2013) found that a processing mode induction significantly moderated the 
relationship between trait rumination and heart rate, and between rumination and 
skin conductance at a trend level. Following abstract training, trait rumination was 
related to greater increase in arousal during the watching of a trauma film, 
whereas the opposite was true following concrete training.  
 
Most of the studies adopted a “why” vs. “how” framework in relation to abstract 
and concrete processing, with the exception of two studies (Goldwin et al., 2013; 
Vrielynck et al., 2010b).  Vrielynck et al. (2010b) were interested in low vs. high 
construal levels of thinking, and asked participants to write about a negative life 
event for several days, at either a low-construal level (i.e. in a concrete processing 
mode) or a high-construal level (i.e. in an abstract processing mode). They found 
that participants adopting a low-level construal were less distressed about the 
event during subsequent writing sessions than individuals who wrote at a high-
construal level. Another unique study was Goldwin et al. (2013) who were 
interested in concreteness ratings of trauma recall narratives, which they rated 
using Stöber’s concreteness coding system (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002). The authors 
found that concreteness of trauma recall did not differ between groups categorised 
by high rumination/high posttraumatic stress symptoms (PTSS), high trait 
rumination only, high PTSS only or controls. However, they did find that when 
participants were asked to report the percentage of thoughts and images they 
experienced in relation to both depressive rumination and trauma recall, trauma 
recall was characterised by greater image-based activity than depressive 
rumination, whereas depressive rumination was characterised by significantly 
higher verbal-linguistic activity. The authors concluded that this result 
demonstrates the uniqueness of trauma recall in comparison to other forms of 
repetitive negative thinking such as worry and depressive rumination. 
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3.6. What can experimental studies say about the mechanisms by which 
abstract and concrete processing modes influence outcome in trauma-
exposed individuals? 
Despite some mixed findings on trauma-related outcomes, overall there seems to 
be consistent support from the experimental literature that the processing mode 
hypothesis can be successfully applied to thinking about trauma. However, 
conclusions about the mechanisms by which abstract and concrete processes exert 
their effects have been tentatively drawn, as few studies have examined these 
mechanisms directly. The main theoretical explanation for the adaptive and 
maladaptive effects of concrete and abstract trauma-related thinking seems to be 
that abstract processing acts as a type of cognitive avoidance that hinders 
successful emotional processing of the trauma, whereas concrete processing 
enables it (Foa & Kozak, 1986). This is the same mechanism hypothesised to 
underlie the dysfunctional effects of worry in GAD (Borkovec, Shadick, & Hopkins, 
1991). In relation to trauma, the theory proposes that “why” and “what-if” 
questions that characterise trauma-related rumination serve to “help” individuals 
avoid processing the worst moments of the trauma, as they distract from more 
distressing cognitions, such as visual memories of the event (Ehlers & Steil, 1995). 
Although some individuals may feel that this strategy is beneficial (as illustrated by 
Bassanini et al., 2014), cognitive models of PTSD suggest otherwise.  
 
Ehlers and Clark (2000) propose that cognitive processing of the traumatic event 
in a way that induces a sense of current threat is key to the maintenance of 
persistent PTSD.  They suggest that this sense of current threat typically results 
from two key processes: (1) excessive negative appraisals of the trauma and/or its 
sequelae; (2) disturbance in autobiographical memory of the event, which is 
poorly elaborated and contextualised. All of the discussion sections in the 
experimental studies reviewed hypothesise that abstract-evaluative thinking about 
the trauma and/or its sequelae serves to maintain PTSD symptoms (e.g. 
heightened arousal, negative alterations in mood, intrusive memories) by 
encouraging processes (1) and (2), whereas concrete-experiential thinking 
interrupts them both.  
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Specifically, abstract thinking consisting of “why” and “what-if” thoughts is 
hypothesised to reinforce and maintain negative appraisals about the trauma, 
which could include overgeneralising from the event and perceiving other 
activities as more dangerous than they really are (e.g. ‘nowhere is safe’), 
exaggerating the probability of further catastrophic events happening to oneself 
(e.g. ‘I attract disaster’), or construing negative appraisals of one’s own feelings 
and behaviour during the event (e.g. ‘It was all my fault’). The overlap between 
abstract negative appraisals of self, world and others in depression and trauma-
related negative appraisals was shown in Birrer et al. (2011) where no difference 
was found in relation to the presence of “why” and “what-if” type thinking in both 
PTSD and depressed populations. The perpetuation of negative appraisals is also 
presumably the mechanism by which abstract rumination about trauma prevents 
recovery from negative mood (Ehring et al., 2009a; Ehring et al., 2009b; Zetsche et 
al. 2009).  
 
On the other hand, concrete processing is hypothesised to facilitate functional 
appraisals of the trauma and/or its sequelae by providing specific contextual 
information that prevents the perpetuating cycle of negative overgeneralising from 
one distressing experience to another.  This can be seen in Vrielynck et al. (2010b) 
where writing in a concrete way about the unique aspects of a stressful event 
helped participants to feel less distressed during re-confrontation with the event, 
better able to make sense of the event experienced and to express less anger when 
thinking about the event. This supports the idea that focusing on the actual 
situation itself in a concrete way facilitates more functional appraisals of the 
trauma and is therefore better than trying to think generically/abstractly about it. 
However, none of the studies in the present review examined the direct effect of 
processing mode on individual appraisals of the trauma, so at present this 
argument is only theoretically permissible and warrants specific research 
attention. 
 
In terms of the process of elaborating and contextualising the autobiographical 
memory for the traumatic event, few studies directly reported on this, although 
most studies endorsed it as a proposed mechanism by which processing modes 
exhibit their effects. The hypothesis is that concrete processing enables the 
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elaboration of the trauma memories, and in doing so, increases associations with 
other stored autobiographical information. In this way, concrete processing may 
theoretically have the effect of integrating the trauma memory into an individual’s 
autobiographical memory base, facilitating intentional retrieval of trauma-related 
material, increasing the coherence of the memories, and rendering the memories 
less vulnerable to triggering by matching sensory cues in the environment (i.e. 
fewer intrusive memories). When this processing is disrupted (e.g. in the form of 
abstract processing), trauma memories may be poorly integrated into 
autobiographical memories, which would theoretically result in more disorganised 
trauma memories, poorer intentional recall and increased likelihood in 
involuntary trauma-related intrusions. 
 
To test this, Zetsche et al. (2009) employed a specific concrete processing 
condition as part of their processing mode manipulation called “memory 
integration”. This condition aimed to integrate the traumatic experience of 
watching a trauma video into preceding and subsequent experiences in 
autobiographical memory (See Table 3 for details). The authors hypothesised that 
participants in this condition would experience fewer intrusive memories than 
participants in abstract ruminative processing or control processing modes in line 
with the above theory. However, this hypothesis was not supported. The authors 
suggested that their methodology may have been partly at fault, in that just asking 
participants to think about concrete questions may not have been enough to help 
memory elaboration and integration processing, as well as the fact that some 
memory integration questions may have directly induced rumination rather than 
functional processing in rumination-prone individuals. They did find however 
some encouraging correlational evidence that intrusive memories were negatively 
correlated with levels of memory integration adjusted for rumination, which is 
supportive of Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) proposal that memory integration is 
needed for successful recovery from PTSD. 
 
As Ehring et al. (2009b) found no difference between abstract and concrete 
processing conditions on the subsequent frequency of intrusive memories, but did 
find a difference on mood and arousal measures, they proposed a slight variation 
to the emotional processing hypothesis. They suggest that abstract processing may 
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exert its negative effects via mood/arousal and therefore impede upon emotional 
processing via the strengthening of negative appraisals of the trauma, rather than 
via the prevention of the elaboration of the trauma memory.  
 
In summary, there are promising experimental findings providing support for the 
idea that the distinction between abstract and concrete processing can account for 
the functional and dysfunctional effects of repetitive thinking about 
traumatic/highly distressing experiences. The literature reviewed seems to be in 
agreement about the mechanisms linked to emotional processing through which 
these processing modes are operating in trauma-exposed populations. The 
proposal that abstract “why” and “what-if” processing is a cognitive avoidance that 
serves to hinder emotional processing of the trauma is made reference to in the 
majority of the papers reviewed with particular reference to Ehlers and Clark’s 
(2000) cognitive model of PTSD. However, as of yet, there has been little research 
directly examining the effects of processing mode on the key components of Ehlers 
and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model, i.e. appraisals of the trauma and 
autobiographical memory of the event. Therefore the emotional processing 
mechanism in relation to the processing mode hypothesis is at present only 
theoretically supported. Figures 3 and 4 summarise the proposed theoretical 
mechanisms by which abstract and concrete processing styles seemingly affect 






































Figure 3. A summary diagram to show the proposed theoretical mechanism by 

























Figure 4. A summary diagram to show the proposed theoretical mechanism by 
which a concrete processing style affects outcome in trauma-exposed individuals 
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4.1. Summary of the evidence 
The present systematic review aimed to summarise the extant literature with 
regards to the effects of “abstract” and “concrete” cognitive processing styles on 
outcomes in trauma-exposed individuals. In addition, the review aimed to provide 
clarity on the mechanisms by which these processing styles may be operating. We 
identified a total of 14 published studies on the topic, all of which had been 
published in the last 8 years.  
 
In line with Ehring et al.’s (2011) prediction about the types of studies in this 
research area, the studies we identified as reporting on abstract and concrete 
processing modes in relation to trauma were either cross-sectional or longitudinal 
studies conducted with traumatized samples, or experimental studies conducted 
with healthy non-traumatized participants. We found one exception to this: a 
cross-sectional study of a non-clinical population that was interested in “why” and 
“how” thinking in response to stressful events in the general population (Bassanini 
et al., 2014). All of the studies reviewed were considered to have adequately 
controlled for selection bias, performance bias, measurement bias and attrition 
bias where appropriate. 
 
Cross-sectional and longitudinal studies illustrated the presence of abstract “why” 
and “what-if” type thinking in traumatised populations, as well as highlighting 
individual preferences for abstract or concrete processing in relation to stressful 
events amongst the general population. In terms of dysfunctional effects of 
abstract processing, “why” and “what-if” thinking was found to explain a significant 
proportion of the variance in PTSD severity in the days, weeks and months after a 
traumatic event. However, there was no clear evidence that reduced concreteness 
of trauma-related ruminations were responsible for rumination amount or PTSD 
severity. Possible mechanisms by which abstract processing exerts a negative 
effect are alluded to in a few of the papers, such as the mechanism of cognitive 
avoidance that hinders emotional processing and prevents the generation of 
solutions to problematic stressful events. 
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Experimental studies tended to manipulate processing modes in student 
populations, using a trauma-film or own distressing life-events as analogue 
traumatic stressors. The main outcomes of interest in these studies were intrusive 
memories of the trauma, negative mood and arousal. The findings are mixed with 
regards to each of these outcomes, caveated by study methodology, but on the 
whole, the picture is emerging that abstract processing results in the maintenance 
of intrusive memories about the trauma, negative mood and increased arousal, 
whereas concrete processing facilitates recovery from these. The majority of 
experimental studies allude to the hypothesis that abstract processing is 
dysfunctional because it hinders successful emotional processing of the trauma 
(Foa & Kozak, 1986). However, only one study directly tested this mechanism by 
including a concrete mode manipulation specifically designed to promote 
autobiographical memory integration in relation to the emotional processing 
hypothesis (Zetsche et al., 2009). However, this study only found correlational 
evidence that intrusive memories are negatively correlated with levels of memory 
integration adjusted for rumination. 
 
4.2. Limitations 
A number of limitations to the present review are noteworthy. First, due to the 
narrative nature of the review and the range in the type of studies reviewed, an 
established quality assessment tool was not employed to assess the potential bias 
in the studies reviewed. Instead the quality of the studies was reviewed narratively 
by the author, which could be considered as a less accurate assessment of the 
methodological rigour of the reviewed studies. Second, in terms of potential bias 
within the included studies, it is worth highlighting that eight of the included 
studies were co-authored by the same author. Although this is probably a 
reflection of a keen research interest, it is important for other research groups to 
also investigate this topic so that we can have increased confidence that these 
processes operate in the way hypothesised across a variety of trauma-exposed 
populations.  Third, although the search strategy was limited to articles published 
in peer-reviewed journals, it may be the case that grey-literature or publications 
in-preparation/in-press exist on this topic. The results of this review should be 
interpreted in light of the fact that it was written at a point where published 
studies are just beginning to emerge in this area, and as such, it may be the case 
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that the number of published studies regarding processing mode in relation to 
trauma will increase in the future and provide stronger answers to the questions 
posed in this review. 
 
4.3. Future research directions 
Given the accumulating evidence that processing style is partly responsible for 
adaptive vs. maladaptive outcomes in trauma-exposed individuals, it seems an 
important next step, as highlighted by Santa Maria et al. (2012), for research in this 
area to now explore the exact mechanisms by which abstract and concrete 
processing styles exert their effects.  At the moment there seems to be a strong 
theoretical rationale for abstract “why” and “what-if” processing to be a form of 
cognitive avoidance that hinders emotional processing of the trauma, and 
therefore inhibits successful elaboration and integration into autobiographical 
memory. However, as of yet, there is little empirical support for this precise 
hypothesis. Experimental studies manipulating processing mode should measure 
the effect of abstract vs. concrete thinking about trauma on memory for the 
trauma, as well as appraisals of the trauma, preferably weeks after exposure to the 
traumatic stimuli. Attempts should also be made to directly test whether the other 
mechanisms by which abstract and concrete processes have been proposed to 
operate in repetitive thinking in depression and worry (see Section 1.2) also apply 
to trauma-related rumination. 
 
There may also be potential moderators of the effect of processing mode on 
trauma-related outcomes and future studies should seek to clarify these. For 
example, one reason for the discrepancy in significant and non-significant effects 
of processing mode manipulations on trauma-related outcomes may be that an 
effect of processing style is moderated by the degree to which the events are 
personally relevant to participants. This can be seen in the present review where 
more studies focusing on intrusions about real-life events (Ehring et al., 2009a; 
Santa Maria et al., 2012) tended to produce significant effects of processing style 
than studies that focused on intrusive memories about a stressful film (Ehring et 
al., 2009b; Zetsche et al., 2009). It may also be the case that results from trauma 
film studies where participants were instructed to watch a trauma might be a truer 
reflection of the cognitive processes in witnesses of traumatic situations, rather 
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than of those directly involved. Future studies should investigate the potential 
effect of personal relevance further, and may wish to consider using virtual reality 
technology as a way of manipulating personal relevance of traumatic stimuli. 
Additional moderators alluded to in the present studies might be trait rumination, 
as this has been found to be the case in the depression literature (Moberly & 
Watkins, 2006; Watkins, 2004), and gender, as found by Zetsche et al. (2009). 
Future studies should examine the role of these and other moderating factors. 
 
Moreover, even within abstract and concrete processing there are different 
dimensions to consider. There is some emerging evidence from the studies 
reviewed that low vs. high level construals produce the same picture of results as 
evaluative vs. non-evaluative thinking (Vrielynck, Francois & Philippot, 2010a), but 
the effects of evaluative vs. non-evaluative thinking remain unexplored. Future 
research should investigate this issue more closely by manipulating various 




The present review aimed to synthesise the extant literature on the role of 
cognitive processing styles in relation to thinking about trauma, and in doing so 
has gathered support for the hypothesis that an abstract processing style is 
maladaptive and a concrete mode is adaptive when in comes to outcomes in 
trauma-exposed individuals (e.g. intrusions, negative mood and arousal). Although 
not all studies found evidence to support this hypothesis, we would argue that 
“absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” (Altman & Bland, 1995), as this is 
an emerging research area and researchers are still attempting to refine their 
methodology when it comes to measuring or manipulating processing mode or 
intrusive memories. The majority of studies in this area seems to be in agreement 
about the theory behind maladaptive abstract processing, and look to both Foa and 
Kozak (1986)’s theory of emotional processing of fear-related stimuli and Ehlers 
and Clark’s (2000) cognitive theory of persistent PTSD to provide an answer. It 
seems theoretically plausible that abstract “why” and “what-if” processing of 
trauma is a cognitive avoidance strategy, which hinders the emotional processing 
of trauma, and thus perpetuates traumatic symptoms. What is now needed is 
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empirical evidence to support the idea that emotional processing has been 
hindered by abstract processing, which would require examination of trauma 
related appraisals and trauma memory integration in future studies. If the theory 
is further supported in this way, the research can confidently move in a clinical 
direction with the designing and testing of treatments for trauma-exposed 
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Abstract processing… 
1. May maintain PTSS, by reinforcing and 
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and interfering with emotional processing 
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Related to intrusive 
memories in abstract 
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Abstract processing… 
1. May interfere with the elaboration and 
contextualisation of the trauma memory 
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1. Is more likely than abstract processing 
to expose the individual to specific details 
of the traumatic memory which would 
facilitate the elaboration and 
contextualisation of the trauma memory 
 
2. Should lead individuals to take in 
disconfirming evidence that is needed to 
modify dysfunctional appraisals 
Key: ↓ =significantly lower scores than, i.e. more improvement, ↑ =significantly higher scores than, i.e. less improvement, ↔ =no significant difference between groups; (DASS-21)= 
Depression, Anxiety & Stress Scale; (PANAS)=Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; (PANAS-X)=Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form; (RRS/RIQ)=Ruminative 
Response Scale of the Response Style Questionnaire; (GHQ)=General Health Questionnaire; (SAES)=Speilberger Anger Expression Scales; (PTQ-S)=Perseverative Thinking 
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concrete solutions 
 
2. May persist in some individuals 
because of “cognitive fusion”.  
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fused to dysfunctional beliefs tend 
to prefer “why” styles of thinking 
as they believe “why” thinking 
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rumination. Ruminative thoughts 
can also be depressive, or related 
the stressful event  
 
2. In relation to trauma may 
provoke avoidance that in turn 
exacerbates depressive thoughts 




Country Total n Female 
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Main findings Conclusions about 
abstract/concrete 
processing mechanisms 
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Ehring et 
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trauma sig. correlated 
with PTSD severity, and 
significantly predicted 
PTSD at 6 months 
 
Reduced concreteness 
was not correlated with 












1. May vary in 
concreteness depending on 
whether the person is 
worrying about a future 
event or ruminating about 
a past event.  Rumination 
about future events 
(worry) may lend itself to a 
greater range of levels of 
concreteness than 
thoughts about past 
experiences that have 
already happened 
(rumination), as the latter 






























questionnaires of PTSD 
symptoms and 
associated symptoms, a 
general information 
questionnaire/intervie
w, and a rumination 
interview. Longitudinal 





Data on rumination 
(presence, 
compulsivity, 
occurrence of “why” 





feelings before & 
after rumination)  
Rumination measures: 
The presence of 
rumination was 
significantly associated 
with PTSD severity 
 
Occurrence of “why” & “ 
what-if” questions (and 
other factors) predicted 
PTSD severity at time of 
interview and 6 months 
later 
Abstract processing… 
1. May be maladaptive 
because it constitutes a 
form of cognitive 
avoidance, thereby 
hindering emotional 
processing of the trauma 
Key: ↓ = signi\icantly lower scores than... i.e. more improvement, ↑ = signi\icantly higher scores than… i.e. less improvement, ↔ = no significant difference between groups; (BDI) = Beck 
Depression Inventory; (RS/RIQ) = Rumination scale of the Responses to Intrusions Questionnaire; (RRS/RSQ) = Ruminative Response Scale of the Response Style Questionnaire; (PDS) = 
Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale 
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Article Analogue trauma stressor Examples of abstract or concrete processing mode instructions given to participants OR examples of abstract/concrete 
rumination measurements 
Ball et al. 
(2012) 
Trauma film of 5 separate real-
life RTAs, lasting 12.5 minutes. 
Includes dead bodies, body 
parts, close-ups of injuries, cries 
of pain and distress 
 After the film, participants were presented with six prompt questions depending on their condition and instructed to dwell on them, 
e.g.: 
 
“Why are there so many reckless & careless drivers causing accidents like that?”  (Abstract; film-related rumination) 
 
“Why didn’t people do something before, to stop the financial crisis happening & affecting so many people?”  






Trauma film of 8 separate real-
life RTAs, lasting 17 minutes. 
Includes dead bodies, injuries 
people & emergency personnel 
at work. 
After the film, participants read a transcript of a trauma survivor thinking about his trauma in an abstract/concrete way, were then 
presented with abstract ruminative/concrete thoughts and were instructed to dwell on them, e.g.: 
 
“Why do so many accidents have to happen?”/“Why does road traffic have to be so dangerous?”/“What if such an accident happened to me?” 
(Abstract ruminative thinking) 
 
“Which different factors contribute to road traffic being so dangerous?”/”What exactly would I think and feel if such an accident happened 






Participants were asked to 
describe (out loud) a distressing 
but non-traumatic life event 
they had experienced within the 
past 2 years and were still 
distressed about 
Participants had to rate how often particular abstract thoughts come to them in relation to their chosen negative event, and were 
instructed to dwell on them, e.g.: 
 
“Why did this event happen to me?”/”What if I had behaved in a different way?”/”Why am I feeling so sad when I think about this event?” 







Participants were asked to 
recall (in their mind) a past 
traumatic experience that they 
still think about frequently 
Participants were interrupted at various points during their trauma-related rumination and were asked to record the contents of their 
thoughts at these points.  
 
The thoughts were rated for degree of concreteness using Stöber’s coding system (1 = abstract, 3 = neither abstract nor concrete, 5 = 
concrete) 
Table 3. Summary of analogue trauma stressors and abstract/concrete manipulations and measurements 
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Article Analogue trauma 
stressor 





Participants were asked 
to recall (in their mind) 
the “hot-spot” of their 
distressing life event and 
imagine it vividly 
Participants were instructed to write about their experience in an abstract-experiential way or a concrete-experiential way, after being presented 
with relevant prompt questions, e.g.: 
“Why do I feel the way I do when thinking about the event?”/”Why did it happen?”/”Why didn’t I behave differently?”/”Which consequences will the 
event have for me in the future?” (Abstract-evaluative) 
 
“How do I feel at the moment?”/”How do I feel during the event?”/”What did I see, hear, think and do during the event?”/”What exactly can I do to 




Trauma film was a scene 
from a motion picture 
(“Irreversible”, rated 
16+) showing the raping 
and beating of a woman, 
lasting 14 minutes 
 
Before the film, participants were presented with 15 positive and 15 negative scenarios and were instructed to process them in either an abstract 
or concrete way, e.g.: 
“Please concentrate on this event for the following minute. Think about why it happened and analyse the causes, meanings, and implications of this 
event.” (Abstract processing) 
 
“Please concentrate on this event for the following minute. Think about how it happened and imagine it in your mind as vividly and as concretely as 






Participants asked to 
identify an upsetting life 
event they had 
experienced in the past 5 
years, that they had not 
recovered from and 
some of the features of 
which had not been 
disclosed previously 
 
Participants were instructed to write about their life event at a low-construal level (concrete) or a high-construal level (abstract) or about a 
neutral topic, e.g.: 
“Could you describe chronologically the different steps of the event?”/“How were objects exactly arranged around you in this place?”/”Who was 
present during the event?” “Could you describe their clothes, attitudes etc.?” (Low-level construal/concrete processing) 
 
“What place typically evokes that type of emotion associated with the upsetting event?”/”What characteristics in people remind you of the 





Same trauma film as used 
by Ehring et al. 2009, but 
updated to replace old 
German footage with 
more recent UK footage 
After the film, participants were instructed to dwell on particular sentences depending on their condition, e.g.: 
“Why do people have to drive that recklessly?”/”Would I ever be able to be the same person as before?”/”How can I drive again without thinking 
about what could happen?” (Abstract rumination condition) 
 
“Think about what you have done and how you felt before coming to the session”/”Has the experiment matched your expectations?”/”Think back to 
the video, judge which scenes you found most unpleasant and think about why and how the scenes were similar or different to your own 
experiences”/”Think about your own experiences on the road, especially those you find enjoyable and in which you feel safe”/”Think about your plans 
for the rest of the day” (Memory integration condition) 
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BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Groups at risk of developing PTSD, such as 
emergency service workers, often know beforehand that they will be exposed to 
trauma. They therefore have the opportunity to adopt potentially protective peri-
traumatic cognitive strategies. The broader literature has established that abstract 
cognitive processing of stressful events is more harmful than concrete cognitive 
processing. The present study tested the hypothesis that training to adopt concrete 
processing during analogue trauma would lead to fewer intrusive memories, PTSD 
symptoms, and better recognition and recall memory compared with training in 
abstract processing at one week follow up. The effects of natural processing on 
these symptoms, as well as the content of natural processing were also explored. 
 
METHODS: Seventy-three healthy participants were trained to process traumatic 
films in an abstract mode (n=26) or concrete mode (n=26) or received no training 
(“natural” processing control) (n=21). Number and type of intrusive memories, 
PTSD symptoms, recognition memory and coherency of trauma recall were 
assessed after one week.  
 
RESULTS: Training in concrete processing led to significantly fewer thought-based 
intrusive memories, PTSD symptoms, better recognition memory and a more 
coherent trauma recall narrative than training in abstract processing. No 
differences were found in the number of image and affect-based intrusive 
memories experienced between groups. Natural processing was identified in this 
sample to be a mixture of abstract and concrete processing. Significant differences 
between concrete and natural processing emerged in relation to PTSD symptoms 
and recognition memory. There were no differences between abstract and natural 
processing. 
 
CONCLUSIONS: The study provides preliminary evidence that training to adopt 
concrete processing during analogue trauma may prove protective against the 
development of PTSD symptoms. The results need to be replicated in a prospective 
study of individuals at-risk of PTSD and likely to be exposed to trauma, such as 




1.1. Peri-traumatic factors are key to early intervention in PTSD  
Since persistent PTSD is well known for its debilitating psychological and social 
consequences, it is imperative to focus research attention on early interventions 
aimed at reducing vulnerability to developing PTSD. This is especially pertinent for 
individuals who are exposed to trauma on a regular basis, as their risk of 
developing the condition is likely to be high. For example, increased rates of PTSD 
have been found amongst certain occupational groups who are regularly exposed 
to trauma, such as emergency personnel (Jonsson, Segesten, & Mattsson, 2003; van 
der Ploeg & Kleber, 2003) and the military (Hoge et al., 2004; Iversen et al., 2008). 
Indeed a recent systematic review (Skogstad et al., 2013) concluded that 
“professional first responders” to traumatic events, such as police officers, 
firefighters and ambulance personnel are more likely to suffer from PTSD than 
other professional groups. Thus far, numerous studies have indicated a range of 
pre-, peri- and post-traumatic factors associated with increased risk of PTSD. Two 
key meta-analyses have concluded that peri-traumatic processes, defined as 
“characteristics of the event itself, and cognitive and affective processes operating 
at the time”, may be the best predictors of future PTSD symptoms (Brewin, 
Andrews, & Valentine, 2000; Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003). As a result, peri-
traumatic factors have been given specific research attention in recent years.   
 
1.2. Processing mode theory  
One particular peri-traumatic process of interest is the mode of cognitive 
processing adopted during the traumatic event. The broader literature on 
emotional disorders has found consistent evidence that the mode or style of 
cognitive processing in which people think about negative events is an important 
factor in determining disorder-related outcomes. 
 
This theory emerged from studies showing that rumination and worry are 
implicated in the onset and maintenance of a range of psychological disorders, 
including PTSD. Both rumination and worry are types of repetitive thinking, and 
Watkins (2008) hypothesised that such repetitive thinking can be functional or 
dysfunctional partly depending on the style or mode of cognitive processing that is 
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adopted. He observed that dysfunctional repetitive thinking tends to be 
characterised by higher-level, abstract, analytical, evaluative, general and de-
contextualised processing. Such thoughts tend to consist of evaluative questions 
(“Why did this happen?”) that are focused on the discrepancies between current 
and unwanted outcomes (“Why didn’t anyone…?”, “If only someone had…”). By 
thinking in this way, a person’s attention is directed to the negative causes, 
meanings and implications of the distressing issue. Conversely, more functional 
thinking tends to be characterised by lower-level, concrete, experiential, non-
evaluative, specific and contextualised processing. These thoughts tend to consist 
of non-evaluative questions that refer to the direct experience and outcome (“How 
did I feel at the time?”, “What did I see/hear?”). By thinking in this way, a person is 
able to process their emotions in relation to the event, whilst focusing on the actual 
experience of the event. This allows for the creation of concrete mental 
representations of the contextual, specific and incidental details of the event.  
 
Support for this hypothesis in relation to depression comes from experimental 
studies that have used cognitive bias modification (CBM) methods to manipulate 
abstract and concrete modes of processing prior to stressful events. For example, 
Watkins, Moberly and Moulds (2008) trained non-depressed individuals to think 
about positive and negative scenarios in a mode consistent or inconsistent with an 
abstract-evaluative mind-set. They found that individuals trained in an abstract 
mode displayed more depressive symptoms after failing at a task than those who 
were trained in a mode antithetical to depressive rumination (i.e. in a concrete-
experiential mind-set). Stemming from this, proof-of-principle studies that have 
deliberately trained dysphoric individuals to adopt a concrete mode of processing 
have been shown to be of benefit in reducing depressive symptoms (Watkins, 
Baeyens, & Read, 2009; Watkins & Moberly, 2009). This has led on to the 
development and evaluation of specific CBM interventions for those most at-risk of 
developing depressive disorders (Watkins et al., 2011, 2012). 
 
1.3. Processing mode theory applied to PTSD 
Since depression and PTSD share many common features, such as overgeneralised 
appraisals and a ruminative style of thinking, it appears highly relevant to explore 
the processing mode theory in relation to PTSD. In their cognitive model of PTSD, 
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Ehlers and Clark (2000) propose that processing of a traumatic event in a way that 
induces a sense of current threat is key to the maintenance of PTSD. They argue 
that a sense of current threat typically results from excessive negative appraisals 
of the trauma and/or its sequelae and a disturbance in autobiographical memory 
of the event, which is poorly elaborated and contextualised. Applying Watkins’ 
processing mode theory to PTSD, the hypothesis would be that abstract, 
overgeneralised, thinking about the trauma is a form of cognitive avoidance, and 
would interfere with the processes of elaboration and contextualisation of the 
event memory and maintain excessively negative trauma-related appraisals. On 
the other hand, concrete processing would be expected to facilitate the elaboration 
of the trauma memory and the modification of excessive negative appraisals, 
therein reducing the likelihood of PTSD symptomatology. If evidence were found 
that training individuals in concrete processing is protective against PTSD 
symptom development, there would be a strong argument for the development of 
early intervention programmes to provide such training, as has been the case with 
depression. Support for this hypothesis is however currently in its infancy, with 
analogue trauma studies manipulating processing mode leading the way. 
 
Ehring et al. (2009) tested whether the dysfunctional effects of trauma-related 
rumination could be accounted for by reduced concreteness of thinking by 
randomly allocating participants to either an abstract ruminative thinking, 
concrete thinking or a distraction control condition following exposure to an 
analogue trauma. Consistent with the literature on depression, the authors found 
that abstract thinking led to a significantly longer maintenance of negative mood 
and arousal than both concrete thinking and distraction conditions. They argued 
that the abstractness of ruminative thinking may have helped to strengthen the 
dysfunctional appraisals of the trauma, and therefore perpetuated the negative 
mood and arousal. However, the authors failed to find differential effects of the 
manipulation on intrusive memories, the hallmark symptom of PTSD. They only 
found indirect evidence for the idea that concrete thinking is more functional than 
abstract thinking as only the concrete condition reported significantly fewer 
intrusive memories than the control. The authors call for a replication of the 
findings before firm conclusions are drawn.  
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In a semi-replication study, Santa Maria et al. (2012) did find differential effects of 
abstract and concrete processing modes in relation to intrusive memories, 
although their analogue methodology differed. The authors found that participants 
who were asked to write in an abstract-evaluative way about a distressing life 
event experienced less of a reduction in intrusive memories both during and after 
the test session than participants who wrote about their distressing event in a 
concrete-experiential way. Taken together, these findings provide early support 
for the hypothesis that an abstract mode of processing adopted following trauma 
can partially account for the negative outcomes seen in PTSD. 
 
In relation to the role of processing mode during trauma, White and Wild (under 
revision) trained healthy participants in either a concrete or an abstract mode of 
processing during exposure to analogue trauma films and found that training in 
concrete processing led to fewer intrusions and associated PTSD symptoms in the 
week after compared with training in abstract processing. Although this study 
provides promising evidence that concreteness training during exposure to 
analogue trauma may prove a valuable tool in the prevention of specific PTSD 
symptoms, the authors note in their limitations that a lack of a “no-training” 
control condition made it unclear whether the results they found were mainly due 
to the dysfunctional effects of abstract training, the functional effects of the 
concrete training, or both. It is also unclear whether concrete training is better 
than what individuals do naturally during exposure to analogue trauma. They 
called for future studies to include such a control to clarify the direction of the 
effect and to provide an insight into the default response of untrained individuals. 
 
Further support for the beneficial effects of concrete training in relation to trauma 
comes from Laposa and Alden (2006). They interviewed emergency service 
workers to elicit cognitive coping strategies perceived to be the most effective in 
regulating emotions when dealing with traumatic situations, and then manipulated 
healthy participants’ use of these strategies using the trauma film paradigm. In the 
first study, functional cognitive strategies used and judged by the workers to be 
most effective during medical crises were: “attending to the mechanical steps of 
medical treatment”, “focusing on events and processes occurring in the here and 
now”, and “recalling and applying prior training to solve medical problems”. 
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Participants in the second study were asked to watch a video of real events in a 
hospital emergency room either in a “medical focus” way or were given no 
instructions (control). The “medical focus” group was asked to “focus on the 
medical procedures being used by the medical staff and think about what the staff 
are trying to accomplish”. The control group was asked to simply watch the events. 
As predicted, the medical focus group reported significantly fewer intrusions 
during the following week compared with controls. The authors inferred that these 
strategies facilitated verbal-conceptual processing, therefore promoting more 
functional processing of the trauma and protecting against the development of 
intrusive memories. 
 
1.4.  Study rationale 
To date, most research has investigated cognitive processing post-trauma.  Yet at-
risk groups have the opportunity to adopt potentially protective cognitive 
strategies during trauma since they often know beforehand when they will be 
exposed to trauma. Preliminary evidence suggests that concrete peri-traumatic 
processing leads to fewer intrusive memories and PTSD symptoms compared to 
abstract processing.  However, it is unclear whether the initial promising effects of 
concrete processing training can be replicated and whether they are likely to be 
more beneficial than natural processing. The present study investigated these 
possibilities.  
 
We were also interested in exploring the effects of peri-traumatic processing 
modes on different types of intrusive memories, since the extant research has not 
often distinguished intrusive visual images from intrusive verbal thoughts or 
affect-based intrusions. Although the DSM-IV stipulates that re-experiencing in 
PTSD can take the form of “distressing recollections of the event, including images, 
thoughts or perceptions’’ (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), there is some 
uncertainty in the literature as to their relative frequency and the causal 
mechanisms of these different types of recollection. For example, some studies 
indicate that image-based intrusions are quite common, and thought-based 
intrusions are relatively rare (Ehlers et al., 2002; Mellman & Davis, 1985), whereas 
others have found thought-based intrusions to be more prominent (Reynolds & 
Brewin, 1998). Hagenaars, Brewin, van Minnen, Holmes, and Hoogduin (2010) 
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propose that intrusive images and intrusive thoughts are different phenomena that 
arise from independent memory systems, and require different levels of 
processing. It was therefore of interest to investigate the effect of processing mode 
training on different types of intrusions in order to shed further light on this 
hypothesis. 
 
Finally, although intrusions are a key indicator of PTSD, they are only one 
measurement of PTSD symptomology. Another marker of PTSD is the disturbance 
in autobiographical memory for the trauma. One hypothesis about the effects of 
training in peri-traumatic abstract processing would be that a focus on “why” and 
“what-if” questions might prevent the formation of a coherent trauma memory. 
The more the person is caught up in “why” and “what-if” thinking, the less able they 
may be to focus on the experience of the trauma as it is actually happening. A 
processing mode theory of PTSD would predict that abstract peri-traumatic 
processing would lead to poorer recognition memory for details relating to the 
trauma and a more incoherent trauma narrative. The present study sought to test 
this hypothesis.  
 
1.5.  Study aims 
The primary aim of the study was to investigate the hypothesis that training in 
abstract processing during exposure to analogue trauma is more harmful than 
training in concrete processing in relation to intrusive memory development, 
associated PTSD symptoms, and the accuracy and coherency of the trauma 
memory. Secondary aims of the study were to explore the effects of processing 
mode training on different types of intrusions, to investigate the differences 
between concrete processing and natural processing in relation to the trauma 
outcomes mentioned above, and to identify the content of natural cognitive 
processing during exposure to analogue trauma. In this way, the present study can 
be seen as a replication of White and Wild (under revision), but with an additional 







1.6.  Research hypotheses 
 
1.6.1.  Primary hypotheses  
1) Training in concrete processing will lead to fewer intrusive memories (total 
number of intrusions) and associated PTSD symptoms (measured by post IES-R) at 
one week follow-up compared with training in abstract processing. 
 
2) Training in concrete processing will lead to better recognition memory (total 
number of items correct on a recognition memory test), better recognition 
accuracy (hits – false positives) and a more coherent trauma recall narrative at one 
week follow-up compared with training in abstract processing. 
 
1.6.2.  Questions to explore  
1) To explore the relationship between training in concrete processing and natural 
processing (no training) in relation to intrusive memories, PTSD symptoms, 
recognition memory, recognition accuracy and trauma recall narrative coherency 
at one week follow-up. 
 
2) To explore the effects of concrete processing, abstract processing and natural 
processing (no training) on different types of intrusions (thought-, image-, and 
affect-based) at one week follow-up. 
 
3) To explore what natural cognitive processing during exposure to analogue 
trauma consists of. 
 
2. METHOD 
2.1.  Design 
The trauma film paradigm was used in the present study as a means of providing 
analogue trauma (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). A between-subjects design was used, 
whereby participants were randomly allocated to one of three groups prior to 
watching the films: abstract training, concrete training or no training (control). All 
participants watched a ‘baseline’ traumatic film clip, followed by processing mode 
training on six traumatic film clips, and ending with a ‘test’ traumatic film clip to be 
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watched in the mode they had been trained in. The control group watched all the 
films without any training. Questionnaires were administered prior to the baseline 
film, after the test film and at one-week follow-up.  
 
The independent variable was training condition (three levels: abstract vs. 
concrete vs. control).  
 
The main dependent variables were:  
1) Number and type (image-, thought- or affect-based) of spontaneously 
occurring intrusive memories experienced over the following week after 
trauma film viewing. 
2) Severity of post traumatic symptomatology at one-week follow-up as 
measured by the IES-R (Impact of Events Scale - Revised, Weiss & Marmar, 
1997). 
3) Recognition memory for the trauma films at one-week follow-up as 
measured by total number of correctly recognized target items (hits) on a 
verbal YES/NO memory questionnaire and recognition accuracy (hits - false 
positives). 
4) Memory coherence in relation to the test trauma film at one-week follow-
up, as measured by a free-recall narrative of the test film content scored for 
coherency. 
 
2.2.  Participants  
The sample consisted of 73 university staff and students (68.5% female) from 
King’s College London who responded to an email circular advertising the study. 
Participants ranged from 18-43 years, with a mean age of 23.49 (4.99 SD). 
Participants were excluded if they had a current self-reported mental health 
problem, or if they scored above clinical cut-offs on standard measures of 
depression and post-traumatic stress, as such individuals were deemed to be at 
increased risk of emotional distress from the trauma films. Depression was 
assessed using the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9; Kroenke, Spitzer, & 
Williams, 2001), using a greater than 10 cut off (moderate depression, Shaw, Vallis, 
& McCabe, 1985). Post-traumatic stress symptoms were assessed using the Impact 
of Events Scale – Revised (IES-R; Weiss & Marmar, 1997), using a greater than 33 
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cut off recommended by Creamer, Bell, and Failla (2003).  In addition, participants 
who were medically trained were excluded from participation since they were 
expected to show a reduced response to the analogue stressor used in this study, 
in keeping with White and Wild (under revision) and Ehring et al. (2009). 
 
2.3.  Ethical approval  
Full ethical approval was granted by the Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery 
Research Ethics Committee at Kings College London (see Appendix, section 6.1). 
 
2.4.  Power analysis 
As the proposed study was a between subjects design with three groups, setting 
power at 80% (the proposed convention for general use) and the alpha level at .05, 
Cohen (1992) was consulted to determine the sample size needed to detect a large 
effect size. The power calculation showed that a sample size of 21 in each group 
would have 80% power to detect a significant difference in mean change scores 
between the three groups using a 3-way ANOVA with a .05 two-sided significance 
level (large effect size). It was therefore concluded that a minimum of 63 
participants (21 in each group) would be needed for ANOVA comparisons between 
three groups.  
 
2.5.  Measures 
Published measures with established psychometric properties were used 
wherever possible. However, for some variables for which no existing measure had 
been validated, it was necessary to use or develop unpublished measures. All 
measures can be found in the Appendices (Sections 6.4 – 6.13). 
  
2.5.1.  Prior trauma exposure 
Trauma screener (unpublished) 
The Trauma screener is a 16-item, self-report checklist of common traumatic 
events. The measure was derived from the trauma checklist included in the Clinical 
Administered Post-Traumatic Scale (Blake et al., 1990) and has been used in 
previous studies (Shepherd & Wild, 2013, 2014). This measure was included in the 
present study to ensure equivalence of prior trauma exposure between the groups, 
and to establish an index event for the baseline IES-R. 
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2.5.2.  PTSD symptoms  
Impact of Events Scale – Revised (IES-R; Weiss & Marmar, 1997) 
The IES-R is a 22-item, self report measure of post-traumatic stress symptoms. The 
measure has been used widely in both clinical and research settings, and has been 
validated with both non-clinical and clinical populations (Creamer et al., 2003; 
Weiss & Marmar, 1997). It has demonstrated excellent internal consistency for the 
total scale (α = .96) and for its three subscales (α = .87-.94 for the intrusion scale, α 
= .84-.87 for the avoidance scale and α = .79-.91 for the hyperarousal scale). Test-
retest reliability coefficients range from r = .5-.9 for the total scale; r = .57-.94 for 
the intrusion scale; r = .51-.89 for the avoidance scale and r = .59-.92 for the 
hyperarousal scale. Concurrent validity has been documented with high 
correlation (r = .84) between the IES-R and the PTSD Checklist (Weathers, Litz, 
Herman, Huska, & Keane, 1993). This IES-R was used in the present study to assess 
levels of post-traumatic stress symptoms at baseline (screening measure) and at 
one week follow-up. 
 
2.5.3.  Depression symptoms 
Patient Health Questionnaire – 9 items (PHQ-9; Kroenke et al., 2001) 
The PHQ-9 is a brief, 9-item, self report measure of depression, which reflects the 
DSM-IV criteria for depression. The scale yields a total score of 27, with higher 
scores indicating greater severity. Total PHQ-9 scores of 5, 10, 15, and 20 
represent valid thresholds demarcating the lower limits of mild, moderate, 
moderately severe, and severe depression (Kroenke et al., 2001). The PHQ-9 has 
been validated in clinical and non-clinical populations (Kroenke et al., 2001; Zhang 
et al., 2013). It has demonstrated high internal consistency (α = .86 to .89) and high 
test-retest reliability, as well as criterion validity and construct validity. The PHQ-9 
was used in the study to ensure equivalence of depressive symptoms between 
groups at baseline, and as a screening measure.  
 
2.5.4.  Demographic information  
General Information Questionnaire (GIQ; unpublished) 
The 10-item General Information Questionnaire was used to elicit demographic 
information. It was adapted for the present study to include a question on driving 
 68
status. Since five of the eight film clips contained footage of road traffic accidents, 
this question was included to ensure equivalence of driving status between groups. 
 
2.5.5.  Trait anxiety  
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait version (STAI-T; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, 
Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) 
The STAI-T is a 20-item, self-report questionnaire, which measures individual 
proneness to anxiety (trait anxiety). Scores range from 20-80, with higher scores 
indicating a higher level of trait anxiety. The STAI-T has been used widely in 
research and clinical practice, and has good internal consistency (α = .86 to .95), 
high test-retest reliability ranging from r = .65 to r = .75, and good construct and 
concurrent validity (Spielberger et al., 1983; Spielberger, 1989).  It was included in 
the study to ensure equivalence in trait anxiety between groups. 
 
2.5.6.  Trait rumination  
Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (PTQ; Ehring et al., 2011) 
The PTQ is a 15-item, self-report questionnaire, designed to measure repetitive 
negative thinking (RNT) processes (e.g. rumination). The scale yields a total score 
of 60, with higher scores indicating a greater tendency towards RNT. The scale has 
been shown to have good psychometric properties, including excellent internal 
consistency for the total scale (α = .95), acceptable – high internal consistencies for 
the three subscales (α = .94, α = .83, and α = .86 respectively), satisfactory test-
retest reliability for the total scale (rtt = .69) and for the three subscales (rtt = .66, rtt 
= .68 and rtt = .69 respectively). The PTQ has also demonstrated convergent 
validity with significant correlations between other measures of RNT, namely the 
rumination scale of the Response Style Questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991) (r = .72), the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer, Miller, 
Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990)(r= .70) and the Rumination Scale (McIntosh, Harlow, 
& Martin, 1995)(r = .62). The PTQ was used in the present study to assess trait 






2.5.7.  Trait dissociation 
Trait Dissociation Questionnaire – short version (TDQ; Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 
2002) 
The TDQ (short version) is an 11-item self-report measure of trait dissociation. 
The full version contains 38 items and has been shown to have high internal 
consistency (α = .93) and good re-test reliability (r = .86), and was predictive of 
intrusive memories in a student population (Murray, 1997). The shorter version 
was validated with an outpatient sample, showing high correlation with the 
original TDQ (r = .94), good internal consistency (α = .86) and adequate retest 
reliability (r = .56) (Murray et al., 2002). The TDQ was used in the present study to 
assess participants’ levels of trait dissociation, and to see what relationship this 
had to subsequent intrusive memory development. 
 
2.5.8.  Proneness to intrusive memories  
Proneness to intrusions scales (unpublished) 
A three item, self-report measure of proneness to intrusive memories was used to 
assess participants’ proneness to negative and positive intrusions. It was also used 
to investigate the relationship between these and the subsequent development of 
intrusions after trauma film viewing. Participants are required to circle on a 5-
point Likert scale (0-5; not at all – everyday) how often in a week particular 
memories of stressful/unpleasant events, unpleasant events they watch on 
television or happy/pleasant events tend to pop into their mind. These scales were 
developed for use in a similar study (White & Wild, under revision). 
 
2.5.9. Emotional reactivity, personal relevance and mood ratings  
Emotional reactivity scales (unpublished) 
Three scales assessing emotional reactivity to the films were given to participants 
after viewing the baseline and test films. These scales were used to ensure 
equivalence of emotional reactivity between groups at baseline, and to assess the 
effect of training condition on emotional reactivity to the trauma films over time. 
Participants were asked to rate on an 11-point Likert scale (0, none – 10, extreme) 
how much distress, horror and activation they experienced after watching the 
films. Distress and horror were chosen as self-report ratings as an effect of 
appraisal training on these emotions in reaction to distressing films has been 
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found in the literature (Schartau, Dalgleish, & Dunn, 2009). A subjective level of 
arousal (named “activation” to avoid confusion) was also included given that 
higher post-trauma arousal has been linked to the subsequent development of 
PTSD (O’Donnell, Elliott, Lau, & Creamer, 2007).   
 
Personal relevance scale (unpublished) 
Personal relevance of the pre- and post-training films was assessed with an 11-
point Likert scale (0, none – 10, extreme). The scale was used to assess the extent 
to which participants thought about themselves in relation to the film clips. It was 
of interest to investigate potential differences between groups in personal 
relevance of the film pre- to post training, as the abstract group were explicitly 
instructed to relate the films to their own lives and both the concrete and control 
groups weren’t. 
 
Mood scale (unpublished) 
An 11-point Likert scale (0, extremely negative – 10, extremely positive) was used 
to assess participants’ self-reported mood before and after training.  
 
2.5.10. Manipulation checks 
Attention and adherence to processing mode checks (unpublished) 
In order to check participant attention to the final film, and adherence to their 
allocated processing mode, two 11-point Likert scales were used after the test film. 
Participants were asked to self-report what percentage of the time they thought 
they had paid attention to the film, and what percentage of the time they had 
watched the film in accordance with the instructions given to them. Participants 
whose attention or adherence to the final film was 50% of the time or less were 
excluded from the analysis, in keeping with White and Wild (under revision).  
 
2.5.11. Intrusion diary and compliance 
Intrusion diary (unpublished) 
Participants were asked to record the number and type (image-, thought-, or affect 
based) of intrusive memories they experienced in the week following film viewing 
in an online diary. Participants were sent daily email reminders to ensure accurate 
adherence to the diary. Intrusion diaries are a standard way of assessing frequency 
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of intrusions and have been used extensively in trauma film research (Holmes & 
Bourne, 2008). 
 
Intrusion diary compliance (unpublished) 
At the end of the week, participants were asked to self-report how well they 
managed to complete the diary accurately for the intrusions they experienced on a 
5-point Likert scale (0, not at all – 5, always).  
 
2.5.12.  Memory measures 
As part of the follow-up questionnaires, participants were given a surprise online 
memory test one-week after viewing the films. The memory test was split in to two 
parts.  
 
Memory coherence test (unpublished) 
Participants were asked to write down as much as they could remember about the 
final (test) film that they had watched using a free-text box with no character limit. 
Their memory narratives were later coded for coherence, with a scoring system 
adapted from Halligan, Michael, Clark and Ehlers (2003). All narratives received a 
‘trauma-recall incoherence score’ out of 3, scoring 1 point for ‘any key missing 
details’, 1 point for ‘inability to remember the film content’, and 1 point for ‘a 
narrative that was out of sequence’. All narratives were scored by the author, and 
20% were scored by a psychologist colleague for inter-rater reliability. Cohen’s 
Kappa was calculated as a measure of agreement between the raters, and was 
found to be 0.90, which represents almost perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 
1977). 
 
Recognition memory test (unpublished) 
Participants were asked to answer 32 recognition memory questions about the 
content of the films they watched (four questions relating to each of the eight 
films). The design of the memory test was based on recognition memory tests used 
in previous analogue trauma film studies (Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004; 
Krans, Näring, Holmes, & Becker, 2009). It contained statements relating to the 
visual elements of the films (rather than the contextual narrative) that participants 
had to decide whether they were true or false. The items were presented in 
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chronological order, thereby allowing participants to think through the film in a 
structured and detailed way. 
 
2.6. Materials  
Eight video clips of real life footage from road traffic accidents, bull fights and 
terrorist attacks (depicting dead bodies, injured humans and animals in distress) 
served as the analogue trauma stressors. Each scene was briefly introduced by a 
female voice providing contextual information. The trauma clips used in this study 
have been used in previous studies (Schartau, Dalgleish, & Dunn, 2009; Steil, 1997; 
White & Wild, under revision), and have been shown to reliably induce negative 
mood and analogue post-traumatic stress symptoms, such as intrusive memories 
(e.g. Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers, 2002). The eight film clips ranged from 21 to 137 
seconds with a mean length of 89 seconds (SD = 35.88). They were presented on a 
13-inch laptop screen using the software QuickTime Player.   
 
2.7. Procedure  
An overview of the study procedure is illustrated in Figure 1. All study 
documentation can be found in the Appendices. 
 
Having read and considered the information sheet (Appendix, section 6.2), 
participants were invited to a testing session at King’s College London. Written 
consent was obtained (Appendix, section 6.3), and screening questionnaires 
(Trauma screener, IES-R, PHQ-9) were administered. Eligible participants then 
completed a series of baseline measures (GIQ, STAI-T, PTQ, TDQ, proneness to 
intrusions and mood rating), before being randomly allocated to one of three 
training conditions (abstract, concrete or control) for the film task. Following the 
film task, participants were shown and emailed a link to an online intrusion diary. 
One week after the test session, participants completed an online intrusion diary 
compliance measure, a surprise memory test for the films, and a post- IES-R. Upon 
completion, participants were posted a £15 payment and a written debrief of the 
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3 = >33 on IES-R 
2 = >9 on PHQ and 
>33 on IES-R 
  
Online intrusion diary completed over a week 
Online memory test and final questionnaires 
completed 
£15 payment and written debrief 
Random allocation to groups 
Yes (N = 81) 
No (N = 44) 
No (N = 5) 




Passed (N = 73) 
Diary compliance 
check 
Passed (N = 73) 
Excluded: 
Abstract 
(N = 2)  
Control 
(N = 1) 
Did not pass 
 (N = 3) 
 
Agreed to  
take part? 
Trauma film procedure 
Abstract (N = 28) 
Concrete (N = 26) 
Control (N = 22) 
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2.7.1  Film task procedure 
An overview of the trauma film procedure is provided in Figure 2. Having 
completed the baseline measures and provided a mood rating, participants were 
randomly allocated to one of three processing mode conditions (abstract vs. 
concrete vs. control). All participants were told that their task involved watching a 
series of film clips of real-life traumatic footage, in a particular way, according to 
some instructions they were to be given. For the baseline film, all participants 
were told to ‘simply watch the film as you would normally watch any film’, and 
completed measures of emotional reactivity and personal relevance afterwards. 
Following the baseline film, participants were given instructions as to how to 
watch the next series of films according to the condition they had been assigned to. 
The abstract and concrete instructions were modified (shorter) versions of the 
instructions used by White and Wild (under revision), which had worked well in a 
study designed to induce then modify responses to intrusive memories (Wild, 
Byrne, & Ehlers, 2014).  
 
Participants in the abstract condition were given the following instructions: 
‘Whilst watching each film, focus on: 
• Why do things like this happen? 
• What does it mean about the world? 
• What if this had happened to you, or someone in your family?’ 
As well as: “Fully absorb yourself in the film, and watch with your full attention 
immersed in the film” 
 
Participants in the concrete condition were given the following instructions: 
‘Whilst watching each film, focus on: 
• What happens moment by moment 
• What you can see and hear 
• What needs to happen step-by-step from here’ 
As well as “Fully absorb yourself in the film and watch with your full attention 
immersed in the film” 
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In the control condition, participants were not given any processing mode 
instructions, but were given the following instructions: 
‘Whilst watching each film: 
• Fully absorb yourself in the film 
• Watch with your full attention immersed in the film’ 
 
Participants were reassured that there were no right or wrong responses and that 
the instructions were simply guides for them to know how to watch the film. They 
were encouraged to try and focus on the instructions and have them in their minds 
for the duration of the clips. Before each film participants were reminded verbally 
and visually of their instructions.  
 
In order to check whether participants in the abstract and concrete groups had 
adopted the correct processing mode, after the baseline and the training films, 
participants were asked to give examples of what they were thinking about whilst 
watching the film. Where participants demonstrated difficulty applying the 
required processing mode, examples of thoughts in line with their processing 
mode were given as examples for them to adopt. Control group participants were 
also asked after each film what thoughts they were having whilst watching the 
film, but were not given any feedback.  
 
After each film, the word ‘relax’ appeared on the screen for five seconds, which 
aimed to minimise any accumulative effect of the training phase on mood. After the 
training films and before the test film, a second mood rating was obtained. For the 
test film, participants were told to watch the final film in ‘exactly the same way’ as 
they had been watching the other films. Following the test film, participants 
completed the emotional reactivity, personal relevance and manipulation checks 
and were then shown how to use the online intrusion diary. The experimenter 
made sure that participants felt well before leaving the testing session and 
encouraged them to contact her if they felt distressed about the experiment in any 
way. No participant took up this option. 
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One week after the testing session, participants were sent an email with a link to 
an online follow-up questionnaire containing a diary compliance measure, an IES-
R and a surprise recall and recognition memory test. All participants received a 
payment of £15 compensation for their time, as well as a written debrief of the 
study after completion of the online follow-up measures.  Prior to the 
commencement of the main study, a pilot study was conducted to assess the 









Figure 2. An overview of the trauma film procedure 
 
2.8. Statistical analysis 
Three-way analyses of variance, analyses of covariance and chi-squared tests were 
conducted to investigate possible pre-experimental group differences in baseline 
measures, manipulation and diary compliance checks, as well as for the number 
and type of intrusive memories, IES-R scores, memory recognition and recall 
scores one week post experiment. Mixed ANOVAS (3 x 2) were conducted to 
compare pre and post training emotional reactivity (distress, horror and arousal) 
between the three groups, as well as pre and post training measures of mood and 





































Variables were assessed for normality by obtaining values of skewness and 
kurtosis and calculating their associated z-scores. According to Field (2009), a z-
score greater than 1.96 is significant at the p<.05 level, above 2.58 is significant at 
the p<.01 level and above 3.29 is significant at p<.001. Variables with z-scores of 
1.96 and above were inspected visually using histograms and Q-Q plots. Variables 
that violated assumptions of normality were log10 or square root transformed 
where appropriate. Homogeneity of variance was assessed with Levene’s test 
before using parametric tests. Observed rather than transformed values are 
reported in tables for the purposes for readability, but the results of statistical 
testing are based on analyses using transformed variables where applicable. 
Measures of effect size were also calculated to determine the importance of the 
effect using partial-eta squared (η2p) or Cramer’s v as appropriate. For effects sizes 
derived using partial eta-squared (η2p) (AN(C)OVAs), η2p = .01 represents a small 
effect size, η2p = .06 a medium effect size and η2p = .14 a large effect size (Cohen, 
1988). For effect sizes derived using Cramer’s v (chi-squared tests), v = 0.1 
represents a small effect size, v = 0.3 represents a medium effect size, and v = 0.5 a 
large effect size (Cohen, 1992). All analyses used a two-tailed significance level of α 
= .05. Data were analysed using SPSS Statistics (V.21). 
 
Three participants failed the adherence check relating to the experimental 
manipulation, reporting 50% (or less) adherence to the instructions for the final 
test film. Two participants had been allocated to the abstract condition, and the 
third was from the control group (See Figure 1). These data were excluded from 




 Total sample 
(N = 73) 
Abstract 
(n = 26) 
M (SD) or N (%) 
Concrete 
(n = 26) 
M (SD) or N (%) 
Control 
(n = 21) 




 M (SD) or N (%) 
 
Age  23.49 (4.99) 24.50 (5.99) 22.85 (4.78) 23.05 (3.75) F(2, 46.40)=0.68, η2p = .02, p = .51 
Gender Female 50 (68.5%) 19 (26.0%) 15 (20.5%) 16 (21.9%) χ2 (2, 73)=2.24, ν = .18, p = .33 
Male 23 (31.5%) 7 (9.6%) 11 (15.1%)  5 (6.8%) 
Ethnicity Caucasian 46 (63.0%)  19 (26.0%) 16 (21.9%)  11 (15.1%)  
χ2 (2, 73)=2.17, ν = .17, p = .34 
Other 27 (37.0%)  7 (9.6%) 10 (13.7%)  10 (13.7%) 
English first 
language 
Yes 56 (76.7%)  18 (24.7%)  21 (28.8%) 17 (23.3%) 
p = .64,  ν = .13  
No 17 (23.3%)  8 (11.0%)  5 (6.8%) 4 (5.5%)  
Marital 
status 
Single 65 (89.0%)  23 (31.5%) 24 (32.9%) 18 (24.7%) 
p = .89, ν = .09  
Married 8 (11.0%)  3 (4.1%) 2 (2.7%) 3 (4.1%) 
Occupation Student 50 (68.5%)  16 (21.9%) 20 (27.4%) 14 (19.2%) 
χ2 (2, 73)=1.47, ν = .14, p = .48 




16.05 (2.61) 16.00 (2.53) 15.58 (2.76) 16.71 (2.50) F(2, 70)=1.12, η2p =.03, p = .33 
Highest 
qualification 
A-levels 36 (49.3%) 12 (16.4%) 16 (21.9%) 8 (11.0%)  
p = .46,  ν = .16   
Undergraduate 
degree 
17 (23.3%) 5 (6.8%) 5 (6.8%) 7 (9.6%)  
Postgraduate degree 20 (27.4%) 9 (12.3%)  5 (6.8%)  6 (8.2%)  
Car driver Yes 38 (52.1%)  10 (13.7%)  16 (21.9%) 12 (16.4%) 
χ2 (2, 73)=3.08, ν = .21, p = .21 
 No 35 (47.9%) 16 (21.9%)  10 (13.7%) 9 (12.3%)  
Table 1. Sample demographics by group 
N.B. For the ‘Age’ variable, Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was significant (p = .042), and therefore Welch’s F-ratio is reported. For the ‘English 
first language’,  ‘Marital status’ and ‘Highest qualification’ variables, some expected cell counts were <5, so Fisher’s exact test p-values are reported. 
 79
3.1. Participant demographics 
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of continuous participant 
demographics, and frequency data for categorical demographics. 
 
3.2.  Group comparisons at baseline 
One-way ANOVAs for 3 groups (abstract vs. concrete vs. control) were conducted 
to investigate possible pre-experimental differences between groups in relation to 
continuous baseline measures. Chi-squared or Fisher’s exact tests were used to 
test for baseline differences of categorical variables. 
 
3.2.1.  Demographic comparisons 
As shown in Table 1, means and standard deviations of sample demographics were 
statistically compared between groups. Statistical testing revealed no significant 
differences in age, gender, ethnicity, English as a first language, marital status, 
occupation, years in education, highest qualification or car driver status between 
groups.  
 
3.2.2.  Baseline self-report measures  
Table 2 compares means and standard deviations of baseline self-report measures 
between the groups. There were no significant differences between the three 
groups prior to the experimental manipulation in baseline symptoms of 
depression (PHQ-9), PTSD (IES-R), prior trauma exposure (Trauma screener) trait 
anxiety (STAI-T), trait rumination (PTQ), trait dissociation (TDQ), self-reported 
proneness to intrusive memories after stressful events (PT1), after watching 
unpleasant scenes on television (PT2) or after experiencing positive events (PT3). 
All participant scores on the baseline IES-R and PHQ-9 were below clinical cut-offs.   
 
3.2.3.  Correlations between baseline self-report measures and PTSD outcome 
measures 
Table 3 shows the Pearson’s correlations that were conducted to investigate the 
relationships between baseline measures and PTSD outcome measures (total 
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number of intrusions, image-, thought-, affect-based intrusions and post IES-R). 
Statistical analysis revealed no significant relationships between any of the 
baseline measures and the intrusion variables, but significant relationships 

















(N = 73) 
Abstract 
(n = 26) 
Concrete 
(n = 26) 
Control 
(n = 21) 
Statistics 
 
M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  
Depression (PHQ-9) 2.10 (2.20) 1.58 (1.58) 2.46 (2.75) 2.29 (2.08) F(2, 43.07)=1.42, η2p = .03, p = .25 
 
PTSD (pre IES-R) 
 
8.27 (9.12) 6.27 (6.82) 9.35 (10.4) 9.43 (9.90) F(2, 70)=.98, η2p = .03, p = .38 
 
Number of previous 
traumatic events  
(Trauma screener) 
 
1.82 (1.07) 1.88 (1.21) 1.88 (1.07) 1.67 (0.91) F(2, 70)=.30, η2p = .01, p = .74 
 
Trait anxiety (STAI-T) 
 
35.58 (7.89) 35.88 (6.80) 34.50 (9.23) 36.52 (7.56) F(2, 70)=.41, η2p = .01, p = .67 
 
Trait rumination (PTQ) 
 
17.49 (8.79) 17.27 (8.32) 18.92 (13.43) 16.00 (11.42) F(2, 70)=.40, η2p = .01, p = .67 
 
Trait dissociation (TDQ) 
 
8.79 (6.95) 9.08 (5.84) 9.88 (8.14) 7.10 (6.60) F(2, 70)=.97, η2p = .03, p = .38 
 
Proneness to intrusions: 
stressful events (PT1) 
 
 
1.30 (.94) 1.08 (.56) 1.50 (1.21) 1.33 (.91) F(2, 40.32)=1.62, η2p = .04, p = .21 
 
Proneness to intrusions: 
television scenes (PT2) 
 
 
.92 (.81) 0.85 (.46) 1.08 (1.02) 0.81 (0.87) F(2, 39.04)=.61, η2p = .02, p = .55 
 
Proneness to intrusions: 
positive events (PT3) 
 
 
2.26 (1.01) 2.15 (0.93) 2.50 (0.99) 2.10 (1.14) F(2, 70)=1.15,  η2p = .03, p = .32 
Table 2. Means, standard deviations and ANOVAs of baseline measures by group 
Key: (PHQ-9) = Patient-Health Questionnaire – 9 items; (IES-R) = Impact of Events Scale-Revised; (STAI-T) = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait version; 
(PTQ) = Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire; (TDQ) = Trait Dissociation Questionnaire.  
N.B. For the PHQ-9, the PT1 and PT2 variables, Levene’s tests of homogeneity of variance were significant (p = .046; p<0.01; p = .015 respectively), and 















 r p r p r p r p r p 
PHQ-9  -.03 .78 -.02 .90 -.09 .43 .07 .54 .24* .045 
IES-R (baseline) .12 .30 .01 .93 .09 .46 .22 .07 .33** .004 





STAI-T .10 .42 .07 .59 .04 .71 .12 .31 .45** <.001 
PTQ  .14 .25 .10 .41 .10 .39 .12 .31 .48** <.001 
TDQ .04 .75 .15 .22 -.05 .65 .003 .98 .43** <.001 
Proneness to intrusions:  
stressful events (PT1) .03 .82 -.04 .76 .06 .62 .05 .67 .39** .001 
Proneness to intrusions: television scenes (PT2) .21 .08 .09 .44 .16 .17 .11 .36 .41** <.001 
Proneness to intrusions:   
positive events (PT3) -.13 .26 -.20 .09 -.06 .61 -.10 .41 -.14 .23 
Table 3. Pearson correlations between baseline variables and PTSD outcomes 
Key: (PHQ-9) = Patient-Health Questionnaire – 9 items; (IES-R) =Impact of Events Scale-Revised; (STAI-T) = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait version; (PTQ) 
= Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire; (TDQ) = Trait Dissociation Questionnaire 
 
*Significant at the α = .05 level, **Significant at the α = .01 level 
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3.2.4.  Responses to baseline film (pre-training measures) 
There were no significant differences in ratings of mood prior to watching the 
baseline film, F(2, 70)=.49,  η2p =.01, p= .62, or horror, F(2, 70)=2.58,  η2p =.07, p= 
.08, distress, F(2, 70)=2.86, η2p =.08, p= .06, or activation reactions to the baseline 
film, F(2, 70)=1.07, η2p =.03, p= .35, or personal relevance of the baseline film F(2, 
70)=.87,  η2p =.02, p= .43. Means, standard deviations of these variables pre- and 
post- processing mode manipulation are shown in Table 6. 
 
3.2.5.  Correlations between baseline responses to film and PTSD outcomes 
Pearson correlations between baseline responses to film variables and PTSD 
outcome measures were conducted, as shown in Table 4. Significant relationships 
were found between personal relevance of the baseline film and total number of 
intrusions (p<.01), personal relevance of the baseline film and number of image-
based intrusions (p<.01), personal relevance of the baseline film and post IES-R 
(p<.001), baseline mood and post IES-R (p<.05), baseline distress and post IES-R 
(p<.05), and baseline activation and post IES-R (p<.05). 
 
Table 4. Pearson correlations between responses to baseline film (pre-processing 














 r p r p r p r p r p 
Baseline 
mood  -.15 .20 -.12 .33 -.07 .58 
-
.20 .09 -.26* .03 
Baseline 
horror .20 .08 .06 .63 .22 .06 .07 .56 .19 .10 
Baseline 
distress .20 .09 .08 .52 .19 .10 .18 .13 .25* .03 
Baseline 
activation .18 .13 .16 .19 .10 .40 .07 .554 .25* .03 
Baseline 
personal 





*Significant at the α = .05 level, **Significant at the α = .01 level, ***Significant at the α = .001 level 
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3.2.6.  Summary: Group comparisons  
As can be expected with random assignment, between groups comparisons 
revealed that the three groups did not differ on key demographic variables, 
baseline questionnaires, ratings of mood, distress, horror, activation or personal 
relevance in relation to the pre-training baseline film. Significant correlations were 
found between some of the baseline measures and the PTSD outcome variables. 
Where baseline measures were significantly correlated with primary outcomes, 
they were treated as covariates in the relevant analyses. 
 
3.3.  Manipulation checks 
Table 5 compares means and standard deviations of manipulation checks between 
groups. There were no significant differences between self-reported attention to 
the final film, adherence to group instructions or self-reported compliance with the 
intrusion diary between groups. All participants reported paying attention to the 
final film (>50% of the time) and complying with their allocated mode of 
processing (>50% of the time). The majority of participants complied with the 
intrusion diary 100% of the time, with a small proportion of participants in each 
group showing less than perfect adherence. 
 





(N = 73) 
Abstract 
(n = 26) 
Concrete 
(n = 26) 
Control 
(n = 21) 
Statistics 
 
 M (SD) or 
N (%) 
M (SD) or 
N (%) 
M (SD) or 
N (%) 
M (SD) or 





7.47(1.25) 7.54(1.27) 7.58(1.27) 7.24(1.22) 
F(2, 70)=.49,   









4.55(2.54) 4.27(2.46) 4.00(2.51) 5.57(2.48) 
F(2, 70)=2.58,   















χ2 (2,73)=3.64,  
ν =.22, p = .16 
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3.4.  Changes in mood, emotional response and personal relevance over 
time 
In order to assess potential changes in mood, emotional reactivity and personal 
relevance of the film clips over the course of the processing mode manipulation, 
five 2 (time: pre- vs. post- processing mode manipulation) x 3 (condition: abstract 
vs. concrete vs. control) mixed model ANOVAs were conducted. These results of 
these analyses are summarised in Table 6.  
 
3.4.1.  Mood  
There was a significant main effect of time on mood, with all groups reporting a 
decrease in mood from pre- to post-processing mode manipulation. There was no 
main effect of condition on mood, and no significant interaction between condition 
and change in mood over time. 
 
3.4.2.  Horror  
There was a significant main effect of time on horror, with all groups reporting an 
increase in horror from pre- to post-processing mode manipulation. There was no 
main effect of condition on horror, but a significant interaction between condition 
and horror over time emerged. The interaction suggests that both the abstract and 
concrete groups showed greater increases in ratings of horror during the 
experiment than the control group.  
 
3.4.3.  Distress  
There was a significant main effect of time on distress, with all groups reporting an 
increase in distress from pre- to post-processing mode manipulation. There was no 
main effect of condition on distress, and no significant interaction between 
condition and change in distress over time. 
 
3.4.4.  Activation  
There was a significant main effect of time on activation, with all groups reporting 
an increase in activation from pre- to post-processing mode manipulation. There 
 86
was no main effect of condition on activation, and no significant interaction 
between condition and change in activation over time. 
 
3.4.5.  Personal relevance  
There was a significant main effect of time on personal relevance, with all groups 
rating the test film as having more personal relevance than the baseline film. There 
was no main effect of condition on personal relevance, and no significant 
interaction between condition and personal relevance over time. 
 
3.4.6.  Summary: Changes over time 
Changes in mood, emotional reactivity and personal relevance of the film clips over 
the course of the processing mode manipulation were compared between groups. 
This revealed that all groups reported a decrease in mood, an increase in distress, 
an increase in activation and an increase in horror from pre- to post- processing 
mode manipulation, with the effect of horror over time being more marked in the 
abstract and concrete groups. This may have been because there was a trend for 
the control group to have greater horror reactions to the baseline film than the 
other two groups, (p = .08) which meant that their increase in horror over time 
would be less. All groups showed a comparable increase in the degree to which 
they found the test film (post-processing mode manipulation) more personally 
relevant than the baseline film (pre-processing mode manipulation). 
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Condition   ANOVA   




Time x Condition 
(n = 26) 
M (SD) 
(n = 26) 
M (SD) 




















Mood              
Pre-processing mode manipulation 7.54 (1.27) 7.58 (1.27) 7.24 (1.22) 
263.96*** .79 <.001 .34 .01 .71 1.46 .04 .24 
Post-processing mode manipulation  4.04 (1.99) 4.58 (1.47) 4.52 (1.69) 
 
Horror 
   
         
Pre-processing mode manipulation 4.27 (2.46) 4.00 (2.51) 5.57 (2.48) 
16.65*** .19 <.001 .64 .02 .53 3.93* .10 .02 
Post-processing mode manipulation 6.19 (2.56) 5.69 (2.54) 5.57 (2.64) 
 
Distress 
   
         
Pre-processing mode manipulation 4.69 (2.15) 3.96 (2.01) 5.43 (2.14) 
33.19*** .32 <.001 1.14 .03 .33 1.92 .05 .15 
Post-processing mode manipulation 6.31 (2.28) 6.04 (2.07) 6.24 (2.64) 
 
Activation  
   
         
Pre-processing mode manipulation 4.81 (2.06) 4.04 (1.82) 4.52 (1.83) 
45.28*** .39 <.001 .57 .02 .57 .53 .02 .59 
Post-processing mode manipulation 6.15 (2.07) 5.96 (1.69) 6.07 (1.93) 
 
Personal relevance 
   
         
Pre-processing mode manipulation 2.42(2.34) 1.62 (2.16) 2.24 (2.45) 
10.90** .14 .002 1.71 .05 .19 1.92 .05 .16 
Post-processing mode manipulation 2.81 (2.59) 2.54 (2.49) 4.24 (3.39) 
Table 6. Effects of the processing mode manipulation on mood, emotional reactivity to and personal relevance of the film clips 
*Significant at the α = .05 level, **Significant at the α = .01 level, ***Significant at the α = .001 level 
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3.5.  Main analysis of research hypotheses 
 
Table 7 displays the means and standard deviations of the main PTSD outcomes by 
group: total number of intrusions, type of intrusions, and total post- manipulation 
IES-R scores. One-way ANOVAs or ANCOVAs with 3 levels (condition: abstract vs. 
concrete vs. control) were conducted to investigate differences in the total number 
of intrusions, type of intrusions and associated PTSD symptoms (post IES-R) 
participants reported one week after the processing mode manipulation. Post-hoc 
analyses were conducted using Fisher’s LSD tests.  
 
Table 7. Means and standard deviations of PTSD outcomes by group  
PTSD outcomes 
Abstract Concrete Control 
(n = 26) (n = 26) (n = 21) 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Intrusions                                                 Total 5.58 (4.43) 3.77 (4.45) 4.90 (3.89) 
Image-based intrusions 2.58 (2.35) 2.54 (3.91) 2.33 (1.88) 
Thought-based intrusions 2.58 (2.98) 0.88 (1.28) 2.00 (2.61) 
Affect-based intrusions 0.35 (0.63) 0.31 (0.55) 0.52 (0.87) 
Post- IES-R                                                Total 13.0 (8.07) 9.81 (12.03) 13.19 (11.21) 
 
3.5.1. Intrusive memories 
Controlling for personal relevance of the baseline film, ANCOVAs revealed no 
significant main effect of condition on total number of intrusions (F(2, 69) = 1.47, p 
= .24, η2p = .04) or on number of image-based intrusions, (F(2, 69) = .35, p = .71, η2p 
= .01). There was also no main effect of condition on affect-based intrusions (F(2, 
70) = .42, p = .66, η2p = .01).  
 
However, there was a significant main effect of condition on thought-based 
intrusions, (F(2, 42.34) = 3.76, p = .03, η2p = .08)2. Post-hoc analysis of the 
significant main effect of condition on thought-based intrusions using Fisher’s LSD 
test revealed the abstract group experienced significantly more intrusive thoughts 
than the concrete group (p = .01). However, no significant differences were found 
                                                     
2
 For the thought-based intrusions variable, Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was 









































between the number of thought-based intrusions in the concrete and control 
groups (p = .16) or between the abstract and control groups (p = .35). These 




















3.5.2. PTSD symptoms (post- IES-R) 
Controlling for the significant correlates of outcome, ANCOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of condition on post- IES-R symptoms (F(2, 59) = 3.12, p = 
.05,  η2p = .10). Post hoc analysis using Fisher’s LSD test revealed significant 
differences between the abstract and concrete group (p = .03), with the concrete 
group experiencing significantly fewer PTSD symptoms as measured by the post-
IES-R than the abstract group, and also a significant difference between the 
concrete and control group (p = .05), with the concrete group experiencing 
significantly fewer PTSD symptoms than the control group. The difference 
between the abstract and the control groups was not significant (p = .98). These 
results are displayed visually in Figure 4. 
Figure 3. Total number of thought-based intrusions by group (means and 









3.5.3.  Summary: Intrusive memories and PTSD symptoms 
Intrusive memories 
Contrary to prediction, there was no main effect of condition on the total number 
of intrusive memories. However, in relation to the exploratory questions, there 
was a significant main effect of condition on the number of thought-based 
intrusions with the concrete group having significantly fewer than the abstract 
group at one week follow-up. There were no differences between any of the groups 
on the number of image or affect-based intrusions.   
 
PTSD symptoms 
In line with prediction, training in concrete processing led to significantly fewer 
PTSD symptoms compared with training in abstract processing at one-week 
follow-up. In relation to our exploratory questions, training in concrete processing 
also led to significantly fewer PTSD symptoms compared with natural processing. 





















Figure 4. Post- IES-R total by group (means and standard errors are shown)  




3.5.4. Trauma memory  
Table 8 displays the means and standard deviations of the memory outcomes: total 
number of recognition memory questions correct, recognition accuracy (hits-false 
positives), and free-recall incoherence score by group. One-way ANOVAs with 3 
levels (condition: abstract vs. concrete vs. control) were conducted to investigate 
differences between groups in recognition memory, recognition accuracy and 
trauma-recall incoherence scores for the trauma films one week after exposure. 
Post hoc analyses were conducted using Fisher’s LSD tests.  
 
Table 8. Means and standard deviations of memory outcomes by group  
Memory outcomes 
Abstract Concrete Control 
(n = 26) (n = 26) (n = 21) 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Total number of recognition memory 
questions correct 19.04 (2.46) 21.23 (1.75) 18.71 (2.13) 
Recognition accuracy (hits – false 
positives) 14.35 (0.69) 17.08 (0.54) 13.71 (0.71) 
Trauma-recall incoherence score 1.50 (1.14) 0.69 (1.01) 1.19 (1.29) 
 
ANOVAs revealed a significant main effect of condition on the total number of 
items correct on the memory test, (F(2, 70) = 10.20, p<.001, η2p = .23), a significant 
main effect of condition on the memory test recognition accuracy, (F(2, 70) = 7.70, 
p = .001, η2p = .18) and a significant main effect of condition on trauma-recall 
incoherence score, (F(2, 70) = 3.65, p = .03, η2p = .09).  
 
In line with the primary hypotheses, post hoc analysis revealed that training in 
concrete processing led to more correctly remembered items on the memory test 
than training in abstract processing (p<.001). In relation to the exploratory 
questions, training in concrete processing also led to more items correctly 
remembered than natural processing (p<.001). The difference between the 
abstract and the control groups in relation to the number of memory items 
correctly remembered was not significant (p =.61). 
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Similarly, in line with prediction, training in concrete processing led to better 
recognition accuracy for items on the recognition memory test than training in 
abstract processing (p = .003). In relation to the exploratory questions, training in 
concrete processing also led to better recognition accuracy than natural processing 
(p < .001). The difference between the abstract and the control groups in relation 
to recognition accuracy was not significant (p = .50). 
 
Again, in support of the primary hypotheses, training in concrete processing led to 
a more coherent trauma-recall narrative than training in abstract processing (p = 
.01). There were no differences between the incoherence of the trauma-recall 
narratives in the concrete and control groups (p = .18) or the abstract and control 
groups (p = .23). 
 
3.5.5. Summary: Trauma memory 
In line with predictions, training in concrete processing led to better recognition 
memory (in terms of total number of items correctly remembered on the 
recognition memory test), better recognition accuracy (hits – false positives) and a 
more coherent trauma recall narrative compared with training in abstract 
processing.  
 
In relation to our exploratory questions, training in concrete processing led to 
better recognition memory and better recognition accuracy for items on the 
recognition memory test than natural processing. However, there were no 
differences between training in concrete processing and natural processing in 
terms of trauma-recall narrative coherency, or between abstract and natural 







3.5.6.  “Natural” processing analysis  
Exploratory analyses were conducted to investigate what “natural” cognitive 
processing during exposure to analogue trauma consisted of. 35% (N = 58/168) of 
the control group’s thoughts they were having whilst watching the films were 
analysed using thematic analysis. Thought narratives were taken from three of the 
films watched, namely the first training film, the 3rd training film and the final film. 
The content of the thought narratives were thematically coded by the author as 
reflecting either predominately abstract processing, concrete processing or a 
mixture of processing modes in line with Watkins’ (2008) processing mode 
definitions. A psychologist colleague was provided with 25% of the sample (N= 
15/58) and was trained to provide a consensus rating as to whether the narrative 
reflected either predominately abstract processing, concrete processing or a 
mixture of processing modes. 
 
Results of the thematic analysis revealed that the majority of participants did not 
consistently adopt one processing mode, with 76% of control participants 
adopting a variety of processing modes across three of the films that they watched 
(e.g. a purely concrete/abstract mode in relation to one film and a mixed abstract 
and concrete processing mode in relation to another). Of the 58 control narratives 
coded, 7 narratives indicated a purely abstract processing mode was being 
adopted (12%), 14 indicated a purely concrete processing mode (24%) and 37 
narratives indicated a mixture of both abstract and concrete modes (64%). Figure 
5 summarises the results of the thematic analysis, illustrating the types of thoughts 






















Figure 5. A visual display of the types of thoughts the control group were having 
whilst watching the trauma films. Blue circles represent concrete thoughts and 
red circles represent abstract thoughts. 
 
An example of a narrative coded as reflecting a purely abstract processing mode:  
“I thought a lot about what the friend might have been going through at that point 
[thoughts about the implications of the event on others]/and how hard it must 
be for the emergency response workers to willingly expose themselves to such scenes 



























































the indignity of the poor lady's situation [thoughts about the implications of the 
event on others].” 
 
 An example of a narrative coded as reflecting a purely concrete processing 
mode: 
 “I was surprised they didn’t shoot him [comments on how they felt in relation to 
film]/and that he wasn’t wearing any trousers [comments on objective details]/I 
guess that’s understandable given his distress [rationalising thoughts]/I jumped 
back when they fired the gun/I started to think about mechanics of shot/how 
accurate could they have been [comments on objective details]/police turns and 
tells person to get out [thoughts about the events as they unfolded]/I noticed a 
car in the background [comments on objective details]/ people still going on with 
their lives despite man in middle of road [comments on objective details].” 
 
An example of a narrative coded as reflecting a mixture of processing modes: 
 ”I found it uncomfortable to hear her moaning [comments on how they felt in 
relation to film]/it sounded painful [comment on sounds]/I was thinking the 
clinical team looked like they knew what they were doing [rationalising/hopeful 
thoughts]/I thought about what if this happened to me [1st person perspective].” 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
4.1. Summary of findings  
As an expansion of White and Wild (under revision), the primary aim of the 
current study was to investigate whether training in abstract processing during 
exposure to analogue trauma is more harmful than training in concrete processing 
in terms of the development of intrusive memories (type and frequency), 
associated PTSD symptoms, and the accuracy and coherency of the trauma 
memory. In addition, the study aimed to extend the extant research in this area by 
exploring the relationship between concrete training and no training in the 
prevention of analogue PTSD, examining the effects of processing mode training on 
specific types of intrusive memories, as well as exploring the content of “natural” 
cognitive processing during exposure to analogue trauma. 
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The primary hypotheses were partially supported by the results of the study, as 
training in concrete processing during exposure to analogue trauma led to 
significantly fewer PTSD symptoms and significantly fewer thought-based 
intrusions than training in abstract processing at one week follow up, but no 
differences were found between conditions in the total number of intrusive 
memories. In addition, training in concrete processing also led to better 
recognition memory, better recognition accuracy and a more coherent trauma 
recall narrative compared with training in abstract processing. These findings 
indicate a partial replication and expansion of White and Wild (under revision) 
and therefore strengthen the hypothesis that training individuals to adopt a 
concrete mode of processing during to exposure to analogue trauma is less 
harmful than abstract training in the prevention of analogue PTSD symptoms. In 
this way, our study can be seen as a useful addition to the emerging evidence base 
showing that the mode of processing adopted in relation to a traumatic event has a 
direct effect on post-event PTSD symptoms (Ehring et al., 2008; Ehring, Szeimies, 
et al., 2009; Santa Maria et al., 2012; Schaich et al., 2013). 
 
In relation to the exploratory questions, we found significant differences between 
training in concrete processing and natural processing in relation to PTSD 
symptoms as measured by the IES-R, recognition memory and recognition 
accuracy of the trauma memory. However no significant differences between the 
two groups in relation to total number of intrusions, or trauma-recall narrative 
coherency were found. These results provide preliminary evidence that adopting a 
concrete mode of processing during exposure to analogue trauma may be more 
protective against the development of PTSD symptoms, and may improve 
recognition memory accuracy for the trauma over and above natural processing. 
However, these results need to be interpreted with caution. As this was the first 
study to investigate “natural” processing style in relation to analogue trauma, 
these findings need to be replicated. In addition, the significant difference between 
the concrete and control group on recognition memory may simply be a reflection 
of the experimental instructions given to the concrete participants, who were 
instructed to pay attention to what they could see and hear in the films, which may 
have inherently biased their ability to score better on a forced choice recognition 
memory test that was based on visual details of the trauma. On the other hand, the 
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result may be an early indicator of the beneficial effects of concrete training in 
improving the integration of the memory for the trauma into autobiographical 
memory. In order to disentangle the effects of concrete processing on trauma 
memory, this should be explored in future research. 
 
In relation to the effects of processing mode training on different types of intrusive 
memories, the results showed that training in abstract processing resulted in 
significantly more thought-based intrusions than training in concrete processing. 
No other differences were found between any of the other conditions on any other 
types of intrusive memories. Additional exploratory analyses included thematic 
analysis of a proportion of the types of thoughts the no training control group were 
having during exposure to the analogue trauma, in order to shed light on “natural” 
cognitive processing styles. These results suggested that natural cognitive 
processing typically consists of a mixture of abstract and concrete processing 
styles, and that in this sample, more than two-thirds of individuals did not 
consistently adopt one processing style when exposed to a variety of analogue 
traumas. However, as previously mentioned, caution must be taken before any 
firm conclusions are drawn with regards to these findings, and replications must 
be made.  
 
Taken together, these results seem to suggest that concrete processing may be 
significantly better than abstract processing at preventing the development of 
analogue PTSD symptoms, but not intrusive memories per se. These results are 
therefore only partially in keeping with those of White and Wild (under revision), 
as they found training in concrete processing during exposure to analogue trauma 
to be significantly better than training in abstract processing at preventing the 
development of both intrusive memories and associated PTSD symptoms. One of 
the reasons for the discrepant findings may be due to the fact a modified, shorter 
version of the processing mode instructions used by White and Wild (under 
revision) were used in the present study. There is also preliminary evidence from 
the results of this study to suggest that concrete training may be significantly 
better than natural processing with regards to its protective effects against the 
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development of analogue PTSD symptoms, although it is unclear at present 
whether this extends to intrusive memories specifically.  
 
The significant difference between the concrete and control groups with regards to 
the development of PTSD symptoms may also be partially explained by the results 
of the thematic analysis that shows that individuals tend to naturally appraise 
analogue trauma in a mixture of concrete and abstract modes. In this way, natural 
appraisals of analogue trauma may not be ‘good enough’ to prevent against the 
development of analogue PTSD symptoms as they contain elements of 
dysfunctional abstract processing amidst functional concrete processing. It seems 
to be that only when a purely concrete mode of processing is adopted that the 
functional effects of processing mode are seen. Taken together, these results 
suggest that a tendency towards peri-traumatic abstract appraisals of trauma 
could be considered a risk factor for PTSD development, and peri-traumatic 
concrete appraisals as a protective factor. 
 
4.2. Theoretical implications 
The maladaptive effects of abstract processing and the adaptive effects of concrete 
processing on PTSD symptoms can be explained on a theoretical level in relation to 
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model of PTSD. As previously described, their 
model proposes that PTSD symptoms persist as a result of continued negative 
appraisals of the trauma and/or its sequelae and a disturbance in autobiographical 
memory of the event, which is poorly elaborated and contextualised. In this way, 
recovery from symptoms requires the elaboration and contextualisation of the 
trauma memory and the modification of excessively negative trauma-related 
appraisals. Abstract processing is hypothesised to interfere with both processes, 
whereas concrete processing facilitates them. The results of the study show partial 
support for this theory as training in abstract processing led to an increase in PTSD 
symptomatology, a more incoherent trauma narrative and poorer recognition 
memory for items related to the event in relation to concrete training. However, 
trauma-related appraisals were not evaluated in the present study, so it is unclear 
what effect abstract processing had on these.  
 99
In addition, Stöber’s (1998) reduced concreteness theory of worry proposes that 
the abstract, verbal, nature of worry interferes with the emotional processing of 
the worry related material, as it perpetuates the avoidance of the emotional 
memory. Applying this theory to PTSD, it may be the case that abstract peri-
traumatic cognitive processing acts as a cognitive avoidance that prevents 
successful emotional processing of the trauma memory in a similar way (Foa & 
Kozak, 1986). In contrast, concrete peri-traumatic cognitive processing may 
facilitate emotional processing by promoting the integration of the trauma with 
other autobiographical memories and thereby inhibit the cue-driven retrieval of 
intrusive memories. Again, our findings only provide partial support for this 
theory, as although the concrete group displayed fewer PTSD symptoms than the 
abstract group, we did not specifically measure trauma memory integration into 
autobiographical memory. However, the results of the exploratory analyses also 
partially support this theory, as the abstract group were found to have more 
thought-based intrusions (rather than images) in comparison to the concrete 
group. This result supports the idea that abstract peri-traumatic processing may 
be similar to worry in GAD in consisting of mainly verbal based thoughts, and 
therefore hinders emotional processing of the trauma-related material in a similar 
way.  
 
4.3. Clinical and occupational implications 
Although it remains to be seen whether the harmful effects of abstract processing 
generalise to survivors of real traumas, the findings hold potential clinical and 
occupational implications with regards to prevention and treatment of PTSD. 
Concreteness training has already been developed as a guided self-help treatment 
for rumination in depression, and has been shown to be efficacious in a proof-of-
principle study (Watkins et al., 2009) and in an RCT in patients with major 
depression (Watkins et al., 2012). As proposed by Schaich et al. (2013), if the 
causal impact of concreteness training on protecting from PTSD symptoms is 
further confirmed in a trauma-exposed population, concreteness training could be 
offered as a preventative intervention to individuals most at-risk of developing 
PTSD. Indeed when Laposa and Alden (2006) interviewed emergency service 
workers about their most effective coping strategies, they found that these at-risk 
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groups had an inherent preference for concrete cognitive processing strategies, 
and when tested in an experimental paradigm, these were found to significantly 
protect against the development of intrusive memories. One example of a 
prevention programme that has already been developed for at-risk groups is the 
Attention Bias Modification Initiative currently being trialled amongst Israeli 
infantry soldiers prior to deployment to combat zones (Abend, Pine, & Bar-Haim, 
2014; Wald et al., 2013). This example is encouraging evidence that prevention 
programmes for at-risk groups are indeed developed and implemented as a result 
of controlled experimental proof-of-principle studies.  
 
In addition, there is preliminary evidence to suggest that excessive levels of 
rumination may impair the effects of evidence-based based PTSD treatment 
protocols (Echiverri et al., 2011). The use of strategies that specifically target 
dysfunctional rumination by changing the processing mode may be promising in 
trauma survivors with PTSD who show excessive levels of trauma-related 
rumination characterised by abstract appraisals.  
 
4.4. Limitations 
The findings of the current study need to be interpreted in light of its limitations. 
For ethical reasons, an analogue trauma paradigm was used to investigate the 
study hypotheses. Whilst it is acknowledged that results derived from analogue 
trauma studies are limited in their clinical application due to the differences in 
stressor-severity, self-reference and self-relevance in comparison to real-life 
traumatic events, there continues to be strong evidence for the validity of the 
paradigm (Holmes et al., 2004; Weidmann et al., 2009). For example, one recent 
study found that repeated media exposure to trauma was in fact associated with 
higher acute stress than direct exposure (Holman, Garfin, & Silver, 2014) which is 
evidence to support the continued use video/TV footage of real-life traumatic 
events to induce trauma related stress symptoms in experimental research 
designs. However, given the recent specification in DSM-V (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013) that non-professional exposure to traumatic material through 
electronic media, television, movies, or pictures is not a sufficient traumatic 
stressor to warrant a PTSD diagnosis, it is important to replicate the results of the 
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current study in survivors of real-life trauma before any firm conclusions for this 
population can be drawn. 
 
An additional concern with regards to analogue designs is the potential for 
demand characteristics in response to the processing mode manipulation. 
However, Clapp et al. (2015) suggest that the role of this type of experimental bias 
is limited, based on the failure of previous studies using analogue trauma film 
paradigms and processing mode instructions to detect widespread demand 
characteristics (e.g. Schartau et al., 2009).  Although we are unable to rule out the 
possibility of demand characteristics in the abstract and concrete processing 
groups, evidence from the existing literature provides reasonable assurance that 
participant biases are unlikely to account for the observed effects. 
 
It is also noteworthy that no main effect of training in abstract vs. concrete vs. no 
training on intrusive memories was found.  Given the relatively modest sample 
size, it is possible that the study was underpowered.  Future research comparing 
abstract, concrete and control manipulations could ensure a larger sample size, 
thereby increasing the power to detect medium effects and reducing the risk of 
both type I (false positive) and type II (false negative) errors. 
 
A related concern is the fact that some of the statistical analyses in the present 
study involved multiple tests of the same hypotheses. This may have inadvertently 
increased our risk of type 1 errors. It is possible that had a statistical correction 
been applied to control for multiple testing (e.g. Bonferroni’s correction) the 
results may have differed. 
 
A thematic processing mode coding system was devised for the purposes of this 
experiment to rate the content of participants’ natural processing in the control 
group. Although a consensus rating was sought in the use of this measure, the 
extent to which the scoring system provides an accurate representation of the 
control participant’s cognitive processing style needs further investigation. 
Further efforts to validate this scoring method through experimental research as 
 102
well as further attempts to elucidate the default cognitive processes of untrained 
individuals would improve the strength of our conclusions. In relation to this, the 
fact that some of the trauma films comprised of several scenes from the aftermath 
of different RTAs may have caused some participants to take the perspective of 
onlookers instead of that of a trauma survivor, as noted by Zetsche et al. (2009) in 
their study. The content of the control group’s thoughts might therefore more 
closely reflect the cognitive processes in witnesses of traumatic situations than 
those of individuals directly involved. 
 
Additional limitations include the recruitment processes and the failure to control 
for prior familiarity with traumatic media footage. First, participants were self-
selected, and due to ethical transparency, participants were given clear 
information about the potentially distressing nature of the films prior to 
volunteering. Second, we did not control for number of hours participants spent 
watching medical TV, playing violent video games or watching horror films as has 
been controlled for in similar studies (Zetsche et al., 2009). It may have been the 
case that those who are typically distressed by such footage opted not to 
participate, and those who are more used to traumatic media were more likely to 
participate. In this way, the final sample may have consisted of individuals who are 
less distressed by traumatic footage than those in the average population, and 
speculatively this may have had some bearing on the subsequent development of 
intrusive memories. Future studies using the trauma film paradigm should explore 
the role of these factors in intrusion memory development. 
 
4.5. Conclusions 
Limitations notwithstanding, the results of the present study are promising since 
they provide more evidence that the processing mode hypothesis can be 
appropriately applied to PTSD. The study has partially replicated the finding from 
White and Wild (under revision) that training individuals to adopt a concrete 
mode of processing during to exposure to analogue-trauma is less harmful than 
abstract processing in preventing the development of PTSD symptomatology, but 
also provided new evidence that training in concrete processing is superior to 
abstract processing in preventing against the development of thought-based 
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intrusions, and in producing a more accurate and coherent memory for the trauma. 
Additionally, to the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the 
relationship between peri-traumatic concrete processing and “natural” cognitive 
processing, and provides preliminary support that training in concrete processing 
may provide protective effects against PTSD development over and above natural 
cognitive processing. 
 
Whilst there were no differences in the total number of intrusive memories that 
developed between conditions, our results give clear indications that concrete 
processing is superior to abstract processing in terms of protecting against the 
development of PTSD symptoms, thought-based intrusions, and promoting a more 
coherent and accurate memory of the analogue trauma. Since individuals may 
naturally adopt a mixture of abstract and concrete processing styles when 
attending to trauma and given the strength of findings linked to concrete 
processing, it may be beneficial to train individuals to adopt a concrete processing 
mode peri-traumatically as a protective measure. Before such prevention 
programmes are developed, future research should test whether the results can be 
replicated amongst trauma survivors as well as continue to examine the content 
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Letter of ethical approval 
 
Claudia Hallett 
Department of Clinical Psychology 
Institute of Psychiatry 
King's College London  
3rd Floor, Addiction Sciences Building 
4 Windsor Walk 
London SE5 8AF 
 
 
19 February 2014 
 
 
Dear Claudia,  
 
PNM/13/14-61 An experimental analogue study to investigate the role of peri-traumatic 
cognitive processing on post-event intrusions and recognition memory  
 
Review Outcome: Full Approval 
 
Thank you for sending in the amendments/clarifications requested to the above project. I am 
pleased to inform you that these meet the requirements of the PNM RESC and therefore that full 
approval is now granted. 
 
Please ensure that you follow all relevant guidance as laid out in the King's College London 
Guidelines on Good Practice in Academic Research 
(http://www.kcl.ac.uk/college/policyzone/index.php?id=247). 
 
For your information ethical approval is granted until 19 February 2017. If you need approval 
beyond this point you will need to apply for an extension to approval at least two weeks prior to 
this explaining why the extension is needed, (please note however that a full re-application will 
not be necessary unless the protocol has changed). You should also note that if your approval is 
for one year, you will not be sent a reminder when it is due to lapse. 
 
Ethical approval is required to cover the duration of the research study, up to the conclusion of 
the research. The conclusion of the research is defined as the final date or event detailed in the 
study description section of your approved application form (usually the end of data collection 
when all work with human participants will have been completed), not the completion of data 
analysis or publication of the results. For projects that only involve the further analysis of pre-
existing data, approval must cover any period during which the researcher will be accessing or 
evaluating individual sensitive and/or un-anonymised records. Note that after the point at which 
ethical approval for your study is no longer required due to the study being complete (as per the 
above definitions), you will still need to ensure all research data/records management and 
storage procedures agreed to as part of your application are adhered to and carried out 
accordingly. 
 
If you do not start the project within three months of this letter please contact the Research Ethics 
Office.  
 
Should you wish to make a modification to the project or request an extension to approval you will 
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need approval for this and should follow the guidance relating to modifying approved applications: 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/applications/modifications.aspx  
The circumstances where modification requests are required include the addition/removal of 
participant groups, additions/removal/changes to research methods, asking for additional data 
from participants, extensions to the ethical approval period. Any proposed modifications should 
only be carried out once full approval for the modification request has been granted. 
 
Any unforeseen ethical problems arising during the course of the project should be reported to 
the approving committee/panel. In the event of an untoward event or an adverse reaction a full 
report must be made to the Chair of the approving committee/review panel within one week of the 
incident. 
 
Please would you also note that we may, for the purposes of audit, contact you from time to time 
to ascertain the status of your research.  
 
If you have any query about any aspect of this ethical approval, please contact your 
panel/committee administrator in the first instance 
(http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/contact.aspx). We wish you every 
success with this work. 
 





James Patterson – Senior Research Ethics Officer 




INFORMATION SHEET FOR MAIN STUDY 
PARTICIPANTS 
REC Reference Number: PNM/13/14-61 
Version 1 25.11.13 
 
What influences reactions to trauma?  A trauma film study 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in this Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
research project. You should only participate if you want to; choosing not to take part 
will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take part, 
it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what your 
participation will involve.  Please take time to read the following information carefully 
and discuss it with others if you wish.  Please ask the researcher if there is anything that 
is not clear or if you would like more information. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
This research aims to investigate what influences different emotional responses to 
traumatic films. Understanding different responses to traumatic material could help 
inform the development of prevention programmes for people who are regularly 
exposed to trauma (e.g. military personnel and emergency service works) and who at 
high risk of developing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) – a severe stress 
reaction that can develop after exposure to traumatic events such as violence, road 
traffic accidents, terrorist bombings and natural disasters. 
 
Am I eligible? 
You will be invited to take part if you are over the age of 18, fluent in English, and if 
the first two questionnaires you complete suggest that you have few signs of depression 
or PTSD. You will not be able to take part if either of these questionnaires suggests that 
you may have depression or PTSD. If this is the case, the researcher will talk with you 
and give you suggestions about what may be helpful. This could be a visit to your GP. 
These screening questionnaires will be destroyed after use. You will also not be able to 
take part if you are a medical student or medical professional. 
 
What will taking part involve? 
Participating in this study will involve attending a testing session at the Institute of 
Psychiatry, which will last for approximately an hour and a half, completing a simple 
online diary over the following week, and completing a few online questionnaires at the 
end of the following week. Therefore the total time commitment required for this study 
is one week. During the testing session, you will be asked to watch a series of film clips 
that contain traumatic material (e.g. road traffic accidents, humans and animals in 
distress) and you will be instructed as to how to watch them. You will be asked to fill in 
some brief questionnaires at various points during the session. After completion of the 
online diary and the online questionnaires you will receive a payment of £15 as 
compensation for your time. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part?  
As this study involves watching films that contain traumatic material, there is a risk that 
some people may become distressed. Furthermore, some of the questionnaires ask about 
sensitive topics, such as previous exposure and reactions to trauma, which some 
participants could find distressing. However, studies of a similar nature have been 
conducted before without adverse consequences and any distress that you may 
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experience is likely to be short-lived. You are free to withdraw at any time, without 
giving a reason, and in the unlikely event that you do become distressed, the session 
would be stopped immediately. You would also be given the opportunity to talk the 
researcher, who is a Clinical Psychologist in training about your distress. The 
researcher’s supervisor who is a Consultant Clinical Psychologist will also be available 
to contact during the testing sessions if needed 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
If you take part you will receive £15 as compensation for your time and will be sent a 
summary of the research findings. Taking part will also give you the opportunity to be 
involved in research which seeks to promote greater understanding of responses to 
trauma and inform preventative interventions for people who are regularly exposed to it.  
When the study is completed we intend to publish the results in a peer-reviewed journal 
(information available on request), but your information would be completely 
confidential and you would not be named in the paper. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
All information and data collected will be anonymised and confidential in accordance 
with the Data Protection Act (1998). You will be randomly allocated a unique code, 
which will be recorded on questionnaires and used in data analysis so that you cannot be 
identified from the data. Anything containing personally identifiable information, such 
as signed consent forms, will be kept separately from the data in a locked filing cabinet 
and only the immediate research team (which includes the researcher and her two 
supervisors) will have access to it. Electronic data will be kept on a secure database on a 
password accessible computer and any paper forms will be kept in a locked filing 
cabinet. All personally identifiable information will be kept for up to 12 years, and then 
will be confidentially destroyed. We will keep a completely anonymised copy of the 
database indefinitely, from which you will not be able to be identified. The only 
circumstance under which confidentiality cannot be maintained is if you indicated 
potential risk of harm to yourself or other people. 
 
What do I do if I want to take part?  
If you would like to take part in this study or require further information about it, then 
please contact the researcher using the following details: 
 
Claudia Hallett, Clinical Psychologist in Training, Addiction Sciences Building, 
Institute of Psychiatry, 4 Windsor Walk, London, SE5 8AF. Email: 
Claudia.Hallett@kcl.ac.uk, Tel: 0207 848 0223/4. 
 
It is entirely up to you to decide whether or not to take part in the study. If you do 
decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and will then be 
asked to sign a consent form. Even if you do decide to take part you will still be free to 
withdraw from the study at any time and without giving a reason. You will also be able 
to withdraw your data up until 31st December 2014.  
 
If this study has harmed you in any way, you can contact King’s College London using 
the details below for further advice and information: 
 
Dr Jennifer Wild, (Research Clinical Psychologist, Honorary Consultant Clinical 
Psychologist and Senior Lecturer), Department of Psychology, Henry Wellcome 
Building, De Crespigny Park, London, SE5 8AF. Email: Jennifer.Wild@kcl.ac.uk, 
Tel: 0207 848 5032 
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CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information 
Sheet and/or listened to an explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: What influences reactions to trauma?  A trauma 
film study 
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref: PNM/13/14-61 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must 
explain the project to you before you agree to take part.  If you have any questions arising from 
the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you 
decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at 
any time. 
 
• I confirm that I have read the accompanying Information sheet for this study (Version 
1, 25.11.13), have had the opportunity to consider the information and to ask questions. 
 
• I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to 
participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw from it 
immediately without giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to 
withdraw my data up until the 31st December 2014. 
 
• I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to 
me.  I understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of 
the UK Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
• I agree that the research team may use my data for future research and understand that 
any such use of identifiable data would be reviewed and approved by a research ethics 
committee  
(In such cases, as with this project, data would not be identifiable in any report). 
 
• I agree to take part in the above project 
 
The information you have submitted will be published as a report and you will be sent a copy. 
Please note that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will not be possible to 





I ___________________________________________________agree that the research project 
named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in the study. I 
have read both the notes written above and the Information Sheet about the project, and 
understand what the research study involves. 
 




I ____________________________________________________confirm that I have carefully 
explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks (where applicable) of the proposed 
research to the participant. 
 




Many people have lived through or witnessed a very stressful and traumatic event at some point 
in their lives.  Indicate whether or not you have experienced each traumatic event listed below by 
marking Y for Yes or N for No. 
  If YES, did you experience distressing 
unwanted memories of the event 
(flashbacks, nightmares, unwanted 
thoughts?) 
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Impact of Events Scale-Revised (IES-R) 
The following is a list of difficulties people sometimes have after stressful life events. 
Please read each item, and then indicate how distressing each difficulty has been for you 
DURING THE PAST 7 DAYS with respect to the traumatic event that you have 









1. Any reminder brought back feelings 
about it. 
0 1 2 3 4 
2. I had trouble staying asleep. 0 1 2 3 4 
3. Other things kept making me think 
about it. 
0 1 2 3 4 
4. I felt irritable and angry. 0 1 2 3 4 
5. I avoided letting myself get upset when I 
thought about it or was reminded of it. 
0 1 2 3 4 
6. I thought about it when I didn't mean to. 0 1 2 3 4 
7. I felt as if it hadn't happened or wasn't 
real. 
0 1 2 3 4 
8. I stayed away from reminders about it. 0 1 2 3 4 
9. Pictures about it popped into my mind. 0 1 2 3 4 
10. I was jumpy and easily startled. 0 1 2 3 4 
11. I tried not to think about it. 0 1 2 3 4 
12. I was aware that I still had a lot of 
feelings about it, but I didn't deal with 
them. 
0 1 2 3 4 
13. My feelings about it were kind of numb. 0 1 2 3 4 
14. I found myself acting or feeling like I 
was back at that time. 
0 1 2 3 4 
15. I had trouble falling asleep. 0 1 2 3 4 
16. I had waves of strong feelings about it. 0 1 2 3 4 
17. I tried to remove it from my memory. 0 1 2 3 4 
18. I had trouble concentrating. 0 1 2 3 4 
19. Reminders of it caused me to have 
physical reactions, such as sweating, 
trouble breathing, nausea, or a pounding 
heart. 
0 1 2 3 4 
20. I had dreams about it. 0 1 2 3 4 
21. I felt watchful and on guard. 0 1 2 3 4 




Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) 
 
Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been 













1 Little interest or pleasure in doing things 0 1 2 3 
2 Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless 0 1 2 3 
3 Trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too 
much 0 1 2 3 
4 Feeling tired or having little energy 0 1 2 3 
5 Poor appetite or overeating 0 1 2 3 
6 
 
Feeling bad about yourself — or that you are a 
failure or have let yourself or your family down 
0 1 2 3 
7 Trouble concentrating on things, such as reading the newspaper or watching television 0 1 2 3 
8 
Moving or speaking so slowly that other people 
could have noticed?  Or the opposite — being so 
fidgety or restless that you have been moving 
around a lot more than usual 
0 1 2 3 
9 
 
Thoughts that you would be better off dead or of 
hurting yourself in some way 
0 1 2 3 






General Information Questionnaire 
Please give us some background information about yourself.  The following questions ask about you and 
your life in general. For each question, either write the answer on the line or tick the box which most 
applies to you. Some questions may have more than one answer. 
 
1. Date of birth ______/_______/__________ 
2. Gender  Male 
 Female 
3. Ethnic background  White  Black/African/Caribbean/Black British   
 Mixed/Multiple Ethnic Groups  Other Ethnic Group 
___________ 
 Asian/Asian British  
4. Is English your first 
language? 
 Yes 
 No. Which is your first language? _____________ 
5. What is your marital 
status? 
 Single                             Divorced/Separated 
 Married/Long-term partner   Widowed 
6. Are you    Employed full-time               Full-time student 
  Employed part-time               Part-time student 
  Self-employed   Unemployed   
  A homemaker   On disability  
  On sick leave   Retired   
  Other: ________________________  
7. What is your job/ 
course? (If 
unemployed/ retired: 






8. How many years of 
formal education 
have you had? 
 
___________years 
9. Please mark any 
qualifications you 
have. 
  No exams                Degree                       
Other: ____________                         
 
 
  GCSE/O Levels/GNVQ   Postgraduate degree: 
please circle: Masters / PhD 
/ other:______________ 
 
  A Levels/NVQ    Vocational degree          
10. How often do you 
drive a car 
  Everyday 
  Once a week 
  Twice a month 
  Twice a year 
  Never 
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State Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait version (STAI-T) 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate option to the right of the 
statement to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do 
not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to 














1. I feel pleasant 
 
    
2. I feel nervous and restless 
 
    
3. I feel satisfied with myself 
 
    
4. I wish I could be as happy as others 
seem to be 
 
    
5. I feel like a failure 
 
    
6. I feel rested  
 
    
7. “I am calm, cool, and collected” 
 
    
8. I feel that difficulties are piling up so 
that I cannot overcome them 
 
    
9. I worry too much over something that 
doesn’t really matter 
 
    
10. I am happy     
11. I have disturbing thoughts      
12. I lack self-confidence      
13. I feel secure      
14. I make decisions easily      
15. I feel inadequate      
16. I am content      
17. Some unimportant thought runs 
through my mind and bothers me  
    
18. I take disappointments so keenly that I 
can’t put them out of my mind  
    
19. I am a steady person      
20. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I 
think over my recent concerns and interests 




Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (PTQ) 
 
In this questionnaire, you will be asked to describe how you typically think about 
negative experiences or problems. Please read the following statements and rate 
the extent to which they apply to you when you think about negative experiences 
or problem 
  
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Almost 
always 
1. The same thoughts keep going through 
my mind again and again. 0 1 2 3 4 
2. Thoughts intrude into my mind. 0 1 2 3 4 
3. I can’t stop dwelling on them. 0 1 2 3 4 
4. I think about many problems without 
solving any of them. 0 1 2 3 4 
5. I can’t do anything else while thinking 
about my problems. 0 1 2 3 4 
6. My thoughts repeat themselves. 0 1 2 3 4 
7. Thoughts come to my mind without me 
wanting them to. 0 1 2 3 4 
8. I get stuck on certain issues and can’t 
move on. 
0 1 2 3 4 
9. I keep asking myself questions without finding an answer. 0 1 2 3 4 
10. My thoughts prevent me from focusing 
on other things. 0 1 2 3 4 
11. I keep thinking about the same issue all the time. 0 1 2 3 4 
12. Thoughts just pop into my mind. 0 1 2 3 4 
13. I feel driven to continue dwelling on the 
same issue. 0 1 2 3 4 
14. My thoughts are not much help to me. 0 1 2 3 4 
15. My thoughts take up all my attention. 0 1 2 3 4 
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Trait Dissociation Questionnaire 
 
Below are some experiences that people may have from time to time. We 
are interested in how often you have such experiences. Please read each 
statement carefully and circle the appropriate number, but do not spend 
too much time on each one. There are no right or wrong answers.  We are 





-times Often Mostly Always 
1. I find myself doing things 
without knowing why. 0 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I feel as if other people live in 
a different world. 0 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I felt that my mind is divided. 0 1 2 3 4 5 
4. I can’t understand why I got so 
cross and grouchy. 0 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I feel distant from my own 
emotions. 0 1 2 3 4 5 
6. I feel that my personality was 
split into distinct parts. 0 1 2 3 4 5 
7. 
I feel numb, unable to feel real 
emotions (such as love, 
happiness, or sadness). 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
8. The world seems unreal or 
strange. 0 1 2 3 4 5 
9. 
I find writings, drawings, or 
notes among my belongings 
that I must have done, but 
couldn’t remember doing. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
10. My moods can really change. 0 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Things seem to go by faster or 
slower than they really do. 0 1 2 3 4 5 
  
 122 
Proneness to intrusions scales 
Please circle the answer that best applies to you. 
How often do you find that you have unwanted memories of unpleasant or stressful 
events popping into your mind, for example, after an exam, job interview or 
argument with somebody? 
 
     
Not at all Once a week 
or less 
2-4 times per 
week 
5 or more 







How often do you find that after you have seen something unpleasant on the 
television or at the cinema, it comes back into your mind without you wanting it 
to? 
 
     
Not at all Once a week 
or less 
2-4 times per 
week 
5 or more 







How often do you find that pleasant or happy events pop into your mind, for 
example, after a nice evening with friends or a film that you found funny? 
 
     
Not at all Once a week 
or less 
2-4 times per 
week 
5 or more 


















DEBRIEFING SHEET FOR STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
REC Reference Number: PNM/13/14-61 
 
What influences reactions to trauma?  A trauma film 
study 
 
Background and aims of the study 
This research aimed to investigate what influences different emotional responses to 
traumatic films. Evidence suggests that the mode in which traumatic events are 
processed may influence the development of PTSD, although experimental evidence is 
lacking. It is crucial to discover what could potentially protect against the development 
of symptoms such as intrusive memories, since this would allow for the development of 
evidence-based prevention programs for at-risk groups. Using a trauma film paradigm 
(Holmes & Bourne, 2008), the current study investigated the effect of processing mode 
training (abstract vs. concrete vs. no training) during exposure to an analogue trauma on 
the subsequent development of intrusive memories, the hallmark feature of PTSD. 
 
The study was also interested in investigating the effect of processing mode on memory 
for the trauma one week later, as well as whether potential vulnerability factors (e.g. 
rumination, dissociation, self-reported proneness to intrusions) were related to the 
frequency of intrusions developed. 
 
Which condition was I in? 
You would have either been trained to view the traumatic films in an abstract or 
concrete mode, or received no training at all.  
 
In the abstract condition, participants were trained to focus on the overall meaning and 
implications of the events and on questions such as ‘Why?’ and ‘What if?’ 
 
In the concrete condition, participants were trained to focus on contextual details, the 
sequence of events and on questions such as ‘What?’ and ‘How?’ 
In the no training condition, participants were not given any specific instructions as to 
how to watch the film – they were simply told to immerse their attention in the film and 
watch with their full attention on the film. 
Psychological theory suggests that training people to adopt a concrete mode of 
processing during exposure to analogue trauma may protect against the development of 
intrusive memories. However, we do not yet know whether this is better than having no 
training and simply adopting a natural viewing mode. The results of the study will 
hopefully shed some light on this question. 
More information? 
If you have been affected by any of the material in the films and would like to discuss 
this further or would like further information about the study, then please contact the 
researcher using the following details: 
 
Claudia Hallett, Clinical Psychologist in Training, Addiction Sciences Building, 
Institute of Psychiatry, 4 Windsor Walk, London, SE5 8AF. Email: 
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BACKGROUND: Measurement feedback systems (MFSs) are important service 
monitoring and development tools. Despite potential benefits, the implementation 
of MFSs into services tends to be met with resistance. Psychological theories of 
behaviour change can help us to understand barriers to initial uptake and 
sustained use. This report describes the development, implementation and 
evaluation of a MFS for the third sector organisation (TSO), “Friendship Works” 
(FW). 
 
AIMS: The overall aim of the commission was to produce a MFS that FW could use 
as a quality indicator for their service. The aim of the evaluation was to assess the 
acceptability and feasibility of the MFS from the perspectives of FW stakeholders 
in a three-month implementation pilot.   
 
METHOD: A MFS consisting of a portfolio of bespoke measures was produced for 
FW. A three-month pilot study was conducted in which the MFS was trialled in the 
service. Caseworker fidelity to the new system was measured quantitatively (as 
percentage adherence to the MFS during the pilot), and caseworker experience 
was assessed qualitatively through thematic analysis of a focus group discussion.   
 
RESULTS: Although the overall completion rate of reviews and MFS forms was 
lower than expected, of the reviews that were completed, caseworkers showed 
high fidelity to the MFS (i.e. correct use of MFS at the appropriate review point). 
Qualitative data showed good face validity, feasibility and utility of the majority of 
the measures. Contextual issues were highlighted as the biggest barriers to 
successful integration of the new system. 
 
CONCLUSIONS: This project acts as a case example regarding the feasibility of 
implementing a MFS into a small TSO. Implications for the consultancy role played 





1.1. What are measurement feedback systems (MFSs)? 
Measurement feedback systems (MFSs) are systems that are developed and 
implemented into organisations for the purpose of systematically measuring the 
quality of service delivery. MFSs typically consist of standardized measures that 
provide objective data on service delivery. The regular provision of service data via 
MFSs can provide ‘feedback’ for the service about whether they are actually 
delivering the service they set out to deliver. For example, if the information 
gathered via the MFS suggests a discrepancy between the service aims and actual 
service user experience and/or outcomes, this information may prompt discussion 
and action on ways to improve the service. Additional intended benefits of MFSs 
include the provision of empirical evidence to illustrate service effectiveness to 
external audiences (e.g. commissioners), a means by which fidelity to the service 
delivery is measured and thereby ensured, as well as the provision of professional 
development opportunities through evaluation research (Bickman, 2008). 
 
1.2. How are MFSs supposed to work? 
There has been some theoretical research into the mechanisms of how MFSs might 
function best within a service. The Feedback Intervention Theory (FIT; Kluger & 
DeNisi, 1996)  suggests that MFSs work by providing new information that 
redirects recipients’ attention towards the details of a task. Evidence consistent 
with this theory can be seen in health care research whereby frequent, 
individualised and non-punitive feedback has been shown to be effective in helping 
primary care providers to adhere to clinical practice guidelines (Hysong, Best, & 
Pugh, 2006). Indeed, a meta-analysis that applied FIT to health care research 
suggested that providing frequent ‘correct solution’ feedback (i.e. information that 
helps the feedback recipient see what must change in order to improve 
performance), and providing feedback in written rather than verbal or graphical 
form had the greatest effect on outcomes (Hysong, 2009). 
 
1.3. What is the evidence that MFSs do what they are supposed to do? 
MFSs that use valid, reliable and standardized measures have been found to be of 
substantial benefit in both adult and youth mental health practice settings 
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(Bickman, 2008; Davies, Burlingame, Johnson, Gleave, & Barlow, 2008; Kazdin, 
2008; Slade, Lambert, Harmon, Smart, & Bailey, 2008). A meta-analysis 
summarised the evidence on the effectiveness of feedback of service outcomes in 
mental health services, and based on the results of twelve controlled trials, the 
authors concluded that feeding back treatment outcomes to practitioners and 
service users results in a positive short-term effect on the mental health of service 
users (Knaup, Koesters, Schoefer, Becker, & Puschner, 2009). In this way, 
providing outcomes continuously and regularly to both clinicians and patients, and 
providing information on treatment progress can have beneficial effects on the 
mental health of the clients using the service.    
 
Similarly, a meta-analytic review of a particular MFS that provided clinicians with 
information about patients predicted to have a negative treatment response, found 
the system to be effective in enhancing treatment outcome and in preventing 
treatment failure. The MFS provided patient progress information to clinicians, 
which meant clinicians were able to intervene before treatment failure occurred 
(Shimokawa, Lambert, & Smart, 2010). This meta-analysis provides further 
evidence that MFS can do what they are intended to do when implemented 
appropriately. 
 
1.4. Barriers to MFS implementation 
However, the implementation of MFSs into services remains a frequent challenge. 
Ultimately, the successful implementation of MFSs depends on the commitment of 
the front line service deliverers to amend their working practice according to 
feedback.  
 
Theories in the healthcare literature relating to changing clinician practice suggest 
that the two most important internal clinician factors involved in behaviour 
change are ‘motivation’ and ‘ability’. These factors have been integrated into a 
theory of applied behaviour change called the ‘Contextualized Feedback 
Intervention Theory’ (CFIT; Riemer, Rosof-Williams, & Bickman, 2005) (Figure 1). 
In relation to MFSs, the theory predicts that clinicians will only integrate the MFS 
into their working practice if they are committed to the goal of the MFS, are able to 
recognise when they haven’t accomplished this goal, are motivated to move 
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towards the goal and are ready to accept personal responsibility if they are not 
moving toward the goal. Additional factors that have been shown to influence the 
amount of attention a clinician will pay to feedback and how likely they are to 
accept it include the source, content, sign (positive or negative) and format of the 
feedback (Sapyta, Riemer, & Bickman, 2005). 
 
Similarly, the ‘Theory of Planned Behaviour’ (TPB; Ajzen, 1991) provides a 
framework in which to understand an individual’s likelihood of carrying out a 
target behaviour. The model proposes that the best predictor of behaviour is 
intention, and intention is influenced by three main factors: an individual’s attitude 
toward the behaviour, their subjective norms, and their perceived behavioural 
control (Figure 2). When applied to the individual adoption of new behaviours, the 
TPB model predicts that altering the three mediators of behaviour intention will 
lead to a change in individual behaviour (Perkins et al., 2007). In this way, applying 
the TPB to the uptake of MFSs, it is important to consider the staff member’s views 
on the expected value of implementing the MFS, their relevant social norms (such 
as the expectations of their team, as well as sources of intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation to evaluate their service) and how much the staff member feels able to 
carry out this behaviour. 
 
The reasons that clinicians and managers give for not using MFS in their services 
(Bickman, 2008; Hatfield & Ogles, 2004; Johnston & Gowers, 2005; Meehan, 
McCombes, Hatzipetrou, & Catchpoole, 2006) can be grouped according to 
particular components of these psychological models. For example, reasons of 
“ambivalence”, “low clinical utility”, “low scientific merit” and “differences in 
values” seem to reflect behavioural beliefs and attitudes towards the behaviour 
(TPB), as well as indicting a potential lack of commitment to providing 
effective/evidence-based services (CFIT). “Competing work demands”,  “lack of 
support from senior staff”, “amount of paperwork”,  “large time burden”, and 
“insufficient resources” may reflect both subjective social norms and perceived 
behavioural control (TPB), as well as indicting that personal responsibility for 
behaviour change is not being taken (CFIT). To some extent these factors can be 
construed as general barriers to service improvement, although the more specific 
MFS barriers may be include “lack of direct, tangible benefits from 
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implementation”, as the benefits of using MFSs are typically seen in the longer 
term, at an organizational or service user level, rather than an individual service 
provider/clinician level (Bickman, 2008; Riemer et al., 2005). Professional 
complacency may also help to explain some of this resistance. Based on anecdotal 
feedback from clinicians, Bickman (2008) suggested that a higher sense of efficacy 
in one’s professional role results in lower motivation to adopt anything new into 
one’s practice. However, professionals should be wary of such complacency, as 
there is little empirical support that experienced clinicians produce better 
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Figure 2. Theory of Planned Behaviour model (Ajzen, 1991) 
 
 
1.5. MFS implementation in third sector organisations (TSOs) 
Many third sector organisations (TSOs) are mindful of the need to evidence their 
service effectiveness for the purposes of raising funding or attracting volunteers 
(Kendall & Knapp, 2000).  However, due to the development of more intensive 
performance regimes in the public sector and shifts towards outcomes-based 
commissioning (Dacombe, 2011; Ellis & Gregory, 2008; Wimbush, 2011), TSOs 
have needed to increase their efforts in evaluating and measuring the impact of 
their services in recent years (Ellis et al, 2008; Ógáin, Lumley, & Pritchard, 2012). 
 
The present study is concerned with the implementation of a MFS in a third sector 
youth mentoring service. Conceptually, youth mentoring programmes pose some 
specific challenges for assessment because they operate at two levels: that of the 
dyadic relationship and that of the program (Deutsch & Spencer, 2009). To date, 
emphasis has been placed on evaluating the effectiveness of mentoring 
















RCT in the United States assessed youth functioning outcomes of a mentoring 
programme and found that youth with a mentor were less likely to start using 
drugs or alcohol, less likely to hit someone, had improved school attendance and 
performance, improved attitudes towards completing school work and improved 
peer and family relationships (Tierney, Grossman, & Resch, 1995). Similarly, a 
meta-analysis of more than 55 studies found a small but significant positive effect 
for mentees in the areas of enhanced psychological, social, academic and 
job/employment functioning as well as reductions in problem behaviours (DuBois, 
Holloway, Valentine, & Cooper, 2002).  
 
Although such empirical testing has provided important information about the 
potential impact of mentoring on psychological and academic outcomes, less is 
known about the mentoring process and how the organisational structure can 
facilitate successful youth outcomes (DuBois & Karcher, 2005; Rhodes & DuBois, 
2008). Deutsch & Spencer (2009) suggest that in order to fully understand what 
contributes to quality mentoring, the characteristics and experiences of individual 
mentors and mentees, the nature and quality of the dyadic relationships they form 
and the programs in which they are embedded must be examined. These outcomes 
were of interest for the youth mentoring service involved in the current study. 
 
1.6. Consultancy role of clinical psychologists in implementing MFS in TSOs 
Partnership working between the National Health Service (NHS) and TSOs has 
been encouraged in the UK for many years, and in mental health care there have 
been some good examples of such collaborations (Sugarman, 2007; Tait & Shah, 
2007). Clinical psychologists working within the NHS are expected as a profession 
to display ‘leadership behaviours’, in order to ensure quality services for patients 
(Department of Health, 2004). It is thought by the British Psychological Society 
(BPS) that ‘the core psychological competencies and relationship expertise (of 
clinical psychologists) in engagement and collaboration serve as valuable tools for 
effective leadership’ (BPS, 2010). In their ‘Clinical Leadership Competency 
Framework’ the BPS detail five key domains of leadership relevant to clinical 
psychologists. These are: 1) demonstration of personal qualities; 2) working with 
others; 3) managing services; 4) improving services; and 5) setting direction. Given 
that clinical psychologists, who by nature of their profession are trained to develop 
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and operationalise service outcome evaluations, and are knowledgeable in theories 
of behaviour change, it is no coincidence that the profession are more and more 
frequently being asked to provide consultancy services to TSOs in order to help 
them with their service development and MFS implementation. However, to date 
there have been few published case examples of this type of partnership work, and 
those that do exist, do so only in poster presentation form (Lane & Koehler, 2013; 
Wright & Gupta, 2010). The following study is one such case example of how 
collaborative working between NHS clinical psychologists and a youth mentoring 
TSO resulted in the development, implementation and establishment of a new MFS. 
 
1.7.  Study rationale 
In June 2012, the youth mentoring charity ‘Friendship Works’ (FW) approached 
the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS) Research Unit of King’s 
College London (KCL) for help in developing a MFS that would enhance their 
routine evaluation and monitoring of their service. They were interested in 
developing measures that would help capture key service information for use in 
service development and approaching service commissioners. The CAMHS 
Research Unit was sought out as a collaborative partner due to their commitment 
to provide and sustain evidence-based practices in services for children, 
adolescents and their families. A clinical psychologist from the CAMHS research 
team and a clinical psychologist in training took the lead in the consultancy work.  
 
1.8.  Study aims and objectives 
This report describes the development, implementation and evaluation of a MFS 
for FW.   
 
The overall aims of the MFS commission were to: 
• Produce a MFS for FW to use in quality monitoring and assessment of 
stakeholder experience. 
• Develop a practical guide and a training workshop for caseworkers to 
support their adoption and sustained use of the MFS. 
 
The specific aim of the MFS evaluation was to: 
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• Assess the acceptability and feasibility of the MFS from the perspectives of 
the FW caseworkers in a three-month implementation pilot. 
 
The objectives of the MFS evaluation were: 
• To collect quantitative evidence on the caseworkers’ fidelity to the MFS in 
the three-month pilot window. 
• To collect qualitative feedback from caseworkers about their experience of 
using the MFS via a staff focus group. 




2.1. Service context 
‘Friendship Works’ (FW), is a youth mentoring charity that provides adult mentors 
to children and young people who are having problems growing up in their home 
and in their social environment. Having been established since 1977, FW is the 
oldest mentoring charity in England.  The team currently provides volunteer 
mentors to over 150 children aged 5-16 across three London boroughs of Camden, 
Islington and Southwark. FW views mentoring support as a way in which children 
can access vital opportunities and build friendships in order to ‘get more out of 
childhood, explore what life has to offer and lead a fulfilling adult life’ 
(http://www.friendshipworks.org.uk/aboutus/what-we-do).  
Their organisational structure can be found in the Appendix (Section 9.1).  
 
2.2. Participants 
The Chief Executive and Head of Mentoring Services at FW were the staff members 
involved in the development and conception of the project. Caseworkers were the 
staff members who took part in the implementation phase (n = 8). Their role in the 
service included taking referrals, recruiting and training volunteers, assessing 
children and families, matching children to their volunteer mentors and acting as 
overall supervisors of the mentor-mentee relationship. As well as initial match 
meetings, caseworkers were in charge of conducting formal (at 6 months, 12 
months, and yearly time points after the initial match meeting) and informal (3 
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months, 9 months and 18 months) review meetings with mentors, young people 
and their parents3. All parties were involved in the evaluation phase. 
 
2.3.  Evaluation standards 
FW have Approved Provider Standard (APS) accreditation from the Mentoring and 
Befriending Foundation. APS is ‘the national quality standard specifically designed 
for mentoring and befriending projects’.  It consists of 12 elements which focus on 
the key management and operational areas that underpin the effectiveness of any 
mentoring or befriending project (http://www.mandbf.org/quality-standard). In 
order to achieve APS, projects are required to demonstrate that they meet the 
requirements of each element every 3 years. Element 11 of the APS stipulates that 
projects must demonstrate that ‘the progress of relationships is regularly and 
routinely monitored to determine whether they are functioning successfully.’ 
Similarly Element 12 mandates that ‘the overall effectiveness of the mentoring or 
befriending project is evaluated to improve its service and outcomes.’  Although 
never formally discussed, in creating a MFS for FW, we were implicitly assisting 
FW in their adherence to these two regulatory standards. 
 
2.4.  Design 
The study was conducted in three distinct phases: development, implementation 
and evaluation of the MFS.  
 
2.4.1.  Developmental phase  
The initial phase consisted of formative work to develop a suitable MFS that would 
derive meaningful data in order to better understand and improve service quality.  
This work drew on relevant theory and stakeholder perspectives.  
 
2.4.2.  Implementation phase  
The implementation phase consisted of a three-month pilot in which the 
caseworkers integrated the newly developed MFS into their workload. A three-
                                                     
3
 “Initial match meetings” are meetings where potential mentors are introduced to the child and their 
parents. “Formal review meetings” are face-to-face reviews of the matches carried out by the caseworker 
separately with the parent, child and volunteer. “Informal reviews” are check-in meetings, and can be 
either face-to-face or on the phone. For more details see http://www.friendshipworks.org.uk/refer-a-
child/referral-process/  
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month pilot window was chosen as it was expected that during this period 
caseworkers would have sufficient contact with children and parents in review 
meetings in order to pilot the new MFS. 
 
2.4.3. Evaluation phase  
The evaluation phase consisted of an investigation into caseworker fidelity to the 
MFS during the implementation phase. The evaluation phase employed a mixed 
methods design, incorporating a prospective audit of case records with a post-
implementation caseworker focus group. 
 
2.5.  Measures 
Data was gathered on: (1) the number of formal and informal child and parent 
review meetings due within the pilot window; (2) the number of actual 
reviews/initial match meetings completed; and (3) the number of reviews/match 
meetings completed using the MFS. Caseworker fidelity to the MFS was measured 
quantitatively, as percentage adherence to the MFS during the three-month pilot 
(i.e. the number of reviews that correctly used the MFS out of the reviews 
completed). Caseworker experience of using the MFS was assessed qualitatively 
through thematic analysis of a focus group discussion. 
 
2.6.  Procedures 
2.6.1.  Developmental phase procedure 
An initial consultancy meeting took place between the Chief Executive of FW and a 
clinical psychologist in CAMHS Research Unit in order to specify FW’s strategic 
vision for enhancing their evaluation methodology. FW stated that they tended to 
rely on informal feedback from parents, mentors and children for feedback about 
their service, and lacked a more formal feedback system. FW’s priority was 
therefore to work with KCL to develop a systematic MFS which could be used to 
enhance the quality of the service and inform potential funders about their service 
outcomes.  FW were particularly interested in the impacts of the mentoring 
programme for children, and the extent to which the mentoring programme is seen 
as acceptable, relevant, and useful by children, their parents and mentors. 
Operationalizing this, KCL’s task became the identification of relevant child, parent 
and mentor reported measures for use in quality monitoring (e.g. measures of 
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personalised goal attainment, relationship quality and psychological functioning) 
and assessment of stakeholder experience (e.g. measures of satisfaction with the 
mentoring programme).  
 
A narrative literature review was conducted to identify measures used in 
evaluations of other mentoring programmes and related interventions in youth 
services. One key document that was used as a reference was the CYP-IAPT guide 
on using outcome tools to inform clinical practice in Child and Adolescent Mental 
Health services (Law, 2012). A preliminary set of candidate measures was 
produced as a result of the literature search, and their relevance discussed with a 
senior caseworker. In light of these discussions, established measures were 
tailored to meet the needs of FWs evaluation goals, and bespoke outcome 
measures were produced (Table 3; Appendix, Sections 9.2-9.5).  
 
Having produced MFS measures that were acceptable at a managerial level, the 
next step was to test the measures’ acceptability and feasibility as perceived by the 
caseworkers. An early piloting stage ensued, where the caseworkers were given a 
week to purposely test out the measures with young people and parents on their 
caseload. KCL and FW met together after this week to discuss caseworkers initial 
reactions to the MFS. It transpired that initial responses from stakeholders were 
very positive, and only small wording changes were made to the forms as a result 
of their feedback. 
 
KCL produced written guidance notes for the caseworkers, detailing the principles 
behind the MFS as well as providing practical administrative information 
(Appendix, Section 9.6).  The guidance notes were accompanied by a training 
workshop hosted by KCL at FW premises. It was intended that a training workshop 
would not only ensure a standardised administration procedure, but would also 
provide the caseworkers with a chance to familiarise themselves with the 
materials before they used them with their cases, as well as a chance to problem 





2.6.2.  Implementation phase procedure 
KCL advised FW that in order to assess whether the MFS was to be both beneficial 
and sustainable in the long-term, the system would need to be trialled by fully 
integrating it into current practice for a number of months. The inclusion of a 
formal pilot study would also help FW to discern whether the measures were 
capturing the information they had initially set out to capture, as well as 
addressing any practical issues about administration, data storage and 
interpretation. It was decided that a 3-month pilot window would be a sufficient 
length of time in order to capture this information. 
 
The 3-month pilot window ran from 1st February 2013 – 31st April 2013 inclusive. 
It was suggested in discussion with the lead caseworker that the natural 
opportunity for children and parent data to be collected would be the informal (3 
months, 9 months, 18 months) and formal review meetings (6 months, 12 months, 
24 months). The timings of these formal and informal review meetings were 
established independently of the MFS development work. However, as introducing 
the goal review measure at these review meetings would possibly interfere with 
matches that were already in progress, it was decided that these forms should 
initially be used only in new match meetings between the child and their mentor, 
and then revisited at their formal and informal review meetings thereafter.  
 
2.6.3.  Evaluation phase procedure 
The evaluation phase was concerned with assessing caseworker adherence to the 
MFS system (fidelity) and their experience of integrating the MFS into their 
working practice. It was thought that this information would help FW to get a 
sense as to whether implementing the MFS would be effective at both an individual 
(child, parent) and team (caseworker) level. Caseworker opinions about the 
process of the implementation were garnered through a post-pilot focus group. 
The post-pilot focus group took place at FW headquarters. The Chief Executive, the 
Head of Mentoring and six caseworkers partook in the group discussion. The 
discussion lasted approximately an hour and was chaired by the researcher. 
Although the focus group was not audio recorded, verbatim notes were taken 
during the group discussion. The notes were transcribed and thematically 
 147 
analysed. It was thought that this information would be useful for FW in their 
decision-making about their use of the MFS going forward. 
 
2.7. Summary figures 
Table 1 provides a detailed study timeline. Figure 3 summarises the inputs and 
outputs at each stage of the intervention. Table 2 provides a summary of the 
measures included in the final MFS, and Table 3 summarises their administration 
schedule. 
 
Table 1. Study timeline 
Phase Dates What was done? What was the purpose? 
1 June  – 
October 
2012 
Consultancy meeting between KCL and 
FW 
Candidate child and parent measures 
identified and produced:  
• Child Progress Scale (CHiPS) 
A 9-item measure of self-reported 
youth functioning (emotional well-
being, family functioning, school 
functioning, peer relationships and 
overall functioning) and quality of the 
mentoring relationship (feeling listened 
to/understood, child focused, 
involvement in fun/interesting 
activities and overall relationship). To 
be used at all formal and informal 
review meetings.  
• Parental Impacts’ and 
Experiences Scale (PIES) 
A 22-item measure to assess parent-
reported impacts of mentoring on 
youth functioning, parental satisfaction 
with mentor and parental satisfaction 
with service. To be used at formal 
review meetings only. 
• ‘Having a Say’ (HAS) 
3 visual analogue scales to assist in 
setting, prioritising and monitoring 
progress towards valued goals/aims of 
match. To be used at all match 
meetings, and all formal and informal 
review meetings thereafter. 
 
To produce progress 
monitoring measures and 
stakeholder experience 
measures that are relevant to 
the objectives, methods and 
intended outcomes of FW. In 
particular, measures were 
intended to help with: 
a) developing an 
understanding of a child's 
needs and preferences that 
can 
assist in matching  
 
b) enhance involvement of 
children in shaping 
mentoring activities to 
better reflect their own 
concerns/priorities 
 
c) identification and 
reinforcement of progress 
towards goals and other 
positive changes 
 
d) identification and 
resolution of difficulties in 
the mentoring 
relationship/other 
unsatisfactory aspects of the 
placement 
 
e) deriving reliable and 
meaningful evidence on 
service quality that can 
be used to support service-




• Mentoring Review Summary 
(MentORS). 
3 free text sections summarising 
distinct perspectives of youth, parent 
and mentor about what is going well 
and what could be better; informed by 
interviews and scores from previous/ 
recent HAS, ChiPS and PIES. Final 
section includes an action plan that is 
agreed between key informants. To be 





Early piloting of measures by 
caseworkers with parents and children 
on their caseload.  
Measures subsequently refined. 
To test out initial feasibility 
and acceptability of measures 
for caseworkers 
To optimise the ease of use, 
perceived benefits and 
relevance of the measures 
1 January 
2013 
Production of written guide with 
information for caseworkers about 
principles and practice of collecting 
data on the new measures 
Delivery of training workshop to 
caseworkers about the collection, 
recording, interpretation and 
purposeful use of data  
To provide a practical 
reference that specifies the 
schedules and other 
procedures for data collection 
and feedback mechanisms. 
 
To support the services’ 
adoption and sustained use of 
evaluation measures and to 
troubleshoot any foreseeable 
implementation problems. 
 
2 February – 
April 2013 
3-month pilot phase: Caseworkers 
adopted the MFS into monthly review 
meetings.  
To collect evidence on the 
feasibility and acceptability of 
the MFS among caseworkers. 
3 May 2013 Analysis of pilot data and focus group 
with caseworkers. 
To understand caseworker 
experiences of using new 
evaluation system and to 
discuss pilot data. 
3 June – 
October 
2013 
Synthesis of pilot data 
Preliminary feedback meeting with FW. 
To collate information from 
pilot study and focus group. 
To share findings with the 
service and begin to 
formulate recommendations 
3 November 
2013 –  
January 
2014 
Production of final report and 
recommendations. 
To produce an executive 
summary of the project and 
recommendations for the 
implementation of any new 










































Development of bespoke candiate measures for the MFS
Written guide explaining MFS administration






















Preliminary feedback meeting with FW











Table 2. MFS summary  
 
 
Table 3. MFS administration schedule  
 
 
Measure Summary of content 
Child Progress Scale 
(ChiPS)  
 
Measures child progress by assessing youth functioning and 
mentoring relationship quality. Five life domains are 
addressed in the ‘personal functioning’ section of the form 
(emotional well-being, family functioning, school 
functioning, peer relationships and overall functioning), and 
four domains in the mentoring relationship section (feeling 
listened to/understood, child focused, involvement in 
fun/interesting activities and overall relationship). The child 
is required to mark the number on the scale that best 
represents their circumstance at the time of administration. 
Parents’ Impacts and 
Experience Scale (PIES)  
 
Measures stakeholder experience by assessing parent-
reported impacts of mentoring on youth functioning, 
parental satisfaction with mentor and parental satisfaction 
with service. The parent is required to circle options that 
best represent their views at the time of administration, as 
well as providing Y/N and free text answers to particular 
questions. 
Having a Say (HAS)  
 
Measures mentor-mentee match efficacy by setting, 
prioritising and monitoring goals/aims of mentor-mentee 
match. The child is required to identify up to three 
important goals/aims they want to achieve within the 
context of the mentoring relationship and to revisit their 
progress towards these goals at each administration point. 
Mentoring Review 
Summary (MentoRS)  
 
Synthesises feedback from different sources. Its purpose is 
to develop a shared understanding and action plan that 
builds on strengths and addresses difficulties in the mentor-
mentee matches. 
Tool To be 
completed by 
To be completed at 
ChiPS Child • Match meeting (ChiPS ‘personal functioning’ form 
only) 
• 3-, 9-, 18-month informal reviews 
• 6-, 12-month and yearly formal reviews 
PIES Parent • 6-, 12-month and yearly formal reviews 
HAS Child • Match meeting 
•  3-, 9-, 18-month informal reviews 
•  6-, 12-month and yearly formal reviews. 






3.1.  Caseworker fidelity to the CHiPS 
 
Figure 4. Caseworker fidelity to the child reviews and use of CHiPS (1st February – 
30th April 2013) 
 
Figure 4 summarises how well caseworkers managed to adhere to their child 
review timetable, as well as their fidelity to the CHiPS at these meetings.  
 
3.2.  CHiPS data summary 
Overall, caseworkers displayed 98% fidelity to the use of CHiPS form. Fidelity for 
each monthly review is summarised below: 
 
Of the 16 3-month informal child reviews due, 8 reviews were completed (50%). 
Of these 8 completed reviews, 7 reviews used the full CHiPS form (87.5%). One 
review used only Part B of the CHiPS form. The reasons for this are unknown. Of 
the 13 6-month formal child reviews due, 7 reviews were completed (54%). All 7 
completed reviews used the full CHIPS form (100%). Of the 10 9-month informal 















































child reviews due, 7 reviews were completed (43.8%). All 7 completed reviews 
used the full CHIPS form (100%). Of the 9 18-month informal child reviews due, 0 
reviews were completed (0%).  Of the 9 24-month formal child reviews due, 4 
reviews were completed (44.4%). All 4 completed reviews used the full CHIPS 
form (100%). 
 
3.3.  Caseworker fidelity to the PIES 
 
Figure 5. Caseworker fidelity to the parent reviews and use of PIES (1st February – 
30th April 2013)  
 
Figure 5 summarises how well caseworkers managed to adhere to their parent 
review timetable, as well as their fidelity to the PIES at these meetings. 
 
3.4. PIES data summary 
Overall, caseworkers displayed 100% fidelity to the use of PIES form. Fidelity for 
each monthly review is summarised below: 
 
Of the 13 6-month formal parent reviews due, 3 reviews were completed (23.1%). 
All 3 completed reviews used the PIES form (100%). Of the 16 12-month formal 





































used the PIES form (100%).  Of the 9 24-month formal parent reviews due, 0 
reviews were completed (0%).  
3.5.  HAS data summary 
No HAS data was available, as no initial match meetings took place within the pilot 
window. 
 
3.6.  MentORS summary 
No MentORS data was available, as there was not enough data available to 
complete this in the pilot window. 
 
3.7. Focus group thematic summary 
The following categories of discussion topics emerged from the thematic analysis 
of the focus group data: face validity, feasibility, utility, and contextual issues 
surrounding the MFS administration. A summary of the thematic analysis is 
provided below. Direct caseworker quotes are presented in italics.  
 
3.7.1.  Face validity 
The “face validity” theme applied to comments about whether the forms measured 
what they had been designed to measure. Caseworkers were unanimous in the 
view that both the ChiPS and PIES held strong face validity. No caseworker made 
any comment about the irrelevance of certain items or questions on the forms, 
despite explicit questioning.  
 
3.7.1.1 Provision of service feedback 
Caseworkers commented that the PIES was particularly useful in gathering parent 
feedback about the service. The caseworkers were struck by the amount of 
positive feedback FW received as a result of using the PIES which they felt they 
‘might not have otherwise received’. They felt that the addition of a formal feedback 
structure provided parents with an opportunity ‘to feedback to the service in a way 
that they may not have felt comfortable doing over the phone or face-to-face.’ 
 
3.7.1.2. Provision of caseworker feedback 
Some caseworkers found using the ChiPS form personally validating, as it 





The “feasibility” theme applied to comments about how easy the forms were to 
understand and use. Overall caseworkers felt that the ChiPS and PIES were easy to 
understand from their point of view, but that may some parents and children may 
need some guidance in completing the forms. The HAS form was seen as infeasible. 
 
3.7.2.1. Caseworker comprehension 
The caseworkers had no problems with either the administration or the content of 
the ChiPS and PIES forms. However, they viewed the HAS form as ‘difficult’ to use 
because it was ‘too wordy’.  
 
3.7.2.2. Recipient comprehension 
Caseworkers observed that some children tended only to circle extreme values (0 
or 10) of the ChiPS, which made them question whether the child had fully grasped 
the nuances of the rating scale and whether their answers were reliable.  
 
With the PIES, caseworkers observed that some parents found it difficult to give 
the form their full attention, and hypothesised whether the length of the 
questionnaire was a problem. Another caseworker observed that parents with 
intellectual difficulties and/or parents whose first language was not English found 
it harder to understand some of the questions. 
 
Although no caseworker used the HAS form in the pilot window, caseworkers 
worried that the wording might be ‘too overwhelming for children’ and thought that 
children might ‘struggle to come up with ideas for goals’, especially in match 
meetings where they have ‘just been introduced to the idea of mentoring’, are 
‘typically overwhelmed with new information’ and therefore ‘don’t need the added 
pressure of having to fill in a form about goals’.    
 
3.7.2.3. Supports needed 
Caseworkers discussed ways in which they could help recipients to better 
comprehend the forms.  Some caseworkers provided verbal guidance to children in 
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order to help them understand the scoring on the ChiPS scales. Caseworkers who 
did this commented that they ‘had much better success when they went through the 
questionnaire together with the child rather than simply handing the questionnaire 
over to them.’  Other caseworkers only provided children with help in interpreting 
particular questions when the child asked directly for help. No firm conclusions 
were drawn with regards to how to support parents with intellectual or English 
language difficulties in filling in the PIES.  
 
3.7.3.  Utility  
The “utility” theme applied to comments about how useful the MFS (and the 
accompanying training tools) were in enhancing the review meetings. Overall, 
caseworkers showed a very positive response regarding the inclusion of the MFS 
into their review meetings.  
 
3.7.3.1. Provision of structure 
The majority of caseworkers felt that having the new forms helped them to 
‘structure their conversations’ and ‘to review progress since last meeting at a glance’. 
One caseworker remarked that ‘the new forms are much nicer and easier to use than 
the ones we had before’. Specifically, the ChiPS was seen as ‘a useful record keeping 
tool’ which provided data that could ‘easily be shared with mentors.’   
 
3.7.3.2. Enabled conversations  
With regards to the ChiPS, some caseworkers observed that children were ‘better 
able to open up and be more thoughtful about their experiences’ and became more 
‘engaged in the conversation’ in comparison to previous review meetings without 
the form. Other caseworkers found that having numerical data from the ChiPS 
helped them to see whether there were particular areas that children were 
struggling with, especially with children who always say “everything is fine”. 
Numerical data provided cues towards problems that caseworkers felt they 
‘wouldn’t have necessarily picked up on previously’, which enabled caseworkers to 
tailor their conversations with children accordingly. 
 
3.7.3.3. Facilitated engagement 
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Caseworkers also found that using the ChiPS form as ‘a task to do with the child 
took the pressure off the child having to talk the whole time’.  One caseworker also 
noticed that ‘children seemed to particularly enjoy being creative and interactive 
with the forms’ as they would draw smiley faces on the form indicating how they 
were feeling in particular domains. With regards to the PIES, one caseworker felt 
that ‘it gave the parents the opportunity to think about things in more depth’, as well 
as helping parents to feel that their ‘views were being listen to and heard more.’ 
 
3.7.3.4. Training tools 
The caseworkers fed back that the pre-pilot training session about how to use the 
MFS ‘had helped them to make sense of the content of the forms’ and that the 
accompanying guidance notes had ‘been useful to look at in the beginning [of the 
implementation phase] for reference’. However, on the whole, caseworkers had not 
tended to look at the guidance notes during the pilot window. The Head of 
Mentoring commented that the printed guidance notes were ‘helpful from a 
managerial point of view as they could be easily given to new staff joining the team.’  
 
3.7.4. Contextual factors 
The contextual theme applied to comments about factors outside of caseworker 
control that contributed to caseworker fidelity to the MFS. Although the forms 
themselves were deemed as useful additions to the review meetings, what was 
more difficult for the caseworkers was finding the time to actually complete the 
informal and formal reviews, rather than the use of the forms per se. This is 
reflected in Figures 4 and 5 which highlight the discrepancy between the number 
of reviews that caseworkers were expected to complete in the three month 
window, and the number that were actually completed. The caseworkers cited 
multiple reasons for this discrepancy.  
 
3.7.4.1. Competing priorities 
Caseworkers unanimously felt that they had ‘too much work to do’, and that in 
terms of priorities, review meetings were typically ‘the bottom of the list’. 
Caseworkers also felt that because there were often problems with completing 
reviews on time, this meant that the following review was also often delayed, 





3.7.4.2. Problems conducting meetings 
Caseworkers also spoke about systematic factors that got in the way of conducting 
meetings, such as parents who would ‘ring up to cancel review meetings last 
minute’, which would leave the caseworker with the subsequent problem of trying 
to find a suitable time to rearrange the meeting amidst their busy schedule. Some 
caseworkers also described having the experience of being ‘stood up’ for meetings. 
Sometimes they would arrive at the relevant household of the child/parent that 
they had planned to meet with, and would find that the desired person was not at 
home.  
 
3.7.4.3. Data storage 
One technical problem that the caseworkers encountered was how to 
electronically store the information generated by the forms. Prior to the start of 
the pilot, FW were in the process of devising an internal IT system that would 
enable caseworkers to electronically input individual data from the forms after 
each review meeting. Such an IT system would provide easy access to the data 
before review meetings (i.e. removing the need for caseworkers to hunt back 
through paper forms for a reminder of what was previously discussed). However, 
as the IT system was relatively new at the start of the pilot, the caseworkers found 
that they had ‘some problems’ in both accessing and navigating their way round the 




4.1.  Summary of main findings 
The present study showcased the development, implementation and evaluation of 
a measurement feedback system for a third sector organisation youth mentoring 
organisation, ‘Friendship Works’. The overall aim of the MFS commission was to 
produce a bespoke portfolio of candidate measures that the service could use for 
quality monitoring. A secondary aim was to develop a practical guide and a 
training workshop for the service in order to support their adoption and sustained 
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use of the MFS. Both of these aims were achieved in collaboration with practitioner 
feedback and in a relatively short period of time. 
 
The aim of the evaluation phase was to assess the acceptability and feasibility of 
the MFS, based on quantitative evidence of its use during a three-month pilot, as 
well as qualitative feedback from a staff focus group. The results of the evaluation 
showed parts of the MFS to be acceptable and feasible from the point of view of the 
caseworkers, with caseworkers demonstrating high fidelity to parts of the MFS in a 
relatively short space of time (i.e. correct use of the MFS at the appropriate review 
point), despite the overall completion rate of reviews and MFS forms in the pilot 
window being lower than expected. Qualitative data from a post-pilot focus group 
showed the majority of measures making up the MFS to have good face validity, 
feasibility and utility, with some suggestions regarding formatting and 
administrative improvements. Contextual issues were highlighted as the biggest 
barriers to successful integration of the new system. Recommendations to FW in 
light of the evaluation are discussed in the following section. 
 
4.2. Findings in context of existing literature 
Looking at these results in the context of the TPB (Ajzen, 1991), the particularly 
high fidelity rates to the MFS may be able to be partially explained by the inclusion 
of procedural elements where caseworkers were specifically asked for their 
views/concerns surrounding the MFS implementation (i.e. during early piloting 
and MFS administration training). The TPB argues that directly addressing the 
cognitions of staff members through individual interventions, can lead to 
improvements in target behaviour (in this instance fidelity to a new MFS during 
routine mentor-mentee review meetings). For example, when caseworkers met 
together during the early piloting phase and raised concerns about whether the 
CHiPS form would compromise their in-session note taking, it was decided that 
two versions of the CHiPS form would be produced – one for the child to complete 
with all the questions on, and one for the caseworkers with the questions removed 
and blank free-text spaces in their place. Giving key stakeholders in the MFS the 
opportunity to raise concerns about its implementation and having the developers 
of the MFS act on these concerns accordingly may have enabled the caseworkers to 
feel respected, involved and listened to in the MFS development process, and 
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therefore more likely to adhere to its implementation. In addition, the consultation 
with caseworkers may also have helped to shift subjective norms about the utility 
and benefits of MFSs. It would be useful in future evaluations of MFS 
implementations to measure relevant cognitions, behaviour intentions and 
subjective norms of the key stakeholders before and after MFS implementation in 
order to investigate the role of these factors in MFS fidelity. 
 
In a recent review of MFSs in child and adolescent clinical practice, the authors 
stated that practical design of MFSs ‘must contain measures that are short, 
psychometrically sound, and are useful in everyday practice’ (Kelley & Bickman, 
2009) in order for them to be most effective at transforming practice. The results 
of our evaluation are consistent with this sentiment. The CHiPs and the PIES forms 
that formed part of the MFS in the present study were based on well-established 
forms (even thought the specific item content was adapted for FW), judged by the 
caseworkers to not be too lengthy and useful in streamlining their casework 
practice. As a result, there was near perfect adherence to these measures in the 
implementation phase. The HAS form however was deemed too lengthy and not 
seen as a useful addition to casework practice, and although there was no fidelity 
data available for it, these opinions informed our recommendations to the service 
to drop it from future MFSs. 
 
4.3.  Limitations 
A number of methodological limitations should be considered when interpreting 
the evaluation findings. Firstly, FW is a relatively small TSO, and therefore the 
number of caseworkers implementing the MFS was also small. It seems likely that 
high fidelity rates were partly attributable to the small number of workers trialling 
the MFS, and caution should be taken before extrapolating these findings to the 
feasibility of implementing MFSs into larger, more corporate TSOs. Secondly, key 
staffing changes at various points during the implementation meant that at times 
there was a lack of clarity from within the organisation as to the service’s longer-
term strategy for implementing the MFS. Thirdly, another limitation of the study 
was the relatively short audit window. Lengthening the pilot study to six months 
may have allowed greater caseworker review activity to be captured, and possibly 
provided an opportunity for the HAS and MentORS forms to be used. The 
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possibility of a pilot extension was raised at the post-pilot focus group, but staffing 
changes at that point in time meant that this was not possible. Fourthly, a further 
methodological limitation of the study was the absence of consultation with 
service users and mentors. Although feedback on the feasibility, validity and utility 
of the forms was gathered from parents and children indirectly, direct interviews 
with parents, children or indeed volunteer mentors about their views of the MFS 
were not conducted. Again, this was something that was considered during the 
development phase, but as it became apparent that even the task of arranging 
review meetings with parents and children was proving problematic, this was not 
pursued. However, the indirect feedback from these stakeholders via the 
caseworkers was positive, and in line with caseworker views.  
 
5. DISSEMINATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1.  Dissemination 
The results of the implementation and evaluation phase were presented verbally 
to FW in a briefing meeting, which incorporated a question and answer session to 
discuss the findings. A summary report was then written and sent with 
recommendations to the Chief Executive of FW for dissemination in an annual 
meeting with the board of trustees (Appendix, Section 9.7).  
 
5.2.  Recommendations 
Given that the implementation of a MFS into FW (a service without any prior 
means of formal evaluation) was deemed both a feasible and a welcome task, it 
was recommended to FW that they maintain their commitment to using MFSs in 
their service evaluation process. Both direct feedback from caseworkers and 
indirect feedback from service users suggested that continued use of a MFS would 
be a useful and feasible adaptation to the service. However, given the limitations of 
the pilot as already discussed, it was also suggested that FW may wish to review 
the content of the piloted MFS in view of emerging strategic priorities and further 
development of underlying programme theory.  
 




1. FW to consider revising the frequency of formal and informal reviews as 
caseworkers are clearly struggling to adhere to the current review schedules.  
 
2. Further consideration should be given as to how best to store the information 
collected from the MFS. The IT department should investigate the accessibility 
of the computer storage system for recording client data, and provide the team 
with training on how to use the system if necessary.  
 
3. The team should also consider how best to share information collected from 
the measures between parties. The electronic storage system may help with 
this, as the information from the forms may be able to be displayed graphically 
and visually for dissemination to other stakeholders.  
 
4. FW should formally and directly investigate the opinions of stakeholders that 
were not assessed in the present pilot study (e.g. parents, children and 
mentors), as these individuals will likely affect the long-term sustainability of 
the MFS. 
 
5.  It may also be particularly useful for FW to consider developing a feedback 
measure specifically designed to capture the opinions and views of the 
volunteer mentor. Knowing more about the mentors as population, such as 
why they volunteer, what makes them more or less likely to continue 
volunteering, what are their support needs, could help FW in their future 
recruitment and support of volunteer mentors. 
 
6. It would be useful to repeat the MFS evaluation in the future once FW have 
established and refined the MFS to take into account more stakeholder 
perspectives and new managerial priorities. This would provide useful 





The present study acts as a case example to illustrate the consultancy role played 
by clinical psychologists working with TSOs – a partnership which is becoming 
increasingly common with the privatisation of the UK health care system. With 
regards to the five key domains as detailed in the BPS Clinical Psychology 
‘Leadership Competency Framework’, I have attempted to fulfil some if not all of 
these competencies during the process of this study. In terms of ‘demonstrating 
personal qualities’ and ‘working with others’ I had to establish a relationship with 
an unfamiliar service (one that I had not previously worked in and had no pre-
existing professional relationship with) by liaising both in person and over 
phone/email with various members of the multi-professional team. I was able to 
effectively engage with multiple stakeholders in FW, and this resulted in the 
successful co-design of a service improvement system for them.  
 
With regards to ‘managing services’ I had to plan and organise meetings that 
would cause least disruption to my clinical and academic responsibilities, whilst 
being sensitive to the limited time constraints of the caseworks. I also had to be 
particularly self aware and act with integrity at times when the study started to 
demand too much of my time.  In terms of ‘improving services’ and ‘setting 
direction’, the overall purpose of the study was to improve the way in which FW 
monitored and recorded their service outcomes which involved critically 
evaluating their current service, encouraging improvement and facilitating service 
transformation. It may be that the high fidelity to the MFS in the pilot phase was 




Despite the potential barriers to MFS implementation within established 
organisations, the present study acts a hopeful example that MFSs can be 
collaboratively designed, implemented, closely adhered to and seen as acceptable 
in a relatively short space of time when psychologists, service managers and 




When thinking about developing a MFS for a service, the short-term costs of 
changing service practice need to be balanced against the potential long-term 
benefits of the service development. Clinical psychologists are increasingly being 
called upon to assist services in this thinking process, as they are able to be 
mindful of the complex mix of organisational- and individual-level factors that 
contribute to the success of MFS implementation, at the same time as providing 
expertise in the evaluation of service innovations. Far from shying away from this 
potentially daunting task, clinical psychologists must step up to these leadership 
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PART A. Impacts of mentoring for your child  
For each question, please circle the option that best expresses your opinion about how mentoring is 
helping your child.  If the question refers to something that was never a problem for your child, then 
please circle the option that says “This was never a problem...”  
 











1 2 3 4 5 6 X 
Not at all A little Somewhat Quite a bit Very much A great deal This was never a problem 








1 2 3 4 5 6 X 
Not at all A little Somewhat Quite a bit Very much A great deal This was never a problem 








1 2 3 4 5 6 X 
Not at all A little Somewhat Quite a bit Very much A great deal This was never a problem 








1 2 3 4 5 6 X 
Not at all A little Somewhat Quite a bit Very much A great deal This was never a problem 









1 2 3 4 5 6 X 
Not at all A little Somewhat Quite a bit Very much A great deal This was never a problem 








1 2 3 4 5 6 X 
Not at all A little Somewhat Quite a bit Very much A great deal This was never a problem 




How much is mentoring helping your child…. 





1 2 3 4 5 6 X 
Not at all A little Somewhat Quite a bit Very much A great deal This was never a problem 




1) ….to develop new skills and interests? 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 X 
Not at all A little Somewhat Quite a bit Very much A great deal This was never a problem 























            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
             
          14) Has your child visited their mentor’s home?              15) If yes to Q14, are you satisfied with this? 
 







1 2 3 4 5 6 




10) How easy is it to talk about your child with the mentor? 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 




11) How easy is it to make or change arrangements with the mentor? 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 




 12) How satisfied are you with the quality of the relationship between your child and the mentor? 
 
17) Have there been any difficulties with your child’s mentor? 








1 2 3 4 5 6 




 13) How satisfied are you with the activities your child has been doing with their mentor? 
 
 
    
   
    






























PART B. Your experience of mentoring 
We would also like to know how you and your child are getting on with the mentor.  
Please circle the option that best expresses your opinion.  
 
PARENTS’ IMPACTS & EXPERIENCE SCALE 
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MANY THANKS FOR TAKING THE TIME TO ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS! 
Your feedback will help us to improve the work that we do with children and families.  
☺ 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 X 





19) How easy is it to let the case worker know about difficulties with your child’s mentor? 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 



















PART C. Your experience of Friendship Works 
Finally, we would like to know your views about the overall service provided by Friendship Works.  Please 
circle the option that best expresses your opinion. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 












1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all A little Somewhat Quite a bit Very much A great deal 
 








PARENTS’ IMPACTS & EXPERIENCE SCALE  
 174 
 175 
MENTORING REVIEW SUMMARY 
Child name:                                              Case worker name: 
Parent name:                                           Mentor name:        
 
  6 month    12 month   2 years   3 years    ____ years 
 
 






Goal 1:    
Goal 2 :     
Goal 3:    
ChiPS Me:               
ChiPS Family:                 
ChiPS School:               
ChiPS Friend:     
ChiPS Overall (life):    
ChiPS Listening:                
ChiPS Important:    
ChiPS 
Fun/interesting: 
   
ChiPS Overall 
(mentor): 
   
    
 







































PIES new skills/int    
PIES self-esteem     
PIES happy    
PIES express feelings             
PIES family                 
PIES other kids               
PIES teachers                   
PIES academic    













ACTION PLAN (what could child, parent, mentor and case worker agree to do differently in the next six months 








Measurement feedback systems are increasingly common in service organisations. 
Their usefulness depends on the extent to which measurements are valid (information 
collected in a meaningful way), reliable (information collected in a consistent way), 
acceptable (information collected in a way that is easy to understand, interpret and 
apply) and feasible (information collected in a practical way).  
These principles have informed the development of a new feedback system for 















This guide includes suggestions for case workers about using the new feedback 
system in routine practice.  It is not intended to be a substitute for professional 
experience and supervision, but as a helpful resource that can be applied flexibly to fit 
the circumstances of different mentoring pairs and families.  Recommendations about 
collecting, combining and responding to feedback have been based on previous 
research and guidance about measurement and quality improvement in children’s 
services (e.g. Michelson & Day, 2012; CO-OP, 2012), as well as input from staff and 
service users of Friendship Works.  
 
Applying service user feedback in youth mentoring: 
A practical guide for Friendship Works 
Background 
What is included in this guide? 
• Monitoring the quality of user experience and outcomes for individual families 
and identifying areas in which mentoring matches can be strengthened 
• Enhancing communication and mutual understanding about needs and 
progress within important dyads (i.e. youth-case worker, youth-mentor, 
parent-mentor, parent-case worker and mentor-case worker) 
• Increasing participation of youth in decision-making about mentoring activities 
• Empowering youth to become more confident and influential in mentoring 
relationships 
 
• Identifying and evaluating targets for service improvement  
• Providing robust evidence about service experience and outcomes that can be 




The feedback system includes (a) three pen-and-paper questionnaires that are 
completed at different times by youth and parents and (b) a Mentoring Review 
Summary form that is completed by case workers to coincide with formal review 
meetings.  The schedule and functions of these feedback tools are outlined in Table 1 
below.  
Please consult with your manager for guidance on other important data collection 
activities, such as registering referrals, undertaking initial assessments for matching, 
and documenting supervision/other contacts with volunteer mentors.   
Table 1. Summary of feedback tools 
Tool Completed by Completed at Description Purpose 
Having A Say 
(HAS) 
Youth Each meeting, i.e. 
match meeting; 3-, 
9-, 18-month 
informal reviews; 6-, 
12-month and then 
yearly reviews. 
 




















Youth Each meeting, i.e. 
match meeting*; 3-, 
9-, 18-month 
informal reviews; 6-, 





9 questions split 
into 2 sections: 
(a) Personal 
Functioning (how 
are things going 
with my life?) and 
(b) Mentoring 
Relationship (how 
are things going 





























Parent Formal review 
meetings only, i.e. 
6-, 12-month and 
then yearly reviews. 
22 questions split 
into 3 sections: 




mentoring and (c) 
experience of 
Friendship Works. 
Includes 16 likert 
scale items 




























Case worker Formal review 
meetings only, i.e. 
6-, 12-month and 






youth, parent and 
mentor about 
what is going well 






HAS, ChiPS and 
PIES. Final 
section includes 
an action plan 










and action plan 








The first task when introducing any measure is to explain its purpose and format.  Extra 
care should be taken when explaining and checking the meanings of questions and 
responses for youth and parents who have literacy difficulties.  This may require that 
you read out part or all of a questionnaire and mark responses together.  
Time should also be set aside for discussing confidentiality.  Permission should be 
sought before sharing feedback from one informant with another, with assurances that 
honest feedback is welcomed and very useful as it allows for specific improvements to 
be made.   
How can feedback measures be administered? 
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It is advisable that completed questionnaires are verified and elaborated using follow-
up interview questions.  This can help to clarify ambiguous or discrepant responses, as 
well as exploring why certain scores might have improved, stayed the same or 
worsened.  Versions of the HAS, ChiPS and PIES without response scales (but with 
questions intact) are available for ease of note taking.  
Some general Do’s and Don’ts of administering questionnaires are listed below  


















Previous research has shown that children and young people value professionals 
taking time to understand their personalised and specific preferences about desired 
outcomes (i.e., goals, aims, wishes).  It is also well established that goal-setting can 
improve outcomes by guiding and directing behaviour, providing clarity about what a 
service user considers important and increasing motivation to achieve. The HAS is 
designed accordingly, so that young people can decide for themselves what they most 
want to get out of mentoring, and then track progress towards these personalised 
objectives. 
Some children and young people will have very clear ideas about what they want to do 
or achieve, whereas others may require more prompting.  In any event, some degree of 
collaboration is usually a good idea to ensure that goals/aims/wishes are reasonably 
focused and achievable, while still keeping to the spirit of what the child/young person 
wants to achieve.  For example, if a teenager wanted to “feel less bored” it might be 
How can the individual measures be used? 
Do: 
• Make sure you have the required questionnaires in advance of a review meeting 
• Explain why you are asking someone to fill out a questionnaire 
• Look at the answers 
• Discuss the answers with respondents 
• Share the information in supervision 
• Always use information from questionnaires in conjunction with other information sources 
• Explore ambiguities and inconsistencies that may exist within and between completed 
questionnaires and other sources of data 




• Give out a questionnaire to someone who doesn’t understand why they are being asked to 
complete it 
• Give out a questionnaire if you don’t understand why you are using it 
• See the data generated from questionnaires as absolute facts 
• Prioritise data obtained from adults over data reported by youth 
 
Having A Say: HAS 
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helpful to break this broad statement down into more focused goals, e.g. “to spend 
more time playing sports with other people, including my mentor.”  By the same token, 
discussion of longer-term ambitions (“to be a vet when I grow up”) can lead to 
identification of shorter-term, measurable objectives (“to visit the Zoo and City Farm” or 
“to learn about different animals with my mentor”).  The boxes on the right of the HAS 
form can be used to operationalise goals/aims/wishes in this way.   
The first iteration of the HAS should be completed at the initial matching meeting in the 
company of the mentor.  This allows the child/young person to influence choices from 
the outset and can help with early relationship building and communication.  By 
reviewing the HAS on a regular basis thereafter, it is possible to monitor whether or not 
a placement is fulfilling a child/young person’s expectations.  Once goals/aims/wishes 
have been accomplished or no longer considered important, new items can be added 
to the HAS.  Regularly checking in and discussing progress/priorities in this way can 
increase a young person’s sense of mastery and influence over mentoring activities.  
 
 
The first part of the ChiPS is designed to assess how a child/young person is 
functioning in everyday life.  The data can be used to extend beyond personalised 
goals/aims/wishes in order to understand more generalised impacts.  It may also be 
possible to pick out certain domains (e.g. functioning at school) that do not appear to 
improve, or even worsen over time.  This can be used to plan new mentoring activities 
that reflect emerging needs.   
 
 
The second part of the ChiPS measures the perceived quality of the mentoring 
relationship.  This allows relationship problems to be identified and addressed 
proactively.  Positive feedback is also useful, as it shows that a placement is on the 
right track and indicates favoured approaches that should be continued.   
 
 
The PIES provides a parental perspective on youth functioning (section 1) and the 
quality of mentoring relationships (section 2).  Additional information is collected about 
the quality of support available from case workers and the experience of using 
Friendship Works more generally (section 3).  The latter can be collected using a 
detachable page and returned anonymously to Friendship Works through the post.  
 
 
There is a large amount of evidence showing that feedback has greatest influence 
when results are shared with service users and translated into specific action plans.  
The Mentoring Review Summary (MentoRS) form is designed to assist with the key 
How can feedback be integrated and used in formal reviews? 
Child Progress Scale-Personal Functioning: ChiPS-PF 
Child Progress Scale-Mentoring Relationship: ChiPS-MR 
Parents’ Impacts and Experience Scale: PIES 
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tasks of summarising feedback from the measures described above, and combining it 
with other data to inform an action plan.   
This may involve the following steps prior to, during and immediately after formal 
review meetings: 
 
Compare current and previous questionnaire responses to establish the trajectory 
of goal attainment, mentoring relationship ratings and personal functioning, as 
reported by youth. Prospective scores can be recorded on the MentoRS and 
plotted on a graph. 
 
Present these findings to the child/young person.  Encourage them to reflect 
upon aspects of the placement that are currently going well and what has/hasn’t 
improved over time.  Useful prompts may include: what difference has your 
mentor made to [ChiPS-PF items]?  What would need to be different in order to 
score [ChiPS-PF/ChiPS-MR items] higher?  Are your original goals still important 
to you? 
 
Summarise this information in the “what’s going well” and “what could be better” 
sections of the MentoRS.  
 
Repeat 1-3 for parent-reported data, paying particular attention to any major 
discrepancies in how the child/young person and parent may be experiencing the 
placement. 
 
Summarise “what’s going well” and “what could be better” from the perspective of 
the mentor.  This can be based on your ongoing contacts/supervisions with the 
mentor, as well as a formal one-to-one progress review. 
 
Distil the main perspectives into a brief written summary that includes details of 
agreed strengths/positives about the placement, areas for improvement and any 
extenuating circumstances.  
 
This summary should be linked to a set of agreed actions on the part of the 
child/young person, parent, mentor and case worker.  Provisional actions may be 
decided during individual meetings (i.e. steps 2, 4 and 5 above) and then 










If possible, a final summary and action plan should be checked for accuracy and 
acceptability and then shared in writing with each of the key informants.  Careful 
judgment will be needed when deciding how to incorporate strongly critical 
feedback and opposing positions.  Although positive feedback is reassuring, 
mentors should be encouraged to see the value of negative feedback that allows 
for specific adjustments to be made in how they relate to their mentees and 
families.   Disagreements should be framed in non-accusatory terms with an 
emphasis on constructive ways forward. 
 
It may be useful for actions to be written in an active voice (known to increase 
likelihood of implementation), as below: 
 
Child: I will help things to go even better with my mentor by…. 
 
Parent: I will help things to go even better in this match by…. 
 
Mentor: I will help things to go even better in this match by…. 
 
Case worker: I will help things to go even better in this match by…. 
 
Implementation and outcomes associated with these actions should be 
scrutinised at the next annual review meeting.  Informal checks on progress and 




More frequent progress monitoring (i.e. every three months during the first year of the 
match) offers the potential to pick up clues about emerging difficulties.  You may find 
that the questionnaires help some children and young people to hint at problems that 
are hard for them to say out-right.  By identifying these issues proactively, it may be 
possible to get things back on track and limit the risk of matches ending prematurely. 
As with all questionnaire data, any notable trends should be carefully examined in the 
context of other available sources and explored directly with the child/young person.  It 
may also be helpful to discuss “off-track” clues in supervision as part of your efforts to 
understand the problems and devise a plan to get things back on track.  Some clues to 
look out for (with possible interpretations and points for clarification) are: 
 




Clues Possible interpretations 
Large drop in 
consecutive scores on 
ChiPS-MR 
Might suggest that the C/YP was let down recently or 
otherwise disappointed by their mentor. Was this a one-
off? Does the mentor realise what has happened? 
Large drop in 
consecutive scores on 
ChiPS-PF 
 
Has there been a sudden life event? Is this something 
that the C/YP can discuss with their mentor? 
General decline in 
ChiPS-MR or flatlining 
some way below max. 
score 
 
Might suggest consistent problems in the relationship, 
i.e. mentor not following the C/YP’s priorities, not 
providing opportunities for fun/interesting activities, not 
showing sufficient interest in the C/YP 
Minimal or slow goal 
attainment 
The C/YP may be finding it hard to achieve their goals. 
Does this reflect a problem in the relationship? Is mentor 
aware and facilitative of goals? Are the goals clearly 
defined, realistic and still relevant? Are any external 
factors hindering goals? 
 
Looking for and responding to such clues can be part of an on going cycle, as shown 
















The feedback system is intended to be used for all new and existing matches from 1/2/13.  
The only exception is that goals/aims/wishes should be formulated with new matches 
only.   
 
An evaluation of the workings of the new system is being undertaken simultaneously by 
a team of psychologists at the Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London.  Decisions 
about longer-term sustainability and adaptations will be made in light of the evaluation 
findings.  In the meantime, you can contact the team with any questions at 
daniel.m.d.michelson@kcl.ac.uk and claudia.hallett@kcl.ac.uk. 
 
 
Children and Young Peoples’ Improving Access to Psychological Therapies Outcomes-
Oriented Practice (CO-OP) Group (2012). A practical guide to using service user 
feedback and outcome tools to inform clinical practice in child and adolescent mental 
health. Available from www.iapt.nhs.uk. 
 
Michelson, D. & Day, C. (2012). Child and Adolescent Service Experience (ChASE): 
Practitioner toolkit. Using client feedback to improve mental health care. London: King’s 














When is the feedback system going to be in use? 
References  
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Friendship Works Service Development Project 
June 2012 – January 2014  
KCL Final Report 
Principal Investigator: Dr Daniel Michelson (Senior Clinical Research Associate) on behalf of 
CAMHS Research Unit, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London 
Project Evaluation Lead: Claudia Hallett (Clinical Psychologist in Training), Institute of 
Psychiatry, King’s College London 
AIMS 
• To specify, pilot and support the sustained implementation of a robust internal 
evaluation strategy for Friendship Works (FW). 
• To test the acceptability and feasibility of the new evaluation strategy from the 
perspectives of caseworkers, parents and young people in a 3-month pilot. 
• To collect evidence on the caseworkers’ uptake of the new evaluation strategy. 
• To provide recommendations for FW in their use of the internal evaluation strategy 
beyond the pilot phase. 
 
METHODS  
Dates What was done? What was the purpose? 
June  – 
October 
2012 
Candidate child and parent measures identified 
and produced: 
• Child Progress Scale (CHiPS) 
A 9-item measure of self-reported youth 
functioning (emotional well-being, family 
functioning, school functioning, peer 
relationships and overall functioning) and 
quality of the mentoring relationship (feeling 
listened to/understood, child focused, 
involvement in fun/interesting activities and 
overall relationship). To be used at all formal 
and informal review meetings. 
• Parental Impacts’ and Experiences 
Scale (PIES) 
A 22-item measure to assess parent-reported 
impacts of mentoring on youth functioning, 
parental satisfaction with mentor and parental 
satisfaction with service. To be used at formal 
review meetings only. 
• ‘Having a Say’ (HAS) 
3 visual analogue scales to assist in setting, 
prioritising and monitoring progress towards 
valued goals/aims of match. To be used at all 
match meetings, and all formal and informal 
review meetings thereafter. 
To produce progress monitoring 
measures and stakeholder 
experience measures that are 
relevant to the objectives, 
methods and intended outcomes 
of FW. In particular, measures 
were intended to help with: 
a) developing an understanding 
of a child's needs and 
preferences that can 
assist in matching  
 
b) enhance involvement of 
children in shaping mentoring 
activities to 
better reflect their own 
concerns/priorities 
 
c) identification and 
reinforcement of progress 
towards goals and other 
positive changes 
 
d) identification and resolution of 
difficulties in the mentoring 
relationship/other unsatisfactory 
aspects of the placement 
 
e) deriving reliable and 
meaningful evidence on service 
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• Mentoring Review Summary 
(MentORS). 
3 free text sections summarising distinct 
perspectives of youth, parent and mentor 
about what is going well and what could be 
better; informed by interviews and scores from 
previous/ recent HAS, ChiPS and PIES. Final 
section includes an action plan that is agreed 
between key informants. To be used at all 
formal review meetings only. 
quality that can 
be used to support service-wide 





Early piloting of measures by caseworkers with 
parents and children on their caseload. 
Measures subsequently refined. 
To test out initial feasibility and 
acceptability of measures for 
caseworkers, children and 
parents 
To optimise the ease of use, 
perceived benefits and relevance 
of the measures 
January 
2013 
Production of written guide with information 
for caseworkers about principles and practice 
of collecting data on the new measures 
Delivery of training workshop to caseworkers 
about the collection, recording, interpretation 
and purposeful use of data 
To provide a practical reference 
that specifies the schedules and 
other procedures for data 
collection and feedback 
mechanisms. 
 
To support the services’ adoption 
and sustained use of evaluation 
measures and to troubleshoot 





3-month pilot phase completed: Caseworkers 
adopted the new evaluation system into 
monthly review meetings. 
To collect evidence on the 
feasibility and acceptability of 
the new evaluation system 
among caseworkers, children and 
parents. 
May 2013 Analysis of pilot data and focus group with 
caseworkers. 
To understand caseworker 
experiences of using new 





Synthesis of pilot data 
Preliminary feedback meeting with FW. 
To collate information from pilot 
study and focus groups. 
To share findings with the service 
and begin to formulate 
recommendations 
November 
2013 –  
January 
2014 
Production of final report and 
recommendations. 
To produce an executive 
summary of the project and 
recommendations for the 
implementation of any new 





Caseworker use of ChiPS and PIES forms  
Figure 1 shows that caseworkers completed about half of the anticipated review meetings with 
children. However, of the reviews that were completed, caseworkers showed very high rates 
of using ChiPS. Caseworkers were even less likely to complete reviews with parents at pre-
specified time points (see Figure 2). But again, caseworkers consistently used the relevant 
form (PIES) when meetings with parents did take place. 
 
Caseworker use of HAS forms 
Unfortunately no HAS data was collected in the pilot window as no initial match meetings took 
place during this period. Therefore caseworker use of the HAS remains unclear. 
 
 
Figure 1. Caseworker fidelity to the CHiPS measure (Feb – April 2013 data)  
 
 

















































































What worked well? 
Feasibility and acceptability 
Overall, caseworkers expressed positive views about the feasibility and acceptability of the 
design and practical application of the measures. One caseworker commented that ‘the new 
forms are much better - nicer and easier to use - than the forms we had before.’ Another 
described the measures as ‘useful record keeping tools that would make sharing information 
between parties easier.’ 
Caseworkers found that using the CHiPS ‘helped children to open up and be more thoughtful 
about their experiences’, and that the PIES provided parents with an opportunity ‘to feed back 
to the service in a way that they may not have felt comfortable doing over the phone or face-
to-face.’ Caseworkers were also struck by the amount of positive feedback FW received as a 
result of using the PIES which they ‘might not have otherwise received.’  
 
What are some areas for improvement? 
Obtaining valid responses 
Caseworkers discussed the need to guide young people and/or parents through the 
completion of the measures in order to reduce the likelihood of inaccurate information. This 
could be further emphasised in future training workshops. 
Data storage  
As part of the project, an electronic data storage system was developed by FW in order for the 
caseworkers to record information from particular measures and have it easily accessible for 
subsequent review meetings. Caseworkers raised some problems with recording and accessing 
the electronic data. 
Opinions of other stakeholders 
Feed back on the measurement system came directly from caseworkers. Although it was 
possible to obtain an indirect account of how children and parents experienced the use of 
measures, more direct discussions with other stakeholders would potentially provide 
additional information of value.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Overall, the findings indicate that the new evaluation strategy has been used faithfully by the 
caseworkers when expected review meetings have taken place. Both direct feedback from 
caseworkers and indirect feedback from service users suggests that continued use of an 
evaluation strategy would be a useful and feasible adaptation to the caseworkers’ workload. 
The benefits of an evaluation strategy from the perspectives of other stakeholders have yet to 
be formally investigated. 
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Based on the above findings, it is recommended that FW maintains its commitment to 
adopting a systematic internal evaluation strategy. FW may wish to review the content of the 
progress monitoring measures and stakeholder experience measures in view of emerging 
strategic priorities and further development of underlying programme theory. 
 
Additional recommendations are suggested below: 
• Consider revising the frequency of current formal and informal reviews as caseworkers 
are currently struggling to complete these on time. 
• Caseworkers to consider how best to share information collected from the measures 
between parties. Revisit the accessibility of the current electronic data storage system 
and the utility of the ‘MentORS’ form in aiding this. 
• Before implementing a new internal evaluation strategy, FW may wish to formally 
investigate the opinions of stakeholders not directly assessed in this study. 
• Consider developing a particular outcome measure to capture the opinions and views 
of the mentor. 
 
January 2014 
 
 
